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To mitigate environmental concerns and fight against climate change, eco-innovation pro-
vides an opportunity to establish France’s leading role to overcome sustainability chal-
lenges. In this thesis, we investigate different aspects of eco-innovation focusing on French
manufacturing firms. Firstly, We examine how collaboration between firms affects the
decision of firms that currently undertake R&D to take the next step and also invest
in increasingly complex environmental or eco-innovation. Our results show that R&D
collaboration is essential in stimulating eco-innovation. Secondly, we examine whether
stringent environmental regulations harm firm competitiveness and further whether regu-
latory induced eco-innovation could offset environmental abatement pressure. Our results
suggest that regulations harm business competitiveness and the intermediate effect of eco-
innovation is not effective. Finally, we investigate whether firms investing in eco-innovation
meet their environmental targets and remain competitive and more specifically, whether
eco-innovation helps firms to improve their environmental performance. Results suggest
that eco-innovation does not exhibit a significant effect on environmental performance for
French manufacturing firms. Overall, this thesis emphasizes the lack of effectiveness of
eco-innovation in France, we hope that this thesis can shed some light on the direction of
further research.
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Introduction
Over the last two decades, the relationship between economic growth and environmen-
tal degradation has received considerable attention from academics and policymakers. In
2010, the European Commission set up a target strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive
economic growth for the European Union (EU) in the Europe 2020 Strategy (Commission,
2010). Along with economic growth, the environmental impacts associated with economic
activities contribute greatly to climate change. To fight against climate change, the Eu-
ropean Commission approved the 2030 climate and energy package in 2014 by which all
EU member states committed to a 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared
to 1990 levels, a 32% share of energy from renewable sources, and a 32.5% increase in
energy efficiency (The European Commission, 2014). Decoupling environmental pressure
from economic growth can be achieved through technological improvements which reduce
environmental pressure (Popp et al., 2010). Technological improvement in improving envi-
ronmental sustainability could also reduce the cost of meeting environmental requirements.
Such technological change is often referred as eco-innovation.
The EU is devoting increasing resources to eco-innovation which is recognised as a key to
1
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improving the EU’s strategic position in the global market. Being the third largest economy
in the EU, France is one of the key participants in the field of environmental protection.
France has a significantly low-carbon energy mix, due to the dominant position of electric-
ity in total energy consumption and the key role of nuclear energy in electricity generation.
According to RTE (2019), 72.3% of total electricity production comes from nuclear power
in 2016. Due to the unique energy structure, France benefit from the lowest CO2 emission
per capita in the EU. However, as a highly industrialized country, France relies heavily on
imported energy sources including natural gas and fuel to satisfy its energy consumption.
Bank (2019) reports that the share of energy imported in total energy consumption in 2015
was approximately 45% and it leads to the fact that although the level of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions has been decreasing, the total carbon footprint caused by the French pop-
ulation is not declining. To achieve the emissions reduction target set by 2030 climate and
energy package, eco-innovation which is known as a crucial driver of successful transition
towards sustainable development seems to provide a feasible tool.
Innovativeness is one of the fundamental instruments of growth strategies to enter new
markets, to increase the existing market share and to provide the company with a competi-
tive advantage. Schumpeter and Backhaus (2003) distinguish different types of innovation:
new products, new methods of production, new sources of supply, the exploitation of new
markets and new ways to organize business. Furthermore, innovation is not only related
to products and processes, but also related to marketing and organization. As the primary
international basis of guidelines for defining and assessing innovation activities as well as
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for compilation and use of related data, OECD (2005) introduces 4 types of innovation:
product innovation, process innovation, marketing innovation and organizational innova-
tion. Product and process innovations are closely related to the concept of technological
developments. A product innovation is the introduction of a good or service that is new or
significantly improved regarding its characteristics or intended uses, including significant
improvements in technical specifications, components and materials, incorporated software,
user friendliness or other functional characteristics (OECD, 2005). Product innovations can
utilize new knowledge or technologies, or can be based on new uses or combinations of ex-
isting knowledge or technologies.
A process innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved production
or delivery method. This includes significant changes in techniques, equipment and/or soft-
ware. Process innovations can be intended to decrease unit costs of production or delivery,
to increase quality, or to produce or deliver new or significantly improved products (OECD,
2005). Furthermore, Fagerberg et al. (2005) highlight that while the introduction of new
products is commonly assumed to have a clear, positive effect on the growth of income and
employment, process innovation, due to its cost-cutting nature, can have a more hazy effect.
The economics literature defines innovation as something new that was created by inno-
vative entities to maximize utility. Endogenous growth theory suggests that innovation
activities are positively associated with economic growth (Romer, 1986; Hasan and Tucci,
2010). As a type of innovation, the definition for eco-innovation is as follows: a new or mod-
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ified process, practice, product, or managerial system that contributes to reduce negative
environmental impacts or to reach environmental sustainability targets (Rennings, 2000;
Mortensen et al., 2005; Horbach et al., 2013). Eco-innovation shows some specific char-
acteristics compared with general innovation (Rennings and Rammer, 2011). Apart from
the benefits brought about by general innovation, eco-innovation brings environmental and
economic benefits as the result of positive spillover effects during the internalization of neg-
ative environmental impacts. Porter and Van der Linde (1995) refer to this as a win-win
situation which allows firms to accomplish their business objectives along with considering
environmental protection. Eco-innovation may be developed with or without a particular
intention of lowering negative environmental impacts. It can be generated during the pro-
cess of achieving typical business objectives such as higher profitability or better product
quality. Many eco-innovation technologies actually combine corporate benefits with social
benefits.
There are several definitions for eco-innovation. One of the widely used definitions il-
lustrates that eco-innovation shows two significant characteristics comparing with general
innovation: “It is innovation that reflects the concept’s explicit emphasis on a reduction of
environmental impact, whether such an effect is intended or not. And, it is not limited to
innovation in products, processes, marketing methods and organizational methods, but also
includes innovation in social and institutional structures” (Machiba, 2009). Meanwhile, in
the EU funded research project, namely “Measuring Eco-Innovation” (MEI) report, Kemp
and Pearson (2007) define eco-innovation as “The production, assimilation or exploitation
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of a product, production process, service or management or business methods that is novel
to the organization (developing or adopting it) and which results, throughout its life cycle,
in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts of resources
used (including energy use) compared to relevant alternatives.” This definition enhances
the previous definition by highlighting two key features: eco-innovation is based on a sub-
jective view of innovation that an innovation as the first introduction of a new product,
process, service or organizational structure into the market (Schumpeter and Backhaus,
2003; Fagerberg, 2004). Also the authors include the adoption of innovations previously
introduced by others. The inclusion of adoption indicates a focus on the diffusion of tech-
nologies. Moreover, the definition of eco-innovation reflects two main consequences of
eco-innovation: fewer adverse environmental impacts and more efficient use of resources.
As discussed above, eco-innovation suffers from double externality effect, regulatory push/pull
effect (Rennings, 1998; Mortensen et al., 2005; Rennings, 2000). The first characteristic
of an eco-innovation is to give rise to a “double externality”, that is to say, a positive en-
vironmental externality, in addition to the classic knowledge spillovers resulting from any
innovation. Externality arises normally as a consequence of market failure. The concept of
double externalities comes with reduced environmental investment incentives and external
benefits (Beise and Rennings, 2005). Once a new innovation is introduced to the market,
imitation from competitors will speed up the diffusion of this new innovation. However,
in the private sector, investment in R&D can be repressed when R&D investment out-
comes spread out to competitors. Furthermore, specific investment in eco-innovation may
Introduction 6
be further inhibited due to the fact that the private returns on R&D in green technology is
less than its social return if prices are not able to adequately reflect negative externalities
(Faber and Frenken, 2009). Thus firms may be reluctant to make further investments to
eco-innovation since firms may not be able to fully appropriate the social returns as private
returns. Externalities triggered by market failure arise due to unregulated use of rights
(Pohl et al., 2015). By improving intellectual property protection, internalization could
be reinforced. However, the trade-off is that with regard to environmental incentives for
eco-innovation, internalization is likely to slow down the diffusion of environmental friendly
technologies in the market. Nevertheless, further internalization requires additional costs
since the implementation normally comes with a time lag.
In this thesis, we investigate different aspects of eco-innovation and try to disentangle some
interesting questions given the current debate on the characteristics of eco-innovation and
the effectiveness of eco-innovation in fighting against climate change. We provide an outline
of this thesis below.
In the first chapter, we study the determinants of eco-innovation for French manufactur-
ing firms. Following the theoretical framework adopted by Kesidou and Demirel (2012)
and Horbach et al. (2012), we separate the determinants of eco-innovation into those that
capture technology push, market pull and regulation pull/push. More specifically, we fur-
ther examine the framework by investigating the relationship between firms that already
invest in the R&D process and the level of engagement in eco-innovation and how this is
Introduction 7
affected by collaboration within and between firms both locally and abroad. Firms need
to handle different technological and economic situations which require different types of
resources of knowledge due to the systemic characteristic of innovation. As Horbach et al.
(2013) suggested, eco-innovation requires more external sources of skills and knowledge in
compared to general innovation. Since the development of eco-innovation requires firms to
combine multiple objectives such as production efficiency and environmental requirements
and to find appropriate mediation among them, this requires firms to evolve from a closed
innovation system to an open innovation mode, leading to a global network of innovation
which is referred to the open innovation paradigm (Chesbrough et al., 2006). Furthermore,
we examine the effect of environmental management systems (EMS) and regulation strin-
gency on eco-innovation.
Chapter 1 contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we investigate whether
the sources of R&D activity affects the level of investment of a firm’s eco-innovation differ-
entiating between cooperative structures. Different from existing studies which identify four
channels of R&D collaboration, including venders, suppliers, competitors and public sec-
tors (De Marchi, 2012; Ghisetti et al., 2015a), we decompose R&D collaboration within and
between firms based on the sources of R&D cooperation, namely domestic private, foreign
private and public sector cooperation. This decomposition allows for a deeper understand-
ing of the effect of the cross-boarder expansion of R&D transactions and the international
innovation networks in stimulating eco-innovation. Second, we consider both command
and control (COC) and market-based environmental policy instruments by examining how
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do strict environmental regulations affect firm incentives to invest in eco-innovation and
whether public funding for innovation more generally increases the level of eco-innovation.
This approach provides a more comprehensive indication on the modification of the optimal
policy mix to promote eco-innovation. Finally, the lack of firm-level data on eco-innovation
restricts a generalized conclusion. The existing literature relies heavily on the Community
Innovation Survey which only provides limited information on the degree of eco-innovation
(De Marchi, 2012; Horbach et al., 2013; Cainelli and Mazzanti, 2013; Ghisetti et al., 2015a).
In Chapter 1, we use a unique firm-level panel which allows for an identification strategy
that is less sensitive to macroeconomic shocks that may be correlated with country or
sector-level eco-innovation and environmental regulations.
Our results show a positive and significant effect of external knowledge sourcing on invest-
ment in eco-innovation and that this is primarily driven by doing R&D collaboration with
foreign firms. The result holds for both pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive
firms, however the magnitude of the effect on pollution-intensive firms is a little lower. We
also find the importance of implementing EMS in stimulating eco-innovation which con-
tinuously improves corporate environmental performance and organizational capabilities.
Furthermore, we find that regulation stringency has a significant and positive effect on
the level of investment in eco-innovation. Meanwhile, given that eco-innovation is affected
by the effect of double externalities, implementation of environmental regulations helps to
foster eco-innovation. Although command and control (COC) instruments are significantly
effective in promoting eco-innovation, the lack of market-based policy instruments limits
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the development of eco-innovation in the French context. Taken these results together,
we illustrate clear indications for optimizing current policy mix in France to promote eco-
innovation.
In the second chapter, we investigate whether more stringent environmental regulations
harm firms competitiveness. More specifically, we examine the direct impact of environ-
mental regulations along with the intermediate effect of induced eco-innovation on firms
economic performance. The conventional opinion on the economic costs of environmental
regulations suggests that stringent environmental regulations impose additional costs which
weaken firm’s competitiveness in the market (Christainsen and Haveman, 1981; Gollop and
Roberts, 1983). In contrast, Porter and Van der Linde (1995) suggest that environmental
standards can trigger innovation in firms and therefore allow them to offset the costs of
complying with these standards. Firm economic performance may be affected through two
channels, first environmental regulations force firms to invest extra capital to meet envi-
ronmental standards, meanwhile regulation induced innovation may offset the additional
costs and even improve business performance.
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature in three ways. First, in addition to productivity
(measured by total factor productivity), we also include profitability (measured by op-
erating margin) as a measurement for firm performance. A number of existing studies
investigate the effect of environmental regulations on productivity without considering the
effect of eco-innovation or only consider general R&D, and the empirical results are mixed
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(Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Alpay et al., 2002; Hamamoto, 2006; Lanoie et al., 2008; Yang
et al., 2012; Greenstone et al., 2012; Franco and Marin, 2017). In particular, we focus
on regulation induced R&D that specifically targets environmental protection to measure
eco-innovation and to illustrate the intermediate effect of eco-innovation. Second, we de-
compose environment abatement expenditures into two types, product abatement costs and
integrated abatement costs. Studies focusing on one specific policy or one specific industry
are not able to provide generalized conclusion. Further, instead of evaluating the different
types of eco-innovation (Rennings and Rammer, 2011; Nesta et al., 2014; Rexhäuser and
Rammer, 2014; Cheng et al., 2014; Van Leeuwen and Mohnen, 2017), our results provide
more generalized policy implications on how to formulate a well designed policy mix to
decouple the environmental protection from economic growth. Finally, as Cohen and Tubb
(2018) point out, most of previous studies use cross-sectional data, country-level or sector-
level panel data due to the lack of data availability. Among existing firm-level studies, very
few are able to identify the level of eco-innovation which gives our study a further advantage.
In chapter 2, we find that at the current stage, stringent environmental policies reduce to-
tal factor productivity (TFP) and meanwhile induced eco-innovations are not able to offset
this negative effect for French innovators. Furthermore, we find that integrated abatement
expenditures are the main influence on the reduction in productivity. Meanwhile, we find
stringent regulations have no impact on firm profitability whereas induced eco-innovation
significantly reduces firm profitability in the short term and this significant effect indicates
higher initial costs for eco-innovation. Overall, we do not find sufficient evidence support-
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ing the Porter hypothesis that stringent environmental regulations induce efficiency and
stimulate innovation which helps firms to become more competitive.
Finally, in the third chapter, we investigate whether eco-innovation can help firms re-
duce carbon emissions and shift their energy strategies toward a low carbon path. More
specifically, we examine the impact of eco-innovation on firms environmental performance
measured by CO2 emissions intensity and fossil fuel intensity. It has been argued that car-
bon emissions can be reduced by improving energy efficiency and enhancing technological
capability (Zhang et al., 2017).
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, previous studies investigating the effect
of eco-innovation on environmental performance (Lee and Min, 2015; Zhang et al., 2017)
only focus on one dimension, CO2 emissions intensity (Huaman and Jun, 2014; Picazo-
Tadeo et al., 2014; Lee and Min, 2015; Zhang et al., 2017; Costantini et al., 2017). Our
analysis employs fossil fuel intensity that takes into account the energy mix optimization.
With additional measurement, we are able to identify different aspects of environmen-
tal performance. Second, our empirical analysis is based on an unique data set at the
firm-level which provides detailed information on French manufacturing firms’ innovation
activities and energy consumption between 2005 and 2012. Such data allows us to in-
vestigate the effectiveness of eco-innovation across industries in France. Thus, instead of
focusing on just one industry like previous firm-level studies (Zhao et al., 2015; Fernando
and Wah, 2017), our sample provides generalized conclusion across all manufacturing sec-
tors in France. To the best our knowledge, this is the first firm-level study investigating
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the impact of eco-innovation on environmental performance in France. Third, we employ
advanced econometric techniques including system generalized method of moments (GMM)
and a propensity score matching difference in difference approach (PSM-DiD) to provide
a precise examination of the impact of eco-innovation on environmental performance. We
take into account the dynamic feature of environmental performance by applying System
GMM approach which provides an efficient estimation. Furthermore, to handle the endo-
geneity concerns regarding the policy effect of eco-innovation on emissions reduction and
to control for selection bias, we employ a PSM-DiD method.
Our results in Chapter 3 suggest that eco-innovation does not significantly improve envi-
ronmental performance for French manufacturing firms over the period 2005-2012. First,
we find the decision to invest in eco-innovation does not significantly reduce CO2 emissions
intensity. Meanwhile, investing in general R&D does not significantly reduce CO2 emis-
sions intensity either. In particular, larger and more mature firms are more likely to have
lower CO2 emissions intensity. Regarding fossil fuel intensity, we do not find any evidence
that eco-innovation significantly reduces fossil fuel intensity. However, results suggest that
more productive firms in non-pollution-intensive sectors are likely to reduce their fossil fuel
intensity. Nevertheless, investing in general R&D would also reduce fossil fuel intensity
significantly.
Chapter 1
Is sharing caring? Outsourcing R&D and the
impact on eco-innovation expenditure
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Abstract
In this chapter we examine how collaboration between firms affects the decision of firms
that currently undertake R&D to take the next step and also invest in increasingly complex
environmental or eco-innovation. More specifically, we investigate how the decision is af-
fected by the source of R&D funding differentiating between public subsidies and different
types of cooperative R&D (domestic private, foreign private and public sector coopera-
tion) as well as regulatory stringency measured by environmental abatement costs. Our
unique firm-level sample of French manufacturing firms that already engage in some R&D
expenditure means that, unlike studies that use more aggregated data, we are able to use
an identification strategy that is less sensitive to macroeconomic shocks that may be cor-
related with country or sector level eco-innovation and environmental regulations. Our
results show the importance of external R&D cooperation (especially with foreign part-
ners) for eco-innovation. We also find that regulatory instruments play an important role
in the promotion of eco-innovation. In other results, we show that more productive firms
are more likely to undertake eco-innovation. Policy implications are discussed.
Keywords: Eco-Innovation, France, abatement costs
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1.1 Introduction
Against a background of growing concerns about climate change and local pollution, firms
are coming under pressure to meet increasingly stringent environmental performance ob-
jectives alongside their more traditional financial goals. One solution that is thought to
increase the ability of firms to meet their environmental obligations, whilst at the same
time remaining competitive, is to invest in research and development (R&D) and more
specifically, to pursue R&D projects that are targeted at solving environmental problems.
If eco-innovation is successful it allows a firm to reduce environmental pressures and at the
same time promote sustainable economic growth through the more efficient use of resources
(Costa-Campi et al., 2017). However, the process of eco-innovation is becoming increas-
ingly complex, and due to the multiple objectives associated often with eco-innovation, it
increasingly requires skills and knowledge from outside a firm’s boundaries (Cainelli et al.,
2011). Hence, in order to tackle the complexity associated with a reducing a firms’ envi-
ronmental impact, companies are increasingly developing cooperative relationships with a
number of actors in their value chain (Ghisetti et al., 2015a; De Marchi, 2012).
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the relationship between firms that already
invest in the R&D process as part of their activities and the level of engagement in eco-
innovation and how this is affected by collaboration within and between firms both locally
and abroad. Definitions of eco-innovation differ in the literature. One definition is to
assume that firms eco-innovate when they develop or adopt innovations which diagnose,
monitor, reduce or prevent environmental problems (Beise and Rennings, 2005; De Marchi,
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2012). Hence, for some firms, eco-innovation simply implies lowering energy costs, man-
aging pollution or reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions more efficiently, whilst for
others, it involves designing and applying pollution management and waste control sys-
tems and green energy technologies.1
Our empirical approach is to construct a panel of French manufacturing firms that under-
took some form of R&D between 2004 and 2011 and to investigate the determinants of
the level of investment by which a firm chooses to engage in the eco-innovation process.
More specifically, our contribution is three-fold. First, we investigate whether the sources
of R&D activity affects the level of investment of a firm’s eco-innovation differentiating be-
tween cooperative structures (the domestic private sector, the foreign private sector and the
public sector). Second, we consider both command and control (COC) and market-based
environmental policy instruments by examining how environmental regulatory stringency,
measured using environmental abatement costs, affects the level that a firm eco-innovates
and whether public funding for innovation more generally increases the level of environ-
mental related innovation. Finally, as Del Rı́o et al. (2016) point out, most of the existing
literature uses simple cross-sectional data. By using a unique firm-level panel allows for an
identification strategy that is less sensitive to macroeconomic shocks that may be correlated
1The existing literature defines eco-innovation in a number of different ways. Kemp (2010) defines
eco-innovation as the “production, assimilation or exploitation of a product, production process, service or
management or business method that is novel to the organization (developing or adopting it) and which
results, throughout its life cycle, in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts
of resources use (including energy use) compared to relevant alternatives”. An alternative definition by
Rennings et al. (2006) defines eco-innovation as “measures of relevant actors which develop new ideas,
behavior, products and processes, and apply or introduce them, and contribute to a reduction of environ-
mental burdens or to ecologically specified sustainability targets”.
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with country or sector level eco-innovation and environmental regulations. To this end we
test five distinct hypotheses that we develop in the theoretical review section of the chapter.
To briefly summarize our results, we find that for French firms, collaboration with foreign
partners is an important determinant of a firm’s investment in eco-innovation. Further-
more, the results show that different regulatory instruments can play a role in promoting
eco-innovation. In other results we find that more productive firms are more eco-innovative.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our theoretical
framework and a brief review of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on eco-
innovation. Section 4 provides a comprehensive description of the data sets and presents
our empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses our results. The final section concludes.
1.2 Theoretical background
There is a growing literature that attempts to understand the factors that encourage firms
to engage in the eco-innovation process. One common finding is that many drivers of gen-
eral innovation are likely to be the same as the drivers of eco-innovation (De Marchi, 2012;
Hojnik and Ruzzier, 2016). Therefore, policies endorsing general innovation should also
result in an increase in eco-innovation. However, eco-innovation also shows some distinc-
tive characteristics. Rennings (2000) emphasizes the role of regulatory push/pull drivers
for eco-innovation, derived from a feature unique to eco-innovation called the double ex-
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ternality problem. Eco-innovation encourages the development of environment friendly
technologies and these new innovative technologies can result in a technology push effect.
However, these new environment friendly technologies may also lead to increased demand
and greater competition. This is referred to as the market pull effect. Rennings (2000)
notes that eco-innovation in particular needs regulation to coordinate market driven de-
mand and innovation driven environmental technologies.
According to general innovation theory, externalities often arise as a consequence of market
failure. The concept of a double externality comes from the conflict between the external
benefits from eco-innovation and the arguably weak incentives to invest in eco-innovation
(Beise and Rennings, 2005). Although once an innovation is introduced to the market, im-
itation by competitors will speed up the diffusion of this innovation which is beneficial for
the environment, this reduces private investment in R&D outcomes from that investment
spill over to competing firms. Moreover, investment in eco-innovation may be inhibited
by the fact that private returns on R&D in green technologies are less than its social re-
turn if prices do not adequately reflect negative environmental impact (Faber and Frenken,
2009). Thus, firms may be reluctant to devote further investment to environmental R&D,
as they are not able to fully appropriate the social returns as private returns. Hence, eco-
innovation brings positive externalities, including general knowledge spillovers in the R&D
phases as well as the environmental externalities in the adoption and diffusion phases, lead-
ing to the social desirability of eco-innovations (Horbach et al., 2013). In addition, if there
are significant common knowledge spillovers, so-called environmental spillovers mean that
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competitors may benefit in terms of reduced regulation costs. As a result, firms devoting
resources to eco-innovation face higher costs compared to their polluting rivals, and one of
the positive externalities works as a disincentive (Rennings et al., 2006). For this reason,
technology push factors and market pull factors push companies towards investment in gen-
eral innovation, while regulatory push/pull effects should provide a boost to eco-innovation.
In this chapter, we follow Horbach et al. (2012) who distinguish between four categories
of factors that have been found to be main determinants of eco-innovation: a technology
push effect including inter-firm collaboration, a market pull effect, a regulation pull/push
effect and finally, firm specific factors.
1.2.1 Technology push
The technological capability of firms is an important factor in the general innovation lit-
erature where capabilities can be either technological knowledge stock or organizational
management measures. To build up such capabilities, investment in R&D or human capital
and training is necessary. Baumol (2002) describes this as ”innovation breeds innovation”,
such that highly innovative firms are more likely to conduct further innovation. However,
general R&D expenditure may not always be allocated to eco-innovation. In fact, perhaps
surprisingly Horbach et al. (2013) find a negative relationship between R&D expenditure
and eco-innovation in their study of French industries such that eco-innovative firms appear
to have a lower level of internal R&D compared with generally innovative firms although
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no such effect was found for German firms.
Focusing on eco-innovation specifically, a number of studies have shown that technolog-
ical capability is an important driver, especially at the initial development stages (Hor-
bach, 2008). Firms with a higher incentive to innovate and a larger technological stock of
knowledge are assumed to have a higher capacity to apply these factors to eco-innovation
(Bigliardi et al., 2012). Horbach et al. (2012) consider the need to have R&D that is in-
ternal to the firm for it to focus on eco-innovative activities. Focusing on German firms,
the authors suggest that internal R&D only affects eco-innovation positively if the target
of the innovation is noise pollution reduction. Nevertheless, Cuerva et al. (2014) in a study
of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in Spain their cross-sectional study shows
a strong correlation between technological capabilities and general innovation but only a
small effect for eco-innovation.
Technological cooperation between firms is also considered an important driver of eco-
innovation (Cainelli et al., 2011). Solutions to environmental problems are often complex
such that a single firm is unlikely to be equipped with all knowledge required to develop
and introduce green technologies. In this case, firms may need to access external knowledge
from various sources. If eco-innovation requires a cooperative effort, it implies complemen-
tarity with activities performed by network partners and may require more cooperation
than other types of innovation. Using German data, Horbach et al. (2012) find that col-
laboration with universities has a positive effect on those innovations that aim to reduce
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material and energy usage but has no effect on innovation that is targeted at reducing
emissions. Horbach (2008), also for German firms, distinguishes between eco-innovation
and non-green innovation and suggests that R&D cooperation is more important for green
rather than for non-green innovation. It is argued that this result is driven by specific
characteristics of green innovation which means that eco-innovation can only be achieved
through the combination of a variety of specialist knowledge and competences that are
necessarily spread across different types of organization. In order to tackle the complex
process of innovation that reduces the environmental impact of firms, companies are in-
creasingly likely to develop cooperative relationships with several actors in their value chain
both within and outside of the domestic market. As noted earlier, eco-innovation involves
organizational and institutional changes, which add further knowledge requirements for
new technology adoption.
In a related study, Ghisetti et al. (2015a) investigate the effect of different external infor-
mation sourcing on eco-innovation across eleven European countries. By measuring the
breadth of external knowledge from a number of different external sources they find a pos-
itive effect of a breadth of external knowledge on eco-innovation. However, their results
suggest an inverted U shape relationship between the breadth of external knowledge and
the intensity of eco-innovation where the marginal return tends to decrease when a firm
uses more than six different information sources. Thus, they suggest that it is possible
for firms to be “too open”. Nevertheless, Ghisetti et al. (2015a) conclude that the multi-
purpose nature of eco-innovation means that eco-innovation usually requires the firm to
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combine multiple objectives and to find and manage suitable compromises along the way.
Typically, an eco-innovator needs to set multiple targets in terms of, for example, produc-
tion efficiency, product quality, and environmental standards (Horbach et al., 2013). Thus,
a broad range of knowledge is needed but can be difficult for the firm to satisfy internally.
Finally, Powell et al. (2005) claim that in advanced fields of research, sources of knowledge
are widely distributed, hence cooperation and coordination between all members of the
value chain is essential. Hence, firms undertaking eco-innovation may need to acquire ex-
ternal sources of knowledge and skills, and this may be achieved through R&D outsourcing
and R&D cooperation (De Marchi, 2012). For example, Cainelli et al. (2011) show that
inter-firm network relationships are one of the drivers of eco-innovation for firms located
in a local production system, while eco-innovation is triggered by firms’ interactions with
external sources including universities and suppliers (although it does not appear to be
stimulated by interaction with customers and competitors). A more recent study by Schi-
uma et al. (2013) investigates Italian manufacturing firms and shows that eco-innovation
requires a higher recourse to external knowledge, in the form of use of external sources of
information and acquiring R&D from external firms. For eco-innovation, cooperation with
universities, research institutions and competitors performs a much more important role
than for other types of innovation.
H1. Firms that utilize external sources of knowledge devote more resources to eco-
innovation
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In terms of the relationship between internal R&D intensity and external R&D coopera-
tion, Hemmelskamp (1999) finds that eco-innovators have a lower R&D intensity but that
this is compensated for by the use of external sources of knowledge (especially true for
product innovations) suggesting that end-of-pipe innovations may require less R&D effort.
Mazzanti and Zoboli (2005) suggest that a synergy exists between external R&D coopera-
tion and internal R&D activities and finds that R&D cooperation with external partners
complements internal environmental R&D. However, Laursen and Salter (2006) do not find
any evidence to support a complementary effect but claim that there is in fact a substitu-
tion between the use of external sources of R&D and internal R&D activities.
H2. There is a complementary relationship between external R&D cooperation and inter-
nal R&D activities.
In addition to the use of external knowledge, a closely related mechanism is through the
enhancement of organizational and strategic capabilities which have also been shown to
promote eco-innovation (Kesidou and Demirel, 2012; Pinget et al., 2015). Organizational
environmental capabilities are often developed through the use of environmental manage-
ment systems (EMS). An EMS is a voluntary organizational framework that details the
procedures used to manage the impact of the organization on the natural environment
(Rennings et al., 2006). Its purpose is to continuously improve corporate environmental
performance and is considered to be a strong indicator of the organizational capabilities of
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the firm with regards to environmental management (Kesidou and Demirel, 2012; Russo
and Harrison, 2005).
Several previous studies have stressed the positive impact that EMS has on eco-innovation.
For example, Rennings et al. (2006) investigate the influence of different characteristics
of the EU environmental management and audit scheme (EMAS) on eco-innovation and
find a positive influence of EMAS on the environmental process innovation. The authors
also emphasize the importance of the participation of specific departments such as the
R&D department as a driver for eco-innovation. Using the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP), Horbach (2008) shows a significant and positive relationship between EMS and eco-
innovation and suggests that EMS helps to reduce the information deficit that enables firms
to detect possible cost savings. The author also claims that general organizational changes
and improvements are relevant to eco-innovation. Rennings and Rammer (2009) argue
that EMSs represent important internal capabilities for successful environmental techno-
logical innovations basing their arguments on the resource-based view of the firm, which
emphasize the importance of internal capabilities or resources that are valuable, rare and
difficult to imitate or substitute and are therefore fundamental for innovation activities. A
more recent study by Kesidou and Demirel (2012) also shows a strong positive relationship
between EMS and eco-innovation.
Similarly, Wagner (2007) applies data on environment-related patent applications as well as
self-reported environmental innovation to estimate the effect of an EMS on eco-innovation.
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Although results suggest a negative effect of EMS on the adoption on firms’ general en-
vironmental patenting activity, he finds a positive effect on self-reported environmental
process innovations. The author notes that under certain circumstances EMS certification
may only be a symbolic gesture, in which case the relationship between EMSs and the
propensity to implement environmental innovations is rather weak. In addition, firms that
implement an EMS are shown to invest more in environmental R&D compared with firms
that do not have an EMS. Even though the implementation of EMS signals the building
of organizational capabilities, management research on EMS has shown that external cer-
tification alone does not boost eco-innovation due to the rather ostentatious organizational
implementation of EMS by some firms (Boiral, 2007). Stakeholders often exert influence
on managers to adopt accreditation or certifications as a way to prove reputation, therefore
performance. Hence, the introduction of EMS can facilitate development and adoption
stages of eco-innovation.
H3. Firms that have implemented an environmental management system have a higher
propensity to invest in eco-innovation.
1.2.2 Regulation pull/push
Since the majority of environmental problems are characterized by negative externalities,
it is argued that eco-innovation is less likely to be driven by traditional market forces.
This means that environmental regulations are likely to play an important role in the en-
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couragement of eco-innovation (Horbach, 2008). The majority of earlier studies focus on
evaluating the effectiveness of two different regulatory measures, command and control
measures (CAC) and market-based instruments (Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Rennings
and Zwick, 2002). Only recently has research shifted towards studying whether environ-
mental regulations indirectly stimulate eco-innovation.
The traditional view regarding environmental regulations is that, as regulations increase
costs, they will restrict the allocation of resources to technological development and pro-
duction and hence be damaging to the firms and hence the economy of the country im-
posing the regulations. The alternative hypothesis, first proposed by Porter and Van der
Linde (1995), suggests that stringent environmental regulations could actually stimulate
greater innovation. The so-called Porter Hypothesis suggests a so-called “win-win” sit-
uation whereby regulations encourage firms to invest in environmental R&D in order to
reduce the costs of complying with those environmental regulations. In turn, firms that
undertake eco-innovation are subsequently able to reduce their production costs and/or
enter into expanding markets for eco-products both domestically and globally.
The Porter Hypothesis has been empirically tested in different contexts and with differ-
ent data sets. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) estimate the relationship between environmental
regulation and innovation in the U.S manufacturing industry. They measure the strin-
gency of environmental regulation using pollution abatement costs as a proxy and examine
the relationship with total R&D expenditure, as well as the total number of successful
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patents. Their results show a positive but weakly significant relationship between regula-
tory compliance expenditure and R&D expenditure but no relationship between regulatory
compliance expenditure and patenting activity, although they were not able to distinguish
between environment-related patents and other patent applications.
Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) extend the previous literature again for the U.S manufac-
turing industry, to empirically analyse the relationship between environmental regulation
and environmental related innovation. Following the previous literature, the authors con-
struct a reduced form model that includes several unique environment related variables.
They use the number of pollution related inspections alongside pollution abatement costs
as proxies for environmental regulation stringency and examine the determinants of en-
vironmentally related patents. Their empirical results show a weakly significant positive
relationship between environmental regulations and patents granted. However, the num-
ber of pollution related inspections does not significantly affect environmental innovation
activities.
Moreover, Popp (2006) shows that after the introduction of air pollution regulation, the
number of relevant patents applications significantly increased. Focusing on the U.S, Japan
and Germany, Popp (2006) finds a significant increase in the number of patents issued on
related abatement technologies following the introduction of more stringent SO2 and NOX
standards. Based on these findings, the author claims that stricter environmental standards
give rise to greater domestic patenting, but does not have an equivalent effect on foreign
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patenting implying that firms respond to domestic environmental regulatory pressure, but
not to foreign policies. Popp (2006) also tests for international knowledge spillovers by con-
sidering the origin of patent citations and argues that earlier NOx related environmental
regulations in Germany and Japan played a crucial role in motivating patenting activities
in the U.S for pollution control technologies to reduce NOx emissions.
In a more recent study, Demirel and Kesidou (2011) identify three types of eco-innovation,
namely end of pipe pollution control technologies, integrated cleaner production Technolo-
gies and Environmental R&D and test the effect of environmental regulations on different
types respectively using firm level UK data. Their results emphasize the important role
of policy intervention in stimulating eco-innovation. And finally, Lanoie et al. (2011) show
that environmental regulation encourages firms to re-allocate R&D expenditures towards
environmental innovation. According to Lanoie et al. (2011), the weak Porter Hypothesis,
which suggests that environmental regulation stimulates innovation in terms of green R&D
investment, holds and that investment in environmental R&D also has a positive effect on
firm performance.
H4. The stringency of environmental regulations stimulates eco-innovation.
The empirical evidence with respect to the use of other policy measures, namely subsidies
for environmental R&D, has been investigated by itself and in combination with other
market-based instruments and regulation. Johnstone et al. (2008) report on three different
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case studies: abatement technologies for waste water effluent from pulp production; abate-
ment of motor vehicle emissions; and the development of renewable energy technologies.
Overall, the case study evidence supports the argument that environmental policy can in-
crease the propensity of a firm to engage in technological innovation. In line with previous
findings, Johnstone et al. (2010) also show that environmental policies significantly affect
private innovators, although the strength of the effect varies over different technologies.
As argued above, the use of combined regulatory instruments can help economies not only
reduce the negative environmental impact but also provide incentives to the private sec-
tor to devote resources to eco-innovation. The presence of public support in the case of
subsidies is particularly crucial for developing green technologies due to the specific char-
acteristics of eco-innovation. Theoretically, Acemoglu et al. (2012) show that although a
carbon price alone could simultaneously control both environmental and knowledge exter-
nalities, such a course of action would lead to lower economic growth due to higher costs.
In addition, they showed that keeping other policy instruments inactive, the sole use of
subsidies would lead to excessively high levels of subsidies and could potentially lead to a
substitution of subsidies for proactive environmental R&D investment.
Empirically, Veugelers (2012) shows very little support for the efficacy of subsidies targeted
at innovation to reduce CO2, when used in isolation. However, Veugelers (2012) suggests
that a combination of regulations and taxes with subsidies, particularly for the adoption
of innovation to reduce CO2 emissions can have an overall positive effect. Costa-Campi
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et al. (2017) also provide an insight into which public policies are more effective in trigger-
ing investment in by examining the relationship between environmental innovation R&D
expenditure and a range of policy instruments, including environmental regulation and
other policy measures including R&D subsidies and environmental taxes. Their results for
22 manufacturing sectors in Spain for the period 2008–2013 that a policy mix of environ-
mental, energy and technological regulatory measures is the most effective combination of
policies. However, they also point out that innovation is not a short term process and
that it can take a long time to develop a technology in response to existing environmental
regulation with a short term negative impact on profits.
H5. Firms that receive public subsidies are more likely to invest in eco-innovation.
To summarize, we argue that existing firm-level studies have not yet reached a consen-
sus whether the stringency of environmental regulations stimulates eco-innovation. The
majority of empirical evidence on the relationship between environmental regulation and
eco-innovation comes from a relatively small number of countries including the U.S, Ger-
many, Italy and the UK and a strong reliance on German data and often for a single year
of data.
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1.2.3 Firm specific factors
Finally, we consider the role of other firm specific factors and firm heterogeneity. For ex-
ample, firms that engage in eco-innovation may already be the pro-active firms and hence
may not react to more stringent environmental regulations since they may already be in
compliance with the new regulations by already having lower emissions intensity. In con-
trast, stricter environmental regulations may promote eco-innovation for the previously less
innovative firms, which only adopt eco-innovation as a measure of reducing higher produc-
tion costs that arise due to the need to comply with the stricter environmental regulations.
When we consider other firm-level characteristics, many previous studies find a positive
effect of firm size on general innovation where the positive effect holds when other factors
such as firm age are controlled for. For studies that concentrate on eco-innovation, a posi-
tive effect of firm size on eco-innovation is also expected. The existing literature provides a
number of explanations. Horbach (2008) reports that firm size positively affects innovation
but not eco-innovation where the positive effect for innovation is put down to large firms
having greater access to financial and human resources (Rave et al., 2011). Kesidou and
Demirel (2012) use four thresholds for size, namely micro, small, medium and large and find
that large firms with over 250 employees spend six times more on average on environmental
R&D compared to medium sized firms with more than 50 but less than 250 employees. The
authors claim that larger firms’ higher propensity to eco-innovate could be due to a higher
public visibility and hence greater pressure from the public to appear be environmentally
friendly. A latter study by Horbach et al. (2013) shows a significant and positive link
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between firm size and eco-innovation intensity in France and Germany arguing that it is
because eco-innovation realized by larger firms. Similarly, Przychodzen and Przychodzen
(2015) investigate the effect of firm size on eco-innovation in Poland and Hungary and
also find that eco-innovation is normally undertaken by significantly larger firms. Taking a
segmentation approach, Del Ŕıo et al. (2017) find that the lack of eco-innovative incentive
of SMEs is due to the restriction of internal technological capabilities, although in their
study they were unable to distinguish between R&D related employees and other employees.
Firm age also differs between firms. The theoretical literature on general innovation sug-
gests that older firms have had longer to accumulate internal capabilities, which should
have a positive effect on innovation in general (Sørensen and Stuart, 2000). Similarly, one
should expect this argument to hold for eco-innovation under the assumption that younger
firms tend to put survival first and prioritise seeking market opportunities (Mazzarol et al.,
2010). Wagner (2007) reports a significant positive association between firm age and the
likelihood of carrying out process eco-innovation although the effect of firm age is insignif-
icant for product eco-innovation. However, the majority of authors show an insignificant
influence of age on the propensity to engage in eco-innovation (Ziegler, 2015; Horbach,
2008; Rave et al., 2011; Del Rı́o et al., 2017).
Given that eco-innovation can be considered as a costly investment with risky returns (more
so that general innovation), financial constraints or difficulties in obtaining credit may re-
duce the possibility that a firm devotes resources to eco-innovation. Access to adequate
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financial resources is considered essential to drive economic growth, however, due to the
specific characteristics of eco-innovation, financial resources are also particularly if a firm
is to start the process of eco-innovation (Ghisetti et al., 2015b).
The degree of eco-innovation can be expected to also differ across sectors. The innovation
intensity of a particular sector depends on factors such as the maturity of the dominant
technology, scale, capital intensity, R&D intensity of the industry and general competi-
tiveness. Sectoral differences and their influence on eco-innovation are usually addressed
through the inclusion of the sectoral dummy variables or otherwise through broader defini-
tions of what constitutes a dirty or pollution intensive sector with the general finding that
highly polluting sector sectors are more likely to eco-innovate (De Marchi, 2012).
1.2.4 Market pull
While regulation still seems to be necessary to overcome the double externality problem, ex-
isting studies indicate that there is no strong stimulus for eco-innovation from the demand
side since eco-friendly products are still too expensive (Rehfeld et al., 2007). Although it is
argued that consumers can also drive innovations (Horbach, 2008; Van den Bergh, 2008),
this argument is only partially supported by empirical evidence. In particular using Ger-
man manufacturing firms, Horbach (2008) illustrate demand as the increase in expected
turnover and empirically shows that demand factors are an important determinant of eco-
innovation. Furthermore, following previous studies, Wagner (2007) classifies stakeholders
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into three different groups based on the intensity of their environmental concern. The
author underlines that firms with predominantly environmentally concerned stakeholders
are more positively associated with eco-innovation. The above literature also examines the
impact of demand factors upon a binary dependent variable which suggests that the deci-
sion of firm to eco-innovation. Meanwhile, Kesidou and Demirel (2012) push the discussion
further by using R&D intensity as the dependent variable to study the market pull effect
taking corporate social responsibility (CSR) and customer requirements into account. In a
study of UK manufacturing firms, they find little evidence to support the argument that
demand factors boost investment in eco-innovation.
1.3 Data and empirical strategy
1.3.1 Data
In this study we use firm-level data for France. Our motivation for concentrating on French
firms is two-fold. First, as the third largest economy in the EU, France assigns significant
resources to R&D activities which were approximately 4,8643 millions Euros in 2015 which
ranked second in the EU. These R&D expenditures account for approximately 2.23% of
total French GDP which is ranked seventh in the EU (Bank, 2017). In the ranking of inno-
vation outputs, France came eighth worldwide for the number of patents issued, with a total
figure of 13,315 patents granted in 2010 (Commission, 2016). Second, France has a strong
track record in environment protection. In the latest Environmental Protection Index,
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France ranks 10th among 180 countries worldwide (YCELP and Yale, 2016) and consists of
a combination of governmental policies and regulations, technological innovations and sig-
nificant growth in the provision of eco-industrial parks (EIP).2 In terms of eco-innovation,
France’s eco-industry sector ranks fourth in the world by size and is the second largest
in the EU (Commission, 2016). In 2011 the total production from eco-industry reached
79.3 billion and growth in the production of these industries was stronger (+7.5%) than
total economic activity (+4.2%). In terms of employment, around 455,600 people worked
full-time in the green economy, while exports related to eco-activity was approximately 1.9
billion Euros.
In this study, we construct an unbalanced panel data set to investigate what determines
the decision of an existing innovator to engage in eco-innovation. To do this we merge
four different data sets. First, we use the Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to
R&D Activities (Enquete annuelle sur les moyens consacres a la R&D) collected by the
French Ministry of Education and Research that consists of over 7,000 firms that perform
R&D activities and invest more than 350,000 in innovation and a sample of the remaining
companies that dedicate fewer resources to R&D. The resulting data set provides a good
representation of the innovation activities carried out by French firms in terms of internal
and external resources, the number of employees working for the R&D department, public
funds received, the number of patents and indicators of product and process innovations.3
2The term eco-industry refers to all economic activities that provide technical solutions for (down-
stream) environmental protection. This includes activities from filtration systems for air pollution to waste
management and has recently been expanded to include clearly defined and tangible renewable energy
(Jänicke, 2012).
3Note that all firms in this data set are innovators. Due to the sampling structure, firms that only
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The next stage is to merge in financial information on manufacturing firms that comes from
two main data sets. The first is the Unified and Comprehensive File of SUSE (FICUS)
database that is based on an annual fiscal census of firms called the Unified Corporate
Statistics System (SUSE) which is conducted by the French Ministry for the Economy and
Finance. SUSE covers all firms that are under the industrial and commercial benefit (BIC)
tax system or under the non-commercial benefit (BNC) tax system that means SUSE com-
prises all firms that send a tax return to the French Ministry for the Economy and Finance.
The result is an unbalanced panel that comprises over 3 million manufacturing firms for a
period of 14 years between 1994 and 2007. Three kinds of variables are available. First,
there is firm information such as the primary industry classification at the 4-digit NACE
level, employment and date of creation. Second, there are income statement variables such
as total turnover, total labour cost and total gross earnings. Third, there are balance sheet
variables such as debt and capital stock. The second data set with complementary financial
data is the Approached File of ESANE Results (FARE) which is the new Annual Business
Statistics Production data that replaced FICUS from 2008. Hence, to obtain fiscal data
from 2008 we use the FARE file that gives an unbalanced panel covering the years 2008 to
2012.
Finally, the fourth data set comes from the ANTIPOL survey that we use to construct our
invest relatively small amounts in R&D are randomly selected. Thus, a problem with this data set is
missing values and firms with long year gaps between observations. To obtain a consistent panel we drop
firms with more than six year gaps between data points from our sample. After removing those firms use
extrapolation techniques to fill in missing observations.
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firm-level environmental variables. The survey asked 10,000 plants about their investment
in capital to control pollution. Until 2005, the survey was a census of plants having at least
100 employees whatever their activities. This threshold was reduced to 50 or 20 employees
for pollution intensive activities. After 2006, ANTIPOL become a census for plants that
have at least 250 employees and a survey for other plants stratified by activities and by size
group. ANTIPOL asked plants how much they invest in end-of-pipe technologies and inte-
grated technologies to prevent the emissions of seven pollutant categories: (1) waste water;
(2) non-radioactive waste; (3) climate pollutant; (4) noise and vibration; (5) land and water
pollutant; (6) biodiversity and (7) landscape and other pollutants. The advantage of the
survey is that it explicitly excludes workplace health, securities and hygiene questions and
focus exclusively on pollution control. To obtain a firm level data set we aggregate the
plant-level data to the firm level by subtracting the first 9 digit SIREN code which is the
unique French business identification number from the 16 digit SIRET code. Firms that
have no plant showing in ANTIPOL are excluded from the sample. We assume that any
missing pollution abatement expenditure from ANTIPOL are very small in comparison to
reporting plants. A robustness check tests our aggregation assumption.4
After merging the four data sets we remove inconsistent observations and coding errors from
our sample (for example, incomplete data, negative values for R&D expenditure and other
4This assumption may have an impact on our main results that if a firm has several plants below the
threshold that are not surveyed by ANTIPOL and a large plant that is surveyed by ANTIPOL, under
the previous assumption, then this firm’s total pollution abatement expenditure equals to the firm’s large
plant expenditure. However, if the summation of the small plants’ expenditures is not small comparing to
the large plant, then the firm’s total expenditure is underestimated. This measurement error could lead to
biased coefficient of interest.
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contradictory information). In addition, we drop firms with less than 10 full-time equiva-
lent employees. All monetary variables are in thousands of Euros and have been deflated
using a French Producer Price Index at the sector level with 2010 as a baseline (INSEE,
2017). Our final sample is an unbalanced panel of almost 7,300 observations for around
2,200 French manufacturing firms over an 8 year period. We also distinguish between pollu-
tion intensive sectors and non pollution intensive sectors following Shimamoto (2017) who
categorises the five most pollution intensive sectors as (1) Manufacture of pulp, paper and
paper products, (2) Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres,
(3) Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, (4) Manufacture of




There are various different measures of eco-innovation. Arundel and Kemp (2009) de-
scribes four although the most widely used are first, environmental research and develop-
ment (R&D) expenditure and second, the number of green patents.5 Environment related
patents and investments in environment protection have been widely adopted as proxies for
eco-innovation (Jaffe et al., 1995; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997), and these two types of measure
5Other measures of eco-innovation described in Arundel and Kemp (2009) include direct output mea-
sures such as data on the sales of new products and indirect impact measures that are derived from
aggregate data such as changes in resource efficiency and productivity.
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are considered to be environmental R&D input or environmental R&D output measures.6
In this chapter we use environmental R&D expenditure at the firm level as our proxy for
eco-innovation. Measures of industry and firm level environmental R&D have been used in
a number of previous studies although they tend to have as their dependent variable subjec-
tive measures of the motivation to undertake eco-innovation that are obtained from different
survey data sets (Del Ŕıo et al., 2011; De Marchi, 2012; Del Ŕıo et al., 2017; Jové Llopis
et al., 2017). Unlike previous studies, firms in our sample are specifically asked how internal
R&D is allocated and one of the categories is the percentage of R&D expenditure dedi-
cated to the protection of the environment. Our environmental R&D expenditure variable
is therefore constructed by multiplying the share of environmental R&D expenditure by
total internal R&D expenditure. This variable captures the extent of a firm’s internal R&D
investment in eco-innovation, and is more precise than previous R&D based eco-innovation
indicators employed in the literature. Surveys investigating environmental R&D activi-
ties often ask firms whether they conduct environmental R&D but do not specifically ask
about environmental R&D intensity (Horbach, 2008). In a number of early studies, to-
tal R&D expenditure was used as an indicator of eco-innovation (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997;
Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003) based on the assumption that there is a strong correlation
between eco-innovation and general innovation although this is potentially problematic as
eco-innovation could crowd out general innovation. Thus, an advantage of our approach is
6Although useful, patent counts have a number of limitations as a record of eco-innovation (Veugelers,
2012) as it is often difficult to value different patents. For example, the patent count gives the same weight
to patents with no commercial values and those which are highly profitable. Hall et al. (2007) highlight
that the distribution of the value of patents is highly skewed, thus only a fairly small number of patents
actually have any commercial value and could impact any analytical results.
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that we have a direct measure of the investment in eco-innovation: log transformed variable
”Log EnvR&D” is based on the exact environmental R&D expenditure of a firm.
1.3.2.2 Explanatory variables
With respect to our explanatory variables, our key variables are based on information on
R&D cooperation with external partners. First, we include a dummy variable ”ExtR&D d”
that indicates if the firm was subcontracting and collaborating on R&D with external firms
or institutions. Furthermore, we include the log transformed variable ”Log ExtR&D” which
illustrates the level of R&D expenditure that has been subcontracted and collaborated with
external firms or institutions. Nevertheless, the R&D data identifies three types of external
partner: (1) the foreign private sector, (2) the private sector in France and (3) the public
sector (including higher education and public organizations) and more specifically, partners
from the public sector that includes both domestic and international partners. Thus we test
both Binary variables and continues variables indicating if the company cooperates with
any of those partners have been created to distinguish between the different roles of different
partners toward eco-innovation. Following De Marchi (2012), the variable ”R&D intensity”
expresses R&D intensity as the ratio between the number of R&D activities related employ-
ees and the total number of employees. Moreover, we include the interaction term between
”ExtR&D d” and ”R&D intensity” and the interaction term between ”Log ExtR&D” and
”R&D intensity” to test for the complementarity hypothesis (H2). We also include public
funding as an control for firm’s innovation structure. Our public funding variable includes
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all funding received by firms for R&D activities from public resources and the variable
”Pubfunding d” is equal to one if the firm received any public funding.
To capture information about the organizational capability of a firm we measure a firm’s
engagement with environmental management systems. In line with Kesidou and Demirel
(2012) and Costa-Campi et al. (2017) we also consider ISO 14001 approval to be one of the
most widely used measures of a firm’s commitment to having an operational environmental
management system alongside having an Eco Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS).
ISO 14001 can be used by any firm, regardless of its activity, and is granted once a firm
sets up an environmental management system and obtain a certificate for their productive
process. ISO 14001 has been frequently included as a determinant of eco-innovation and
has been found to be effective in stimulating environmental R&D. Information of ISO 14001
accreditation is obtained from the ANTIPOL data set and has been available since 2002.
Furthermore, with regard to organizational capability, the ANTIPOL data set provides two
more variables ”sme” and ”EMS process”. ”SME” is a binary variable which equals one if
a firm has some other sort of environmental management systems other than ISO 14001.
”EMS process” is a binary variable which equals one if a firm is in the process of obtaining
environmental certificate. Since all these variables are at plant level and it is possible that
only one plant among several plants for a firm has environmental managements systems we
assume that if a plant of a firm is accredited environmental management systems, then this
firm is also accredited with having an environmental management system. After aggregat-
ing to firm level, due to the fact that “ISO” and ”SME” variables only partially capture the
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effect of a firm’s environmental management system, we construct a new variable namely
”EMS” which equal to one if a firm is accredited ISO 14001 or any other environmental
management systems.
To capture the effect of environmental regulations, we introduce a policy variable that the
previous empirical literature had tended to include as a determinant of eco-innovation,
namely environmental abatement costs. Environmental regulation are thought of an effec-
tive tool for encouraging firms to devote resources to eco-innovation. Institutional pressure
from stakeholders is also thought to trigger eco-innovation and more so among high pol-
luting firms (Berrone et al., 2013). We proxy the stringency of environmental regulations
using environmental abatement cost expenditure. This is done by summing the total inte-
grated and end of pipe investment across different pollutant categories from the ANTIPOL
data set that gives us a measure of total abatement costs. More specifically, this variable
includes expenditure that is the result of the operation of abatement capital, expenditure
due to environmental taxes and expenditure due to environmental management such as
the training of managers or the purchase of services. Since abatement intensity becomes
relatively small when we scale abatement expenditure by total output, we transform this
variable into percentage by multiplying it by 100.7
In addition to our key variables of interest we also include a series of controls. To control
for the possible effect of exporting on degree of eco-innovation we include a binary vari-
7These expenditures exclude expenditure for labour health and security and expenditure that allows a
reduction of material or energy use.
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able ”Export d” using information on the exports of manufacturing firms from the Unified
and Comprehensive File of SUSE (FICUS) database and the Approached File of ESANE
Results (FARE). To the extent that access to foreign markets may lead to exposure to
new products and ideas we would expect more innovation from exporters. In particular,
if consumers in foreign markets demand green products it provides an opportunity for
the firm to charge premium prices and increase returns to eco-innovation. Similarly, for-
eign ownership provides firms with greater exposure to international markets and provides
network opportunities with foreign firms that may improve environmental efficiency and op-
portunities for eco-innovation through environmental technological spillovers and through
possible exposure to institutional pressures from foreign governments and other overseas
stakeholders(Cainelli et al., 2012). Multinational corporations (MNCs) may also obtain
financial benefits from the adoption of a standardised environmental strategy which may
allow them to offset the initial cost of complying with environmental regulations (Costan-
tini and Mazzanti, 2012). Hence, we include two firm ownership dummy variables, namely
”French group” and ”Foreign group” where a firm is considered to be part of a larger French
group if 50% of the equity is owned by a larger domestic company and similarly if 50% of
the equity is owned by a foreign group. To control for the effect of financial constraints on
eco-innovation, we also include a measure of leverage by including a firm’s debt-to-equity
ratio measured as Debt divided by (Debt plus Equity) (Lee and Min, 2015).
To control for a firm’s productivity we calculate total factor productivity (TFP) following
Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013). Building on Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Doraszelski
1.3. Data and empirical strategy 44
and Jaumandreu (2013) show that we can endogenously consider the link between R&D and
productivity without explicitly modeling how the knowledge capital accumulates. Hence,
we include lagged R&D expenditure as an additional instrument in the production func-
tion. Nevertheless, since the assumption that total wages equals to labour productivity can
fail (Syverson, 2011), we proxy labour using the log of the number of full-time equivalent
employees.
Finally, we include a series of standard control variables. Firm size is included and could
be positive or negative since size provides a scale advantage but could be negative as small
firms are perceived to be more flexible especially in terms of adopting new technologies.
Firm size, ”Log size” is measured as the log of the number of full-time equivalent employ-
ees. We also include firm age as an indicator for accumulated organizational resources and
is expected to positively relate to technological innovation, although as with size, younger
firms may be more innovative as a way to increase market share. Our variable ”Log age”
is measured as the log of age in years generated by deducting firms’ creation year from the
current year. Likewise, because efficient firms are more likely to survive and grow (Pinget
et al., 2015), firm age is likely to have a positive impact on eco-innovation. We control for
the input prices by including a control variable ”Log avewage” which is a proxy for the
price of labour measured as the ratio between salaries paid to the employees and firm total
number of employees. To take into account invariant characteristics we use year dummies
and two-digit NACE sector dummies to control for business cycle effects common to all
businesses. We also include regional dummies for the 25 administrative regions.8
8The 25 administrative regions include 22 regions in Metropolitan France and 3 overseas regions. Since
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1.3.2.3 Model specification
In this chapter we apply a range of econometric techniques to understand how external co-
operation between firms and institutions can influence eco-innovation controlling for firm
heterogeneity. First, in order to benchmark our findings we test for the determinants of
eco-innovation but with the addition of extra control variables. Since changes in firm char-
acteristics, such as firm size may induce firms to switch to invest in green R&D, they may
also affect other firm characteristics such as R&D intensity. Hence we lag all independent
variables by one year to mitigate possible endogeneity concerns. Hence, we estimate the
following baseline model that allows us to test our various hypotheses:
Log EnvR&Di,t = β1(Fi,t−1) + β2(Ti,t−1) + β3(Pi,t−1) + µi + γt + εi,t (1.1)
where F, T and P are vectors of explanatory variables, while Log EnvR&D indicates the
log transformed level of resources that the firm dedicates to eco-innovation in year t.
Table 1.1 defines our variables. In the first set of variables F, we include those control
variables that have been identified in the literature as firm specific factors (Del Rı́o et al.,
2017) and includes firm age, firm size, average wage, ownership of firm, TFP and leverage.
Then in the second set of variables T, we include a series of variables to capture tech-
in 2014, the French parliament passed a law reducing the number of metropolitan regions from 22 to 13
effective 1 January 2016, we adopt the previous legal concept of a region.
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nological capabilities and includes R&D intensity, our external cooperation R&D dummy,
public funding dummy, ”EMS” dummy and ”EMS process” dummy. Finally, we include
abatement intensity as our policy instrument in set of variables P. In addition, we take
into account time-invariant characteristics through random effect µ and fix parameters of
time, sector and regional dummies, namely γt. Sector dummies are included to control
for time invariant factors common to firms across different sectors respectively and include
year dummies to account for business cycle effects.
[Table 1.1 about here]
Due to the sampling structure of the R&D data that includes only large innovators that
invest more than 350,000 in innovation and a sample of the remaining companies that
dedicate fewer resources to R&D, we observe a large number of zero observations for our
dependent variable. Hence, we estimate a Tobit model. This implies that our depen-
dent variable ”Log EnvR&D” is an observed realisation of an underlying latent variable
that describes the intention of a firm to engage in environmental R D activities. Thus,
when this intention is positive, we equate the observed variable to the latent variable
Log EnvR&Di,t = Log EnvR&D
∗
i,t. When the latent variable is zero, our measurement
variable equals zero, thus ln envrdi,t = 0. So:
Log EnvR&Di,t =

Log EnvR&D∗i,t if Log EnvR&D
∗
i,t > 0
0 if Log EnvR&Di,t = 0
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We calculate marginal effects to allow comparisons across models. However, a number of
endogeneity concerns remain unresolved. First, there could still be other factors in the
error term that are correlated with a firm’s eco-innovation investment. Second, there could
be reverse causality if environmental R&D causes a change in productivity. Third, policy-
makers may introduce less stringent regulations in a particular sector if they observe that
the productivity of this sector is low or is falling. Our solution to address such endogeneity
problems is to impose a lag structure to control for the delayed effect of the independent
variables on eco-innovation and to resolve the reverse causality concerns.
1.3.2.4 Descriptives
We begin with a description of our data. The sample we use in our econometric analy-
sis consists of 2,197 French manufacturing firms and 7,238 observations between 2004 and
2011. Of the 2,197 firms, 754 firms have done some environmental R&D investment, which
represent 34.09% of the firms in our sample. Table 1.2 presents the summary statistics
for our independent variables. The average size of the firm is approximately 600 full-time
equivalent employees thus our sample consists of relatively large firms. Likewise, the av-
erage export is around 95% which shows that a large majority of firms in our sample are
exporters, again a result of our sample being restricted to relatively large firms.
[Table 1.2 about here]
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In terms of our main variables of interest, over 60% of firms do some degree of external
R&D with around 20% of firms having at least some external R&D overseas and around
28% including public institutions in their R&D process. Nearly half of all firms domesti-
cally outsource at least some of their R&D process domestically. In terms of our policy
variables around 25% receive some degree of public funding and over 70% have some sort
of environmental management systems in place.
In Table 1.3, we present the annual average R&D expenditure and annual environmental
R&D expenditure. Although R&D expenditure remains relatively stable over time (with a
dip following the financial crisis in 2009), the average value of eco-innovation has continued
to increase over this time period. Figure 1.1 plots environmental R&D expenditure intensity
over time and shows that average eco-innovation intensity increased from just over 3% in
2004 to nearly 7% in 2011. Figure 1.2 plots the percentage of firms with an environmental
management system distinguishing between eco-innovators and general innovators showing
that eco-innovative firms have a higher rate EMS implementation. Thus, it appears that
eco-innovators devote greater resources to environmental protection.
[Table 1.3 about here]
[Figure 1.1 about here]
[Figure 1.2 about here]
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In terms of our abatement intensity variable, Figure 1.3 indicates that average abatement
cost intensity did not vary much between 2004 to 2011. This may be explained by the fact
that French manufacturing industry is highly developed and that France had introduced
consistent and relatively strict environmental policy prior to our period of analysis. Given
that there were no significant environmental policies introduced during this period a rel-
atively stable percentage might be expected although another explanation is that stricter
environmental policies were prevented by business lobby groups whilst at the same time,
the implementation of new policies was often slowed as a result of bureaucratic adminis-
trative structures (Adelman and Engel, 2007).
[Figure 1.3 about here]
Table 1.4 presents the distribution of environmental R&D investment for firms across dif-
ferent sectors where we observe considerable sectoral variation in the adoption of eco-
innovation although the average intensity remains below 10% of total R&D expenditure
with the exception of (sector 40). However, Figure 1.4 shows that there is no substantial
difference in environment R&D intensity between pollution intensive sectors and non pol-
lution intensive sectors. For example, the environmental R&D intensity for manufacturing
of machinery is close to manufacturing of basic metals.
[Table 1.4 about here]
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[Figure 1.4 about here]
In Table 1.5 we group firms into polluter and non-polluters following. In our sample, 580
French manufacturing firms are classified as pollution-intensive representing 26.22% of the
firms in the sample. From Table 1.5 we observe that polluters appear to be on average
more productive, pay lower wages and are smaller in size. Nevertheless, polluters have a
higher R&D intensity as well as a higher level of investment in environmental R&D and
are more willing to cooperate with external partners. Not surprisingly, polluters have a
higher abatement intensity but also have a higher rate of implementing an environmental
management system. Figure 1.6 shows that a higher share of polluters have an environmen-
tal management system in place compared to non-polluters with both groups exhibiting a
slight upward trend in EMS attainment.
[Table 1.5 about here]
[Figure 1.6 about here]
Figure 1.7 provides evidence of the distribution of R&D across France and maps the lo-
cation of innovators in our sample across regions. Larger clusters are represented by the
darker shaded areas. In particular, innovators seem to be particularly clustered in the
Ile-de-France, the region surrounding Paris, where most of the multinational enterprises
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(MNEs) and of research institutions are located, or in Rhone-Alpes, the region bordering
Germany.
[Figure 1.7 about here]
1.4 Empirical results
We present our main results in Table 1.6 and Table 1.7. The parameters reflect the im-
pact of a change in the control variables on the level of resources that are invested in
eco-innovation activities. In Table 1.8 we separate our sample into pollution intensive sec-
tors and non pollution intensive sectors. We employ the random effect Tobit model and
to help with the interpretation of the coefficients, we report the marginal effects. We first
look at our baseline model in Table 1.6 which investigates the firm’s level of investment in
eco-innovation activities.
First, in Table 1.6, as a test of H1, Model (1) shows a positive and significant effect of
external R&D cooperation on a firm’s level of investment in eco-innovation. Compared to
firms that had not previously outsourced R&D to external partners, firms that engaged in
R&D cooperation in the previous period invest 6.7 percentage points more in eco-innovation
activities in the current period. When we regress eco-innovation on the different types of
cooperation agreement with our three different categories of partners in Specification (2),
we find that it is firms that cooperate with foreign firms that has the main influence on
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the level of investment in eco-innovation by the firm in France. Thus, we confirm H1
that overall R&D cooperation with external partners promotes eco-innovation but that for
French firms it is cooperation with foreign partners is driving this result rather than do-
mestic partners or cooperation with the public sector and universities.
Second, from model (2) in Table 1.6, we find a negative but insignificant effect of R&D
intensity on eco-innovation. One possible explanation is that eco-innovation is too expen-
sive in the initial stages prior to diffusion, since private returns on environmental R&D
are less than it’s social return if prices do not adequately reflect negative environmental
impact. The insignificant effect may be caused by substitution between the use of external
sources of R&D and internal R&D activities as discussed by (Laursen and Salter, 2006).
To test the complementary/substitution argument that underpins H2, we report models
with different specifications of the variable measuring internal R&D effort in model (3) (ex-
cluding internal R&D) and (4) which includes an interaction term between R&D intensity
and our external R&D dummy. In each case our external R&D cooperation variable re-
mains positive and significant. However, as the interaction term is insignificant we are not
able to accept H2 that there is complementary between external R&D cooperation and
internal R&D intensity. Such finding is interesting in terms of policy implications since it
gives support to the idea that eco-innovation must be supported by policy which helps to
improve knowledge spillover as well as public–private partnerships in order to help firms to
overcome innovation barriers.
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To test H3 on the role of organizational capabilities, the results show across all models (1)-
(4) that the implementation of an environmental management system (EMS) promotes eco-
innovation and is a finding that is consistent with previous studies (Kesidou and Demirel,
2012). Our findings indicate that, compared to firms that had no EMS, firms that had
an EMS in place in the previous year devote on average 6.6 percentage points more in
eco-innovation. The results confirm H3 that firms which build organizational capabilities
accumulate necessary technologies that enable them to invest in eco-innovation.
We now consider the role of regulatory and policy instruments in encouraging a firm to
invest in eco-innovation. In line with the literature (Kesidou and Demirel, 2012; De Marchi,
2012; Horbach et al., 2013; Costa-Campi et al., 2017), we find that policy instruments are
important drivers of eco-innovation. Looking first at the abatement intensity, we find a
positive and significant effect of abatement expenditure intensity on a firms investment in
eco-innovation. The interpretation of the coefficient in Model (1) is that a 1% increase
in the mean abatement intensity is expected to increase the expenditure in eco-innovation
by 6 percent points on average. Since we use abatement intensity as a proxy for policy
stringency, we confirm H4 that firms are motivated by stringent environmental policies to
undertake eco-innovation.
In contrast, the results for our public funding variable is positive but insignificant. Unlike
Horbach (2016) who finds a positive and significant coefficient for environmental subsidies,
our insignificant effect is closer to Cuerva et al. (2014) who conclude that public funding
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is not relevant as a way to explain eco-innovation among low tech firms. Thus, our results
suggest that, although general public funding such as subsidies promote general R&D ac-
tivities, they do not appear to affect the level of investment in eco-innovation. In this case,
H5 is rejected.
In terms of our other control variables, results from different specifications show that lagged
TFP has a positive and significant impact on the investment in environmental R&D of firms
across all specifications. Our results suggest that more productive firms are likely to in-
vest more in eco-innovation. The other consistently positive and significant determinant of
eco-innovation is firm size and suggests that larger firms on average devote more resources
to eco-innovation. Kesidou and Demirel (2012) claim that Large firms are more likely to
invest in environmental R&D because of their relatively higher public visibility and the cor-
responding social pressures from both society and government. Thus, beside the traditional
advantage for large firms to be able to devote significant resources to general innovation
this argument also appears to apply to eco-innovation as well as firms being more able to
satisfy society and government requirements (De Marchi, 2012; Cuerva et al., 2014; Del Ŕıo
et al., 2017). However, as shown previously in Table 1.2, the average size of the firm in
our sample is approximately 600 full-time equivalent employees which suggest our sample
consists of relatively large firms. Regarding our export status dummy, we find positive
but insignificant effect on eco-innovation. This is potentially due to the high participation
rate of export in our sample. From Table 1.2, we observe over 95% of observations export.
This large proportion thus do not display significant impact on the decision to devote to
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eco-innovation.
[Table 1.6 about here]
In the next stage we replace our external R&D dummies with with their continuous equiv-
alents. Hence, in Table 1.7, instead of dummy variables for external R&D cooperation,
we estimate the model using the level of external cooperation R&D which is measured
by natural logarithm of external R&D investments in Model (1). In Model (2), again we
decompose the level of external cooperation R&D into three different sources of external
cooperation R&D. Model (1) shows a consistent positive and significant effect of level of
external R&D cooperation (level of R&D outsourced)on a firm’s level of investment in
eco-innovation. The coefficient indicates that firm devoted 1% more in R&D coopera-
tion (level of R&D outsourced) would increase their current eco-innovation expenditure by
0.01%. When we distinguish between the three sources of external cooperation R&D in
specification (2), we also find that the level of R&D outsourced to foreign firms is posi-
tively correlated with the level of investment in eco-innovation. Overall, we find consistent
results when we replace our external R&D dummies with with their continuous equivalents.
[Table 1.7 about here]
In Table 1.8, we report the results for pollution intensive firms and non-pollution intensive
firms. Specification (2) shows that determinants of eco-innovation differ slightly between
1.4. Empirical results 56
two groups of firms. For polluters we find that external R&D cooperation remains an
important driver of eco-innovation and confirms that abatement intensity as a positive
and significant impact on the promotion of eco-innovation. Nevertheless, the impact of
abatement cost on eco-innovation is slightly smaller for polluters comparing to our base-
line model. Thus, the presence of abatement costs motivates pollution intensive firms to
undertake eco-innovation, but as they are already likely to be highly regulated may make
them less sensitive to abatement rises. In other results we find that none of TFP, size or
the implementation of a EMS has as impact on the level of investment environmental R&D
of pollution intensive firms. The EMS result may be due to the fact that polluters already
have a relatively high rate of EMS implementation (shown in in Figure 1.6). Interestingly,
we now find that pollution intensive firms that export are more likely to eco-innovate.
For the relatively cleaner firms, model (3) shows generally similar results to the full sample.
Our results show that lagged abatement cost remains significant in affecting the investment
in environmental R&D of firms in clean sectors. Compared with polluters, the marginal
effect of our abatement cost variable is relatively larger such that 1% increase from mean
in abatement intensity increases the expenditure on eco-innovation by 7 percentage point
on average. However, from Table 1.2, we observe the average abatement intensity for
firms in clean sectors is almost one third smaller that that of polluters. Hence, our results
suggest that clean firms are more sensitive to environmental regulations. Relating our re-
sults to the pollution haven hypothesis, Gray and Shadbegian (1998) suggests that more
stringent regulations may divert investment from productivity to abatement expenditure.
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Our results suggest that firms in pollution intensive sectors would refer to pay the abate-
ment costs rather than starting the eco-innovation process with its attendant costs and
inherent uncertainty. In other results we find that firm age is negatively associated with
eco-innovation expenditure and suggests that younger firms invest relatively more resources
on eco-innovation everything else equal. We also find a positive and significant effect of
lagged TFP on eco-innovation which indicates that within those relatively cleaner sectors,
more productive firms invest more in eco-innovation activities.
[Table 1.8 about here]
1.5 Robustness Checks
As part of our analysis we undertake a series of sensitivity checks. The first set of robust-
ness checks test whether using different plant to firm level aggregation strategies influences
the results. For example, our results may be biased if we only have data on a small number
of a firm’s plants which would underestimate certain key variables. To address potential
aggregation bias we restrict the sample to firms according to the ratio between the firms′
total number of full-time equivalent employees for plants from the ANTIPOL data and the
total number of full-time equivalent employees from the financial data sets (FICUS and
FARE). A ratio equal to 100% suggests that there is no measurement error. In our estima-
tions we try three alternative thresholds that reduce measurement error as the threshold
increases but reduces the sample as the threshold increases.
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Table 1.9 presents our results from equation (1) using different thresholds for aggregating
plants to firms. Column (1) reports the baseline estimation with the whole sample which
can also be referred as 0% threshold, Columns (2), (3) and (4) reports the results for
thresholds of 50%, 75% and 90%, respectively. Focusing on our key variables of external
R&D and abatement intensity, our results are fairly consistent across the different models.
Following the same approach, we re-estimate the equation (1) using our three different
external R&D cooperation dummies and results are presented in Table 1.10. We also find
consistent results comparing with Table 1.7.
[Table 1.9 about here]
[Table 1.10 about here]
There are two possible reasons for the differences in the results. First, the measurement
bias is reduced as we restrict the sample. Second, the composition of sample changes as the
threshold increases. This selection may be endogenous as, for example, firms in pollution
intensive sectors are those most likely to be included in the 90% threshold sample as even
their smallest plants have to answer to ANTIPOL survey which a number of plants in
clean sectors do not. Despite these differences the results are fairly robust to the choice of
threshold and all of the key variables are significantly different from zero for all thresholds
suggesting that higher thresholds reduce the potential bias from the aggregation process.
1.5. Robustness Checks 59
Table 1.11 reports the distribution of firms by sectors for the 0% threshold sample and the
90% threshold sample. From Table 1.11 we observe that there is no substantial difference
in the composition of the sample between these two groups. Hence, we are confident that
the effect of a different sample composition is very small in our case and that our main
results are not unduly influenced by our aggregation methodology from plant level to firm
level.
[Table 1.11 about here]
Secondly, we implement Probit estimation to assess the impact of determinants on the
probability of doing eco-innovation. We generate an eco-innovation status variable which
equals to one if eco-innovation is greater than zero, zero other wise. Table 1.12 presents
results on Probit estimations. In Model (1) We find that compare to firms that had not
previously cooperated with external partners in R&D, firms that cooperated in the previous
period have 3.8% higher probability to devote to eco-innovation. Particularly in Model (2),
cooperating with foreign partners shows a significant and positive effect on the probability
of devoting to eco-innovation whereas cooperating with other two types of external partners
does not. Regarding control variables, larger and more productive firms are more likely
to invest in eco-innovation. In Model (4), we apply the generalized estimating equations
(GEE) estimation since calculating marginal effect for interaction term in Probit estimation
is inefficient (Papke and Wooldridge, 2008). We find the interaction term between external
R&D cooperation and internal R&D remains insignificant which also confirms our previous
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finding. Overall the results are fairly consistent comparing with Tobit estimates, showing
the robustness of our results.
[Table 1.12 about here]
In a final robustness check we use two alternative TFP measures using the Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) approach and Wooldridge (2009) approach to test whether excluding R&D
expenditure from the TFP estimation alters our results. To tackle the endogeneity problems
faced by traditional solutions, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose a two step approach
based on using material and investment respectively to proxy for the firm’s unobserved
productivity. Furthermore, Wooldridge (2009) argues that traditional two-stage methods
such as Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) are not efficient and re-
quire constructing the standard errors by bootstrap. Wooldridge (2009) proposes a new
approach combining the moment conditions of both stages into a single set and obtains effi-
cient GMM estimates in one step. The correlation coefficients between these measurements
of TFP are relatively high and Table 1.13 shows that the estimated MEs vary from 0.0511
to 0.0550 and remain significant at the 5% level across the three different specifications.
[Table 1.13 about here]
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1.6 Conclusions
This study contributes to the empirical literature that examines the drivers of eco-innovation
with particular attention being given to the impact of outsourcing R&D on the expendi-
ture on eco-innovation. Identifying the determinants of eco-innovation is of interest since
advances in environmental technologies are thought to help in the fight against the effects
of climate change. Although R&D expenditure has often been studied, previous data lim-
itations have restricted the ability to analyze the determinants of eco-innovation. In this
chapter we are able to overcome the data limitations of earlier studies by constructing a
panel of 2,197 French firms for the period 2004-2011 using data from various surveys on
innovation, environmental activities and finance.
Theoretically, we separate the determinants of eco-innovation into those that capture mar-
ket pull, technology push and regulation pull/push. From this theoretical framework we
formulate five hypotheses to reflect the impact of firms characteristics and policy instru-
ments on eco-innovation expenditure. These hypotheses are tested on a unique panel data
of firms across 22 manufacturing sectors in France taking into account various firm hetero-
geneity and endogeneity concerns.
Our main finding is that there is a positive effect of external knowledge sourcing on eco-
innovation expenditure and that this is primarily driven by cooperating with foreign part-
ners. The result holds for both pollution intensive and non pollution intensive firms, how-
ever the magnitude of the effect on pollution intensive is a little lower. Another of our
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main findings is that the stringency of regulations has a positive effect on the level of
eco-innovation. The policy that promotes eco-innovation reduces technological and mar-
ket uncertainty, on the other hand, given that eco-innovations are affected by the effect
of double externalities, implementation of environmental regulation helps fostering eco-
innovation. Although command and control (COC) instruments are significantly effective
in promoting eco-innovation, the lack of market-based policy instruments limits the devel-
opment of eco-innovation in the French context.
Our empirical results provide further explanation of the drivers that initiate and improve
eco-innovations and carries some important policy implementations. Whilst organizational
capabilities are key drivers of eco-innovation, the existence of strict government policies is
essential in stimulating the degree of eco-innovation. Thus, current environmental regula-
tions that target on promoting eco-innovations need to be supported by well designed policy
mixes for pollution abatement which should be inclusive of different kinds of policy instru-
ments. Also government supported innovation networks are also important through which
innovative firms can get the necessary support to enhance their organizational capabilities.
Overall, with the existence of sector heterogeneity, eco-innovation requires more support
from well designed and targeted environmental regulations. Evidence presented suggests
that current regulatory framework does not seem to effectively motivate eco-innovation,
especially for market-based environmental policy instruments. Thus, current regulatory
instruments require enhancement and policymakers should provide incentives to firms to
engage in eco-innovation by using a mixture of different kinds of policy.
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1.7 Figures and tables



















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source: elaboration based on the Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to R&D
Activities data on French firms over the period 2004-2011.
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Source: elaboration based on ANTIPOL data on French firms over the period 2004-
2011.































2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source: elaboration based on ANTIPOL data on French firms over the period 2004-
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Source: elaboration based on the Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to R&D
Activities data on French firms over the period 2004-2011.
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Source: elaboration based on ANTIPOL,FARE and FICUS data on French firms over
the period 2004-2011.
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17 Textiles                                                                 
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and 
dying of fur                             
19 Leather, leather products and 
footwear                                  
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29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.                                         
30 Office machinery and computers                                           
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apparatus, n.e.c                               
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communication equipment and 
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trailers                              
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40 Electricity, gas and water supply   
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Table 1.1: Definition of variables
Variable Description
Dependent Variables
Log EnvR&D log of green R&D expenditure
Explanatory variables
ExtR&D d =1 if the firm is subcontracting and collaborating on R&D with external parties,
0 otherwise
ExtR&D foreign d =1 if the firm is subcontracting and collaborating on R&D with overseas private
sector, 0 otherwise
ExtR&D domestic d =1 if the firm is subcontracting and collaborating on R&D with private sector
in France, 0 otherwise
ExtR&D public d =1 if the firm is subcontracting and collaborating on R&D with public sectors
(including higher educations and public organizations), 0 otherwise
Log ExtR&D log of R&D investment subcontract and collaborate with external parties,
Log ExtR&D foreign log of R&D investment subcontract and collaborate with overseas private sector
Log ExtR&D domestic log of R&D investment subcontract and collaborate with with private sector in France
Log ExtR&D public log of R&D investment subcontract and collaborate with public sectors
(including higher educations and public organizations)
R&D intensity number of full-time equivalent employees dedicated to R&D divided by
total number of full-time equivalent employees
EMS =1 if the firm has implemented ISO14001 or other environmental management systems,
0 otherwise
EMS process =1 if the firm is in the process of applying for environment management system,
0 otherwise
Abatement intensity total abatement costs divided by total output in %
Pubfunding d =1 if the firm receives resources from public sector
TFP total factor productivity
Log age log of number of years since the firm began to operate
Log size log of firm size (total number of full-time equivalent employees)
Log avewage log of average wage (total salary expenditure divided by total number of full-time
equivalent employees)
Export d =1 if the firm exports, 0 otherwise
French group =1 if more than 50% of share of the firm is held by a French group, 0 otherwise
Foreign group =1 if more than 50% of share of the firm is held by a foreign group, 0 otherwise
Leverage ratio between total liability and shareholders’ equity
1.7. Figures and tables 68
Table 1.2: Summary statistics for all firms
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
EnvR&D d 0.2661 0.4419 0 1
EnvR&D (EUR th.) 442.9893 4626.066 0 191780.4
ExtR&D d 0.6027 0.4894 0 1
ExtR&D foreign d 0.1956 0.3967 0 1
ExtR&D domestic d 0.4892 0.4999 0 1
ExtR&D public d 0.2766 0.4473 0 1
ExtR&D (EUR th.) 2201.823 11278.52 0 287914
ExtRD foreign (EUR th.) 596.7932 3864.092 0 82708.79
ExtRD domestic (EUR th.) 1433.073 8916.767 0 263279
ExtRD public (EUR th.) 163.9508 1937.113 0 62508
R&D intensity 0.0880 0.0974 0.0002 0.8421
EMS 0.7158 0.4511 0 1
EMS process 0.1236 0.3291 0 1
Abatement intensity (in %) 0.1760 0.3782 0 2.5846
Pubfunding d 0.2516 0.4339 0 1
TFP 3.3442 0.4599 0.1250 7.0755
Age 33.3045 23.5128 2 111
Size 604.7061 805.8915 12.5 3908
Avewage (EUR th.) 38.2415 11.5514 17.6686 88.5162
Export d 0.9557 0.2058 0 1
French group 0.5229 0.4995 0 1
Foreign group 0.4664 0.4989 0 1
Leverage 1.3793 2.8240 -11.6410 22.9539
Source: ANTIPOL, FARE, FICUS and The Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to
R&D Activities data. Unit: thousand euros. Information refers to the period 2004-2011.
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Table 1.3: Annual environmental R&D expenditure for 2004-2011









Source: The Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to R&D Activities.










Table 1.4: Average environmental R&D expenditure by sector
All firms Eco-innovators
Nace code Description Number of firms Green R&D Number of firms Green R&D
15 Food products and beverages 198 20.43564 35 123.7706
17 Textiles 72 31.90969 19 177.8669
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 9 24.11169 2 241.1169
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 12 15.09229 3 61.87838
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 23 37.42039 9 111.0541
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 43 116.6858 18 286.5966
22 Printing and publishing 9 12.09498 2 75.59361
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 13 282.8591 9 593.0917
24 Chemicals and chemical products 379 466.2922 158 1703.992
25 Rubber and plastics products 202 93.10162 84 337.252
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 67 684.9005 29 1897.066
27 Basic metals 78 144.1542 28 562.2012
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 197 75.34621 67 275.9001
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 317 193.2221 124 664.7382
30 Office machinery and computers 12 3.605098 1 38.7548
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c 144 174.4865 51 708.79
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 81 58.12385 14 471.1742
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 147 89.61187 24 815.8171
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 94 496.7682 26 2856.417
35 Other transport equipment 52 4049.935 23 11413.45
36 Manufacturing n.e.c 54 707.73 22 2344.356
40 Electricity, gas and water supply 10 9338.456 7 14785.89
Source: The Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to R&D Activities. Information refers to the period 2004-2011.
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Table 1.5: Summary statistics of polluters and non-polluters
Variable all firms polluter nonpolluters
EnvR&D d 0.2659 0.3080 0.2508
(0.4418) (0.4618) (0.4335)
EnvR&D (EUR th.) 442.9893 492.8611 422.0024
(4626.006) 3732.59 (4954.4)
ExtR&D d 0.5985 0.6622 0.5776
(0.4902) (0.4731) (0.4939)
ExtR&D foreign d 0.1944 0.2390 0.1773
(0.3958) (0.4266) (0.3819)
ExtR&D domestic d 0.4858 0.5368 0.4692
(0.4998) (0.4988) (0.4991)
ExtR&D public d 0.2744 0.3835 0.2315
(0.4462) (0.4864) (0.4207)
ExtR&D (EUR th.) 0.3984 0.1261 0.0872
(0.3602) (0.1902) (0.1446)
ExtRD foreign (EUR th.) 596.7932 680.32 549.35
(3864.09) (4257.12) (3583.81)
ExtRD domestic (EUR th.) 1433.073 786.43 1644.98
(8916.767) (3295.31) (9957.06)
ExtRD public (EUR th.) 163.9508 225.74 135.59
(1937.11) (2482.28) (1608.57)
R&D intensity 0.880 0.0914 0.0866
(0.1867) (0.0907) (0.1001)
EMS 0.7149 0.7370 0.7059
(0.4515) (0.4403) (0.4557)
EMS process 0.1235 0.1300 0.1206
(0.3291) (0.3364) (0.3257)
Abatement intensity (in %) 0.2964 0.3281 0.1069
(0.1967) (0.5399) (0.2456)
Pubfunding d 0.2496 0.2433 0.2551
(0.4328) (0.4292) (0.4359)
TFP 3.3441 3.3815 3.3285
(0.4603) (0.4912) (0.4453)
Age 33.3281 34.7973 32.6753
(23.5056) (24.8948) (22.8788)
Size 601.3407 554.363 625.8715
(802.695) (759.051) (823.9445)
Avewage (EUR th.) 38.2013 40.5277 37.2803
(11.5479) (10.9773) (11.6523)
Export d 0.9556 0.9487 0.9586
(0.2059) (0.2207) (0.1992)
French group 0.5221 0.5051 0.5313
(0.4995) (0.5001) (0.4991)
Foreign group 0.4673 0.4813 0.4602
(0.4989) (0.4998) (0.4985)
Leverage 1.3864 1.2832 1.4198
(2.8287) (2.7124) (2.8681)
Source: ANTIPOL, FARE, FICUS and The Annual Survey on the Resources
Devoted to R&D Activities data. Standard deviations in parentheses. Information
refers to the period 2004-2011.
1.7. Figures and tables 72
Table 1.6: Determinants of eco-innovation of French manufacturing firms (2004-2011):
baseline estimation
Dependent variable: Log EnvR&D
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)




ExtR&D foreign di(t−1) 0.0550
∗∗
(0.0223)
ExtR&D domestic di(t−1) 0.0196
(0.0182)
ExtR&D public di(t−1) 0.0305
(0.0198)





∗∗∗ 0.0669∗∗∗ 0.0644∗∗∗ 0.1408∗∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0475)
EMS processi(t−1) 0.0073 0.0076 0.0073 0.0102
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0435)
Abatement intensityi(t−1) 0.0620
∗∗∗ 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.0619∗∗∗ 0.1165∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0422)
Pubfunding di(t−1) 0.0319 0.0308 0.0316 0.0364
(0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0424)
TFPi(t−1) 0.0511
∗∗ 0.0504∗∗ 0.0514∗∗ 0.1004∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0478)
Log agei(t−1) -0.0327 -0.0325 -0.0322 -0.0288
(0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0359)
Log sizei(t−1) 0.0777
∗∗∗ 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.1003∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0262)
Log avewagei(t−1) 0.0098 0.0110 0.0051 -0.0069
(0.0562) (0.0560) (0.0544) (0.1075)
Export di(t−1) 0.0614 0.0619 0.0610 0.0979
(0.0492) (0.0491) (0.0491) (0.0797)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0827 0.0801 0.0824 0.1749
(0.0949) (0.0947) (0.0948) (0.1596)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0654 0.0594 0.0659 0.1338
(0.0962) (0.0959) (0.0960) (0.1598)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0031 -0.0058
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0050)
Log likelihood -7580.96 -7581.17 -7582.23 -7580.82
Wald chi2 323.68∗∗∗ 323.64∗∗∗ 322.90∗∗∗ 324.12∗∗∗
Observations 7,238 7,238 7,243 7,238
No.firms 2,197 2,197 2,199 2,197
Marginal effects reported with standard errors in parentheses for Specification (1), (2) and (3). Coefficient
reported with standard errors in parentheses for Specification (4). All regressions include sectoral, year and
regional dummies. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.7. Figures and tables 73
Table 1.7: Determinants of eco-innovation of French manufacturing firms (2004-2011):
alternative measurement of external R&D
Dependent variable: Log EnvR&D
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)




Log ExtR&D foreigni(t−1) 0.0075
∗∗
(0.0042)
Log ExtR&D domestici(t−1) 0.0022
(0.0036)
Log ExtR&D publici(t−1) 0.0064
(0.0052)





∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0645∗∗∗ 0.6959∗∗∗
(0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.2429)
EMS processi(t−1) 0.0091 0.0067 0.0061 0.0064
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0372)
Abatement intensityi(t−1) 0.0598
∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0614∗∗∗ 0.0673∗∗
(0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0214)
Pubfunding di(t−1) 0.0315 0.0318 0.0327 0.0377
(0.0202) (0.0205) (0.0201) (0.0223)
TFPi(t−1) 0.0602
∗∗ 0.0518∗∗ 0.0509∗∗ 0.0539∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0265)
Log agei(t−1) -0.0342
∗ -0.0325 -0.0321 -0.0356
(0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0226)
Log sizei(t−1) 0.0742
∗∗∗ 0.0733∗∗∗ 0.0728∗∗∗ 0.0413∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0162)
Log avewagei(t−1) -0.0056 0.0076 0.0010 -0.0009
(0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0544) (0.0614)
Export di(t−1) 0.0605 0.0601 0.0596 0.0657
(0.0488) (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0537)
french groupi(t−1) 0.0767 0.0809 0.0803 0.0915
(0.0944) (0.0944) (0.0943) (0.1034)
foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0579 0.0615 0.0645 0.0739
(0.0962) (0.0957) (0.0955) (0.1046)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0058
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0050)
log likelihood -7580.96 -7584.16 -7584.78 -7580.24
Wald chi2 323.68∗∗∗ 317.17∗∗∗ 318.00∗∗∗ 325.32∗∗∗
Observations 7,238 7,238 7,243 7,238
No.firms 2,197 2,197 2,199 2,197
Marginal effects reported with standard errors in parentheses for Specification (1), (2) and (3). Coefficient
reported with standard errors in parentheses for Specification (4). All regressions include sectoral, year and
regional dummies. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Determinants of eco-innovation of French manufacturing firms (2004-2011):
pollution intensive and non-pollution intensive firms
Dependent variable: Log EnvR&D
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)



























Log avewagei(t−1) 0.0098 0.0697 -0.0345
(0.0562) (0.0997) (0.0698)
Export di(t−1) 0.0614 0.1919
∗∗ -0.0174
(0.0492) (0.0854) (0.0621)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0827 -0.0158 0.1777
(0.0949) (0.1436) (0.1369)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0654 -0.1279 0.2102
(0.0962) (0.1454) (0.1387)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0031 -0.0042 -0.0029
(0.0026) (0.0055) (0.0031)
Log likelihood -7580.96 -2475.05 -5074.38
Wald chi2 323.68∗∗∗ 108.48∗∗∗ 248.53∗∗∗
Observations 7,238 2,146 5,092
No.firms 2,197 577 1,620
Marginal effects reported with standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include
sectoral, year and regional dummies. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Determinants of eco-innovation of French manufacturing firms (2004-2011):
baseline model for different thresholds regarding aggregation process
Dependent variable: Log EnvR&D
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
(0%) (50%) (75%) (90%)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
ExtR&D di(t−1) 0.0670
∗∗∗ 0.0689∗∗∗ 0.0724∗∗∗ 0.0624∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0210) (0.0226) (0.0250)
R&D intensityi(t−1) -0.0104 -0.0752 -0.1675 -0.1647
(0.1581) (0.1709) (0.1818) (0.1931)
EMSi(t−1) 0.0644
∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗ 0.0774∗∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0248) (0.0265) (0.0285)
EMS processi(t−1) 0.0073 0.0004 -0.0085 -0.0118
(0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0268) (0.0298)
Abatement intensityi(t−1) 0.0620
∗∗∗ 0.0607∗∗∗ 0.0557∗∗ 0.0516∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0215) (0.0228) (0.0253)
Pubfunding di(t−1) 0.0319 0.0315 0.0438 0.0592
∗∗
(0.0203) (0.0225) (0.0245) (0.0276)
TFPi(t−1) 0.0511
∗∗ 0.0483∗∗ 0.0556∗∗ 0.0652∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0265) (0.0283) (0.0314)
Log agei(t−1) -0.0327 -0.0249 -0.0219 -0.0214
(0.0206) (0.0219) (0.0231) (0.0243)
Log sizei(t−1) 0.0777
∗∗∗ 0.0792∗∗∗ 0.0808∗∗∗ 0.0857∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0162) (0.0172) (0.0184)
Log avewagei(t−1) 0.0098 0.0284 0.0289 -0.0201
(0.0562) (0.0621) (0.0674) (0.0751)
Export di(t−1) 0.0614 0.0368 0.0300 0.0458
(0.0492) (0.0529) (0.0540) (0.0587)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0827 0.1018 0.1100 0.1427
(0.0949) (0.1033) (0.1069) (0.1117)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0654 0.0915 0.0955 0.1307
(0.0962) (0.1045) (0.1082) (0.1132)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0040 -0.0037
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0034)
Log likelihood -7580.96 -6729.71 -5869.39 -5146.09
LR test 323.68∗∗∗ 289.73∗∗∗ 262.83∗∗∗ 227.24∗∗∗
Observations 7,238 6,358 5,615 4,931
No.firms 2,197 2,096 1,979 1,858
Marginal effects reported with standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include
sectoral, year and regional dummies. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Determminants of eco-innovation of French manufacturing firms (2004-2011):
baseline model for different thresholds regarding aggregation process
Dependent variable: Log EnvR&D
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
(0%) (50%) (75%) (90%)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
ExtR&D foreign di(t−1) 0.0550
∗∗ 0.0417∗ 0.0504∗ 0.0451∗
(0.0223) (0.0247) (0.0268) (0.0277)
ExtR&D domestic di(t−1) 0.0196 0.0318 0.0406
∗ 0.0309
(0.0182) (0.0201) (0.0214) (0.0236)
ExtR&D public di(t−1) 0.0305 0.0281 0.0254 0.0377
(0.0198) (0.0216) (0.0234) (0.0261)
R&D intensityi(t−1) -0.0290 -0.0886 -0.1870 -0.1867
(0.1585) (0.1714) (0.1822) (0.1936)
EMSi(t−1) 0.0669
∗∗∗ 0.0674∗∗∗ 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0797∗∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0248) (0.0264) (0.0285)
EMS processi(t−1) 0.0076 0.0003 -0.0078 -0.0109
(0.0217) (0.0244) (0.0267) (0.0297)
Abatement intensityi(t−1) 0.0640
∗∗∗ 0.0625∗∗∗ 0.0568∗∗ 0.0531∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0214) (0.0227) (0.0252)
Pubfunding di(t−1) 0.0308 0.0304 0.0420
∗ 0.0557∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0226) (0.0246) (0.0277)
TFPi(t−1) 0.0504
∗∗ 0.0480∗∗ 0.0549∗ 0.0652∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0265) (0.0283) (0.0314)
Log agei(t−1) -0.0325 -0.0248 -0.0219 -0.0209
(0.0206) (0.0219) (0.0231) (0.0243)
Log sizei(t−1) 0.0745
∗∗∗ 0.0766∗∗∗ 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.0820∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0163) (0.0173) (0.0185)
Log avewagei(t−1) 0.0110 0.0295 0.0295 -0.0225
(0.0560) (0.0619) (0.0672) (0.0749)
Export di(t−1) 0.0619 0.0375 0.0309 0.0464
(0.0491) (0.0528) (0.0539) (0.0586)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0801 0.1007 0.1092 0.1425
(0.0947) (0.1031) (0.1067) (0.1115)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0594 0.0878 0.0917 0.1279
(0.0959) (0.1042) (0.1079) (0.1130)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0029 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0036
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0034)
Log likelihood -7581.17 -6730.72 -5869.39 -5145.39
LR test 323.38∗∗∗ 287.91∗∗∗ 262.83∗∗∗ 228.35∗∗∗
Observations 7,238 6,358 5,615 4,931
No.firms 2,197 2,096 1,979 1,858
Marginal effects reported with standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include










Table 1.11: Firm distribution for threshold 0% level and threshold 100% level
0% threshold 100% threshold
Nace code Description Number of firms Percentage in % Number of firms Percentage in %
15 Food products and beverages 198 8.95 130 7.83
17 Textiles 72 3.25 59 3.58
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 9 0.41 3 0.18
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 12 0.54 11 0.66
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 23 1.04 21 1.31
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 43 1.94 32 1.91
22 Printing and publishing 9 0.41 7 0.42
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 13 0.59 10 0.59
24 Chemicals and chemical products 379 17.13 263 15.83
25 Rubber and plastics products 202 9.13 165 9.92
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 67 3.03 37 2.27
27 Basic metals 78 3.52 64 3.88
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 197 8.90 158 9.56
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 317 14.32 254 15.23
30 Office machinery and computers 12 0.54 6 0.36
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c 144 6.51 103 6.15
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 81 3.66 63 3.76
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 147 6.64 106 6.39
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 94 4.25 79 4.78
35 Other transport equipment 52 2.35 45 2.69
36 Manufacturing n.e.c 54 2.44 37 2.27
40 Electricity, gas and water supply 10 0.45 7 0.42
total 2,213 100 1,660 100
Source: ANTIPOL, FARE, FICUS and The Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to R&D Activities data. Information refers to the period 2004-2011.
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Table 1.12: Probability of eco-innovation of French manufacturing firms (2004-2011)
Dependent variable: EnvR&D d
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)




ExtR&D foreign di(t−1) 0.0268
∗∗
(0.0136)
ExtR&D domestic di(t−1) 0.0142
(0.0109)
ExtR&D public di(t−1) 0.0162
(0.0124)





∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.1408∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0475)
EMS processi(t−1) 0.0070 0.0068 0.0070 0.0102
(0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0435)
Abatement intensityi(t−1) 0.0369
∗∗∗ 0.0371∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.1165∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0422)
Pubfunding di(t−1) 0.0107 0.0100 0.0096 0.0364
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0424)
TFPi(t−1) 0.0343
∗∗ 0.0339∗∗ 0.0344∗∗ 0.1004∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0478)
Log agei(t−1) -0.0148 -0.0148 -0.0142 -0.0288
(0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0359)
Log sizei(t−1) 0.0337
∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0341∗∗∗ 0.1003
(0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0262)
Log avewagei(t−1) -0.0088 -0.0089 -0.0167 -0.0069
(0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0325) (0.1075)
Export di(t−1) 0.0366 0.0368 0.0363 0.0979
(0.0291) (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0797)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0498 0.0482 0.0501 0.1749
(0.0520) (0.0517) (0.0519) (0.1596)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0406 0.0376 0.0420 0.1338
(0.0527) (0.0524) (0.0526) (0.1598)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0058
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0050)
log likelihood -2923.22 -2924.18 -2924.47
Wald chi2 260.77∗∗∗ 258.76∗∗∗ 259.85∗∗∗ 242.01∗∗∗
observations 7,300 7,300 7,305 7,300
No.firms 2,212 2,212 2,214 2,212
Marginal effects reported with standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include
sectoral, year and regional dummies. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.13: Determinants of eco-innovation of French manufacturing firms (2004-2011):
alternative measurements of total factor productivity
Dependent variable: Log EnvR&D
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)































Log avewagei(t−1) 0.0098 0.0060 0.0072
(0.0562) (0.0564) (0.0563)
Export di(t−1) 0.0614 0.0612 0.0612
(0.0492) (0.0492) (0.0492)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0827 0.0819 0.0824
(0.0949) (0.0949) (0.0949)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0654 0.0651 0.0649
(0.0962) (0.0962) (0.0962)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0031
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Log likelihood -7580.96 -7583.39 -7580.88
Wald chi2 323.68∗∗∗ 324.62∗∗∗ 324.02∗∗∗
Observations 7,238 7,244 7,239
No.firms 2,197 2,198 2,197
Marginal effects reported with standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include
sectoral, year and regional dummies. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter 2
Eco-innovation, environmental regulation and




In this chapter we examine the impact of environmental regulations on firm performance
measured by productivity and profitability using a firm-level panel data of French manufac-
turing firms that invest in R&D. More specifically, we measure environmental abatement
costs to capture regulatory stringency and investigate whether stringent environmental
regulations weaken firms’ economic performance. In addition we test whether regulatory
induced eco-innovation could offset environmental abatement pressure, known as the Porter
hypothesis. Finally, we provide new evidence on the relationship between regulatory strin-
gency and profitability. Unlike studies that use more aggregated data, our unique firm-level
data-set allows us to use an identification strategy that is less sensitive to macroeconomics
shocks that may be correlated with country or sector level eco-innovation and environmental
regulations. Our results show that at the current stage, stricter environmental regulations
harm firm total factor productivity (TFP) and meanwhile eco-innovation is not able to
offset this negative effect for French innovators. Meanwhile, we find regulations have no
impact on firm profitability after all, whereas eco-innovation significantly reduces firm’s
profitability. Overall, we do not find sufficient evidence supporting the Porter hypothesis.
Policy implications are discussed.
Keywords: Eco-Innovation, France, abatement costs, productivity
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2.1 Introduction
Along with economic development, pollution as an accompaniment created along with eco-
nomic activities has affected the environment and further intensified climate change. To
handle the challenges of climate change and resource scarcity, more and more organizations
have started advocating innovation activities relating to environment protection to effec-
tively reduce pollution and improve the utilization of scarce resources (Carrillo-Hermosilla
et al., 2010). Triguero et al. (2013) introduce eco-innovation as a common environmental
strategy that firms adopt to achieve superior environmental and economic performance si-
multaneously.
As the third largest economy in the EU, France possesses a strong track record in environ-
mental protection. The total environmental expenditures accounted for about 3% of GDP
in France which is above the EU members’ average and in the Eco-innovation Scoreboard,
France is at the 7th place in 2015(Eco-innovation Observatory, 2018). The eco-industry
employment accounts for on average 1.3% of total paid employment in France (European
Commission, 2015).1 Cainelli et al. (2011) illustrate the importance of eco-industry and
suggest that eco-industry has the capability to help the world begin to recover from the
financial crises.
This study investigates the direct relationship between regulatory stringency and produc-
1The definition for eco-industry is that Firms providing goods and services for environmental protection.
The definition includes the provision of clean technologies, renewable energy, waste recycling, nature and
landscape protection, and ecological renovation of urban areas.(European Commission, 2018)
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tivity, and the consequent indirect influence of eco-innovation triggered by regulations on
productivity for French manufacturing firms. In particular, we contribute to the litera-
ture in three aspects. First, we not only measure economic performance using total factor
productivity (TFP), but also incorporate operating margin to investigate the financial per-
formance of French firms. Secondly, we examine the similarities and differences between
pollution intensive and non-pollution intensive firms in the French context. Finally, Kozluk
and Zipperer (2015) suggest that most of the existing empirical studies use country level
or sector level data. Unlike more aggregated data, our firm-level data allows us to identify
the level of investment in eco-innovation which is less sensitive to macroeconomic shocks
that may be correlated with country or sector level eco-innovation and environmental reg-
ulations.
To briefly summarize our findings, we find that at the current stage, stricter environmental
regulations harm firms productivity and meanwhile regulation induced eco-innovation is
not able to offset this negative effect for French innovators. Furthermore, we find that it
is firms that pay higher integrated abatement expenditures that has the main influence
on the decline of productivity in France. Meanwhile, we find stringent regulations have
no impact on firm’s profitability after all, whereas regulation induced eco-innovation sig-
nificantly reduces firm’s profitability and this significant effect indicates the high initial
costs for eco-innovation which could potentially harm firms competitiveness. Overall, we
do not find sufficient evidence supporting the Porter hypothesis that strict environmental
regulations could induce efficiency and stimulate innovation that helps firms improving
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competitiveness in the market.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the environmen-
tal regulation framework in France and Section 3 provides a brief literature review of both
the theoretical and empirical analysis. Section 4 provides a comprehensive description of
the data sets and presents our empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses our results. The final
section concludes.
2.2 Background
In this section, we provide a detailed introduction to the environmental regulations ap-
plied to French manufacturing sectors. French environmental regulatory framework is sub-
stantially influenced by EU laws and specifically in the Environmental Code, most of the
relevant laws and decrees have been codified. The Environmental Code focuses on three
dimensions including resource consumption, climate change, and pollution emission.
Regarding resource consumption, as an important resource, lands are regulated by two
land-use regulations, namely solidarity and urban regeneration establishes metropolitan
plans (SCoT) and local land use plans (PLU). A construction project needs to comply
with local land use plan which gives permission based on several criteria including an en-
vironmental impact report. Furthermore, the planning tax is applied to all activities of
building that require permission to build based on the surface of the new construction.
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The value of planning tax in 2014 was 705 per square meter, and for different municipali-
ties across France, this rate fluctuates between 1% and 5% across different municipalities.
Second, water consumption is charged with certain rates which depend on various criteria
set by the government. In addition, groundwater is considered more valuable with a higher
tax rate than surface water. Third, extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) schemes are
specifically introduced in France to increase recycling of materials. For each EPR, manu-
facturers pay non-profit private companies which recycle wastes. The rate of the payments
depends on manufacturers output level. Fourth, fuel consumption is also regulated by the
French government and the tax rates vary across different types of fuels. Although collect-
ing government revenue is the primary target for setting up fuel taxes, fuel taxes efficiently
restrict fuel consumption and the accompanied emissions. For instance, industries such as
chemical, cement, non-metallic products in France exempt from fuel taxes like many other
European countries (Baranzini et al., 2000).
Carbon emissions are regulated through two panels: the domestic tax system and the Euro-
pean Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). France’s carbon tax was first introduced
on April 1st 2014 at a rate of 7 per tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent (OECD, 2014).
However, carbon taxes are included in the Internal Consumption Tax on Energy Products,
which applies to firms that produce, import, and/or store fossil fuel. Thus carbon tax is
passed on to consumers through higher price. The EU-ETS is a cap-and-trade system for
green house gases emissions that covers every EU members. The EU-ETS entered into force
in 2005. Until 2016, Emissions from installations in the system has been falling by slightly
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over 8% compared to the beginning (European Commission, 2016). According to EU-ETS,
emissions from firms are not allowed to exceed preset levels which depend on a number of
criteria . However, trading emission permits on the market with other firms that receive
emission allowances is allowed. Except emission intensive sectors, not all manufacturing
sectors are covered by the EU-ETS,.
In France, the government regulates emissions through the tax system ”Taxe Generale sur
les Activites Polluantes” (TGAP). In 2017, 18 pollutants such as sulfur oxides and other
sulfur compounds, hydrochloric acid, etcetera are included, and the tax rates are subject to
pollutants. TGAP levies taxes on firms with a polluting activity or selling polluting prod-
ucts: waste, harmful emissions, oils and fossil fuels, detergents and extracted resources
(of France, 2019). In addition, firms in waste storage and waste incineration sector have a
specific TGAP rate depends on the wastes. Finally, water pollutants including suspended
solids, chemical oxygen demand (COD), biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), reduced ni-
trogen, phosphorus, metals and metalloids, inhibitors, Adsorbable Organic Halogen (AOX),
and thermal pollution are charged. A category of stringency is attributed to each watershed
components given their level of pollution. There are three categories from lax to strict. The
rate of the fee varies across pollutants.
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2.3 Literature review
The debate on the economic costs of environmental regulations has been taking place for
decades. The conventional point of view suggests that stricter environmental regulations
raise costs which weaken firms’ competitiveness in the market (Christainsen and Haveman,
1981; Gollop and Roberts, 1983). Environmental regulations impose additional financial
constraints on firms’ productive activities in two ways. First, firms face direct costs such
as end-of-pipe products or process-integrated technologies to adjust production processes.
Second, due to financial constraints, firms’ budgets are bounded. By devoting additional
resources to comply with environmental regulations, there are potential opportunity costs
for the firms since they are unable to invest in other profitable opportunities.
In contrast to the conventional point of view, Michael Porter associated environmental
regulations with positive performance impacts of affected firms for the first time in 1991
(Porter, 1991). The argument was further elaborated in Porter and Van der Linde (1995)
and known as the Porter hypothesis. The hypothesis is as follow: environmental standards
can trigger innovation in firms and therefore allow them to offset the costs of complying
with these standards. Critical to their argument is that firms would not innovate in the
absence of government regulation. The authors propose that regulations can unlock profit
opportunities that firms otherwise could not have developed alone by opening up new mar-
kets. In addition, regulations can also reduce uncertainty about future demands for new
technologies and hence lead to a higher level of R&D investment than without regulation.
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More specifically, Porter and Van der Linde (1995) suggest that environmental regula-
tions may affect firms’ productivity in two ways. First, the direct effect of regulations on
productivity implies that firms are forced to re-evaluate their production procedures to
meet regulatory requirements. And this involuntary action comes with extra capital costs
as regulation abatement expenditures, thus regulations tend to lower firms’ productivity.
Second, environmental regulations may affect firms’ productivity through innovation. Envi-
ronmental regulations cause firms to invest more resources to innovation and some of these
innovations could reduce negative environmental externality. Nevertheless these triggered
innovations may offset the additional costs and even enhance productivity. Furthermore,
Porter and Van der Linde (1995) suggest the impact of environmental regulations on pro-
ductivity may not be significant in the short run since innovation is not necessarily a short
term process. It can take a relatively long time to invent a technology in response to an ex-
isting environmental regulation and that may affect current profit. However, eco-innovation
would provide an early mover advantage.
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) extend the Porter hypothesis by introducing three distinct variants
of the Porter hypothesis, namely “weak,” “narrow,” and “strong” version. The “weak” ver-
sion argues that well designed environmental regulations may stimulate innovation and this
argument does not indicate the types of innovation. The “narrow” version suggests that
flexible environmental regulations give firms greater incentive to innovate than prescriptive
forms of regulations. Finally, the “strong” version posits that well designed environmental
regulations may induce innovation which would compensate for the cost of compliance,
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thus environmental regulations could potentially enhance firms’ competitiveness.
A number of studies examine the impact of strict environmental regulations on economic
performance and empirical evidence is considerably mixed (Ambec et al., 2013; Kozluk and
Zipperer, 2015). Early industry-level studies, which tend to find a negative effect of envi-
ronmental regulations on productivity growth, suffer from problems of identification. Gray
(1987) takes both environmental and workers’ health and safety regulations into account
and tests their effects on productivity growth in U.S manufacturing industries and the au-
thor finds that the industries’ annual costs associated with pollution control significantly
reduce the annual productivity growth rate. Likewise in the U.S context, Alpay et al. (2002)
investigate the strong Porter hypothesis for the U.S and Mexican food processing indus-
tries. The authors calculate productivity using a micro profit function approach and find
relatively mixed results. Their results show an insignificant effect of pollution abatement
expenditures on either profitability or productivity growth in the U.S. However, Mexican
environmental regulations have a substantial impact on both profitability and productivity
growth. While regulatory enforcement reduced profitability significantly, a positive effect
on productivity growth is noted. Therefore the authors suggest environmental regulations
do not always harm productivity and they improve long run competitiveness to some extent.
Focusing on Quebec manufacturing sectors, Lanoie et al. (2008) provide more evidence for
the strong Porter hypothesis. Firstly, the authors measure regulation stringency using the
ratio of the investment in pollution-control equipment to the total cost and emphasize the
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dynamic feature of the Porter hypothesis. According to Lanoie et al. (2008), an environ-
mental regulation implemented at a certain time would influence firm’s performance in the
next one year or longer period until innovations targeting on coping with this regulation
are accomplished. So instead of investigating contemporaneous impact of a regulation, the
authors control for this dynamic effect by comparing the effect of environmental regulations
on productivity in a certain year and the same effect a few years later when new innovations
have been induced. Their results suggest that allowing the dynamic effect, environmental
regulations show a negative contemporaneous effect on productivity, however, after a few
years, they become less detrimental and even positive.
However, few industry-level studies have examined the whole causality chain, from regu-
lations to competitiveness, through innovation. In the Japan context, Hamamoto (2006)
finds a significant and positive effect of pollution abatement expenditures on the R&D ex-
penditures in five Japanese manufacturing sectors over 20 years, thus the author confirms
that the strict environmental regulations would stimulate innovation. Further results in-
dicate that the increases in R&D expenditures associated with strict regulations lead to
an increase in the TFP growth rate. Likewise, Yang et al. (2012) investigate causal links
between pollution abatement expenditures, innovation and productivity in Taiwan. The
authors find that the pollution abatement expenditures promote R&D activities, and the
induced R&D expenditures stimulated by environmental regulations have a significant pos-
itive effect on the growth rate of TFP. More recently, using abatement costs to measure
regulation stringency, Rubashkina et al. (2015) find that industry productivity is not sig-
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nificantly affected by abatement costs whereas patenting activities increase in a panel of 17
European manufacturing sectors. However, Franco and Marin (2017) find that downstream
stringency affects innovation activities and productivity the most while within-sector reg-
ulations only affect productivity but not innovation. The authors confirm the direct effect
of regulations on productivity, while the part of the effect mediated by induced innovations
is relevant only for what concerns downstream regulations.
Evidence from firm or plant-level studies also shows an inconclusive effect of environmen-
tal regulations on productivity growth (Cohen and Tubb, 2018). Gray and Shadbegian
(1995) investigate the relationship between regulation stringency and plant-level produc-
tivity for U.S paper, oil and steel industries. Their results show that pollution abatement
expenditures caused a decline in plant-level productivity in 1980s. Likewise, Jaffe et al.
(1995) remark the negative effect of environmental regulations on productivity and sug-
gest that for firms in heavily regulated industries, abatement costs take a relatively small
share of production costs, thus environmental regulations should not be expected to be a
key determinant of overall competitiveness. Berman and Bui (2001) focus on oil refinery
industry which is a heavily regulated sector in the U.S. The authors apply a difference in
difference (DiD) approach by comparing the productivity of refineries which are subject
to more stringent regulations in the South Coast Air Basin with refineries in other areas.
Their results suggest that treated refineries have a higher productivity even though they
are subjected to more stringent air pollution regulations. Thus the economic cost of envi-
ronmental regulations may be overemphasized. However the authors fail to consider plant
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specific characteristics in their analysis.
Additionally, applying a large U.S panel data with 1.2 million plants between 1972 and
1993, Greenstone et al. (2012) examine the economic costs of air quality regulations using
non-attainment designation as a measure of regulation. Their results suggest that stricter
air quality regulations reduce TFP by roughly 2.6%. Almost all of the effects occur in
the first year of non-attainment status, indicating pollution abatement expenditures re-
duce productivity in a short term. Gray and Shadbegian (1998) investigate paper mills’
technology choices in the U.S and find a significant effect of more stringent water and air
regulations on investment choices of paper mills. Such regulations encourage new mills to
invest more in eco-innovation. Nevertheless, mills which have relatively higher pollution
abatement expenditures tend to invest less in productive capital, and these losses have
larger magnitudes comparing with the increased abatement investments, leading to lower
total investments in high pollution paper mills. Though, their findings imply that stricter
regulations tend to reduce investments and relocate investments from production to abate-
ment, which is against the strong Porter hypothesis. Testing for all variants of the Porter
hypothesis, Lanoie et al. (2011) suggest that environmental regulations shift firm’s R&D
direction by which invest more in R&D activities specifically targeting on environmental
protection. Their results confirm the weak Porter hypothesis that environmental regulation
stimulates innovation, furthermore, the induced eco-innovation has a positive effect on firm
performance. However, the magnitude of the negative effect of environmental regulations
on firm performance is greater than the indirect causal link mediated with R&D expendi-
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tures. Therefore, strong Porter hypothesis is not supported.
Rennings and Rammer (2011) examine the effect of regulation-driven eco-innovation on in-
novation performance and profitability using 2003 Germany MIP survey and in general, the
authors find insignificant effects of environmental regulations on innovation activities and
profitability. However, when differentiating between product and process eco-innovation,
Rennings and Rammer (2011) show that the process eco-innovation triggered by environ-
mental regulations significantly reduce profit margin. Nevertheless, the limitation of cross-
sectional data restricts a generalization of the results. Rexhäuser and Rammer (2014)
measure profitability by return on sales (ROS) and identify two types of innovation activ-
ities, type one improves firm’s material and energy efficiency, and the other type does not.
The authors estimate the relationship between innovation activities and firm profitability
in Germany and they only find partial evidence supporting the strong Porter hypothesis.
These results suggest that only eco-innovation which improves resource efficiency positively
improves profitability. However the use of ROS may lead to potentially biased results since
accounting-based information also includes non-operating incomes. Nevertheless, the mea-
surement on eco-innovation is debatable since this study mainly considers eco-innovation
adopted without taking other technological capabilities into consideration. A recent study
from Van Leeuwen and Mohnen (2017) examine the impact of regulation stringency on pro-
ductivity through eco-innovation for Dutch manufacturing firms. Similarly, this study does
not show an overall significant effect of eco-innovation on productivity. The authors further
distinguish between product eco-innovation and process eco-innovation, and suggest that
2.4. Data and empirical strategy 94
process eco-innovation significantly increases TFP whereas product eco-innovation tends
to reduce TFP.
2.4 Data and empirical strategy
2.4.1 Data
To investigate the causal links among environmental regulations, eco-innovation and firm
performance, we merge four data sets to construct an unbalance panel data for French
manufacturing firms. First, ANTIPOL survey (Survey on environmental protection studies
and investments) is included in order to obtain information on regulation stringency at the
firm level. Secondly, financial information on manufacturing firms is obtained from two
data sets, namely the Unified and Comprehensive File of SUSE (FICUS) database and the
Approached File of ESANE Results (FARE). Finally, we include the Annual Survey on
the Resources Devoted to R&D Activities (Enquete annuelle sur les moyens consacres a la
R&D) collected by the French Ministry of Education and Research in our panel. Detailed
explanation regarding four data sets has been discussed in Chapter 1.
After merging four data sets presented above, we remove inconsistent observations and
errors from our sample, such as incomplete data, negative values for investment and other
contradictory information between different data sets. In addition, we drop all firms with
less than 10 full-time equivalence employees. All monetary variables are represented in the
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unit of thousand Euros and have been deflated using French Producer Price Index at the sec-
tor level with 2010 as a baseline (INSEE, 2017). Our final unbalanced panel data comprises
almost 4,800 observations for about 1,500 French manufacturing firms during 2004-2011.
We also distinguish between pollution intensive sectors and non-pollution intensive sectors.
In line with Shimamoto (2017), we categorize the five pollution intensive sectors including
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products, Manufacture of chemicals, chemical prod-
ucts and man-made fibres, Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel, Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products and Manufacture of basic metals
and fabricated metal products.
2.4.2 Empirical strategy
2.4.2.1 Environmental regulations and performances
We investigate the overall effect of regulation stringency on productivity. Environmental
regulations may affect productivity through several channels. First, the firm would devote
additional inputs to comply with environmental requirements which we refer to as the
direct effect. Thus, higher production costs may reduce productivity. On the other hand,
environmental regulations could trigger innovation which may increase productivity, we
refer to this as the indirect effect. To investigate the mechanism behind these effects, this
study applies a two-step approach following Hamamoto (2006) and Lanoie et al. (2011).
In the first step, we examine the determinants of environmental R&D with respect to
environmental regulations. Following previous studies (Kesidou and Demirel, 2012), the
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first step of the model is specified as follow:
Log EnvR&Di,t−1 = β1(TFPi,t−2) +β2(Fi,t−2) +β2(Ti,t−2) +β3(Pi,t−2) +µi +γt + εi,t (2.1)
where Log EnvR&D is the log of environmental R&D expenditure of firm i in year t − 1.
Table 2.1 defines our variables. In the first set of variables F, we include firm specific factors
(Del Ŕıo et al., 2017) including firm age, firm size, average wage, ownership of firm, market
share and leverage. Then in the second set of variables T, we include a series of variables to
capture firms’ technological capabilities and includes R&D intensity, external cooperation
R&D dummy, public funding dummy, EMS dummy and EMS process dummy. Finally, we
include abatement intensity as our policy instrument in the set of variables P. In addition,
we take into account time-invariant characteristics through random effect µ and fix param-
eters of regional, time and sector dummies, namely γt. Regional and sector dummies are
included to control for time invariant factors common to firms across different regions and
sectors respectively and meanwhile we include year dummies to account for business cycle
effects. Given the potential reverse causality if firm environmental R&D causes changes in
firm productivity, we impose a lag structure to control for the delayed effect and to resolve
the reverse causality concerns. The estimation results for 2.1 is presented in 2.2.
[Table 2.1 about here]
[Table 2.2 about here]
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Based on the estimated environmental R&D expenditure in the first stage, we further
examine the impact of induced environmental R&D on productivity. As TFP denotes the
contribution to value-added excluding labor and capital in the production function, it is
generally specified as a function of firms’ technological activity measure and other factors
in the productivity literature. Thus after estimating the regulation induced eco-innovation
from Equation (1), the second step of the model is specified as follow:
TFPi,t = β1(fitted Log EnvR&Di,t−1) + β2(Fi,t−1) + β3(Ti,t−1) + β4(Pi,t−1) + µi + γt + λi,t
(2.2)
where TFP is the total factor productivity of the firm i at year t. To elaborate our argument
on firm performance comprehensively, we use the estimated environmental R&D expendi-
ture from Equation 2.1 to estimate the effect of induced environmental R&D expenditure
on firm profitability, the model is specified as follow:
Operating margini,t =β1(fitted Log EnvR&Di,t−1) + TFPi,t−1 + β2(Fi,t−1) + β3(Ti,t−1)+
β4(Pi,t−1) + µi + γt + λi,t
(2.3)
where Operating margin is the operating profit margin of firm i in year t.
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2.4.2.2 Dependent variables
In this chapter, we empirically test whether stricter environmental regulations are asso-
ciated with better economic performance. Economic performance is explained with two
dimensions, namely productivity and profitability. Firstly, productivity is measured by
TFP which is the portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs used during
production. TFP reflects the efficiency of firms and how effective inputs are being used in
utilizing production (Greenstone et al., 2012). Regarding TFP, we denote logs and levels
using lower case letters and upper case letters respectively. We assume that firms produce
a homogeneous good following a Cobb-Douglas production function:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + ωit + eit (2.4)
where yit is the log of value added of firm i at time t, kit is the log of capital, lit is the log
of labour, eit is an error term and ωit is the firm’s productivity. It’s assumed that capital
evolves following a certain law of motion that it is not directly related to current produc-
tivity shocks, whilst labour is an input which can be adjusted whenever the firm responses
to a productivity shock. The OLS estimators would be bias due to the correlation between
labour input and productivity (Ackerberg et al., 2015).
Due to the endogeneity problem of traditional solutions explained above, Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) (LP) propose an two-step approach which use intermediate inputs (invest-
ment denoted i and materials denoted m) to proxy for the unobserved productivity. This
approach firstly assumes monotonicity holds between intermediate input’s demand function
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and ω to obtain ωit = ω(kit, iit). Thus, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) re-write Equation 2.4
as:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + eit + ω(kit, iit) = βllit + φ(kit, iit) + eit (2.5)
Secondly, assuming productivity evolves following an exogenous first-order Markov process:
ωit = E[(ωit|ωit−1)]+ξit where ξit is a random shock which is uncorrelated with k, Equation
for the second stage changes to:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + ξit + E[(ωit|ωit−1)] (2.6)
However, the above two step procedure approach suffers from functional dependence prob-
lems that the moment condition underlying the first stage estimating equation does not
identify the labor coefficient. More specifically, Ackerberg et al. (2015) argue that labour
is a deterministic function of the set of variables that, in the LP procedures, needs to be
non-parametrically conditioned on. Hence, under this non-parametric condition, there is
no variation in labor left to identify the labor coefficient. Instead of using two-step esti-
mation, Wooldridge (2009) combines the moment conditions of both stages into a single
set and obtains efficient GMM estimates and standard errors in one step. In particular,
Wooldridge (2009) suggests using polynomials of order three or less to approximate φ(kit, iit
and E[(ωit|ωit−1)] in order to estimate firm’s productivity.
In this study, we apply a version of the Wooldridge (2009) method extended by Doraszelski
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and Jaumandreu (2013) which account for R&D investment in determining the difference in
firm-level productivity across firms over time. Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) approach
is based on an assumption that the impact of R&D investment on productivity occurs
through the function E[(ωit|ωit−1)]. This assumption implies ωit = E[(ωit|ωit−1, rit−1)] + ξit
where rit−1 denote the lagged log of R&D expenditure. This assumption allows for con-
sidering the link between R&D and productivity endogenously without explicitly modeling
how the knowledge capital accumulates.
Secondly, as another crucial criteria in measuring firm performance, profitability also af-
fects firm growth and the ability to compete in the market. We measure firms’ profitability
in terms of operating margin which is defined as the ratio between operating profit and
turnover. Previous studies by Ghisetti and Rennings (2014) and Rassier and Earnhart
(2015) use return on sales (ROSs) to proxy for profitability. Their measurement has a
potential flaw since the way to calculate ROSs is to divide pre-tax profits over total sales.
Pre-tax profits are inclusive of environmental taxes, thus ROSs are potentially correlated
with environmental stringency which leads to inconsistent estimates. By using absolute
profits after tax to generate operating margins, we are able to overcome the potential en-
dogeneity concern. Furthermore, we apply a lag structure and due to the time span of
our panel data is relatively short, we only lag all explanatory variables one year. This lag
structure allows overcoming endogeneity problems deriving from the simultaneity between
dependent variable and explanatory variables and the potential reverse causality issue. Pro-
ductive firms could be more profitable, however, a firm’s profitability not only depends on
2.4. Data and empirical strategy 101
its own productivity level but also on the productivity level of the other rivals. We control
for this concern by using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which is a widely used proxy
for product market competition (Valta, 2012).
2.4.2.3 Explanatory variables
The measurement of environmental regulation stringency is an essential issue in the field
of environmental economics. A number of different measurements for regulation stringency
have been adopted in existing empirical studies. A large stream of studies specifically in-
vestigate the effect of one particular regulation which is more precise in capturing causal
links, but at the cost of the generality of conclusions. The proxies used range from pollution
abatement expenditures (Greenstone et al., 2012), survey-based policy perceptions (Lanoie
et al., 2011). Regarding regulatory instrument, in our econometric analysis, we introduce
environmental abatement intensity as our proxy for environmental stringency.
In ANTIPOL data, the abatement costs focus on two dimensions: ”investments” (hardware
entirely dedicated to environmental protection, purchases of production facilities more ef-
ficient in terms of environmental issues) and ”studies” (regulatory or investment-related).
First, investments are defined as ”the purchases of buildings, land, machines or equipment
intended to treat, measure, control or limit the pollution generated during production”.
These investments can be either the purchase of specific equipment entirely dedicated to
environmental protection regarding seven different pollutant categories (such as skips, fil-
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ters, retention tanks, pollution measuring instruments) or the purchase of more efficient
process changing equipment in environmental matters regarding seven pollutant categories
(such as acquisition of less polluting electric vehicles, machines emitting less, generating less
waste, consuming less water or less noisy). Second, studies are defined as ”the purchases
of services or internal costs intended to improve knowledge or to establish a summary of
the effect of production activities on the environment (excluding expenses intended for the
development of eco-products)”. For instant, studies includes all regulatory studies such as
danger studies, natural risks reports, reports investigating the impact of production activi-
ties on the environment, as well as audit files (files of preparation for ISO 14001 certification
or EMAS) and ICPE files (Classified Installations for the Protection of the Environment).2
We consider ”investments” as end-of-pipe investments and sum up these investments across
different pollutant categories. Likewise we generate integrated investments using ”studies”.
Furthermore, we sum up total integrated and end-of-pipe investments to construct the total
abatement costs. This variable includes expenditures due to the operation of abatement
capital, expenditures due to environmental taxes and expenditures due to environmental
management such as the training of managers or the purchase of services. These expen-
ditures exclude expenditure for labour health and security and expenditure that allows a
reduction of material or energy use. Thus the abatement intensity is calculated by dividing
total abatement costs by total sales.
We measure eco-innovation using the firm-level environmental R&D expenditures. Among
2These expenditures exclude expenditure for labour health and security and expenditure that allows a
reduction of material or energy use.
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existing firm-level studies, majority of them are based on subjective measures of the mo-
tivation to undertake eco-innovation from different survey data sets (Del Rı́o et al., 2011;
De Marchi, 2012; Del Ŕıo et al., 2017; Jové Llopis et al., 2017). Unlike previous stud-
ies, in our R&D survey, firms are specifically asked for the distribution of internal R&D
and one of the categories is the percentage of R&D expenditure dedicated to environment
protection. Our environmental R&D expenditure variable is therefore calculated by multi-
plying the share of environmental R&D expenditures with the level of total internal R&D
expenditures. This variable captures the extent of a firm’s internal R&D investment in envi-
ronmental innovation, and is more precise than the majority of R&D based eco-innovation
indicators employed in the literature. Surveys investigating environmental R&D activi-
ties often ask firms whether they conduct environmental R&D but do not specifically ask
about environmental R&D intensity (Horbach, 2008). Some earlier studies utilize total
R&D expenditure as an indicator for eco-innovation (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Brunner-
meier and Cohen, 2003) based on the assumption that there is a strong correlation between
eco-innovation and general innovation. This is potentially problematic as eco-innovation
could crowd out general innovation. Thus, one of the advantages of our variable is that it
focuses specifically on R&D expenditures allocated to environmental protection instead of
all types of R&D expenditures.
We use information on the cooperation on R&D with external partners. The dummy vari-
able ”ExtRD d” indicates if the firm was subcontracting and collaborating on R&D with
external firms or institutions. Following De Marchi (2012), the variable ”R&D intensity”
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expresses R&D intensity as the ratio between the number of R&D activities related employ-
ees and the total number of employees. Furthermore, we use public funding as an indicator
of innovation related public policies. The variable ”Pubfunding d” equals to one if a firm
received funding for R&D activities from public resources.
We capture information about the organizational capability of a firm by measuring a firm’s
engagement with environmental management systems. In line with Costa-Campi et al.
(2017), ISO 14001 approval is one of the most widely used measures of environmental
management systems together with the Eco Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). ISO
14001 can be used by any firm, regardless of its activity, and aims to set up an environmen-
tal management system and obtain a certification for their productive process. ISO 14001
has been frequently included as a determinant of eco-innovation and has been found to
be effective in stimulating environmental R&D (Kesidou and Demirel, 2012). Meanwhile,
environmental management system has a strong link to the improved perceived future fi-
nancial performance (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). ISO 14001 accreditation is obtained
from the ANTIPOL data set and has been available since 2002. Furthermore, with regard
to organizational capability, the ANTIPOL data set provides two more variables ”SME”
and ”EMS process”. ”SME” is a binary variable which equals one if a firm holds other
environmental management systems other than ISO 14001. ”EMS process” is a binary
variable which equals one if a firm is in the process of obtaining environmental certificate.
Due to the fact that ”ISO” and ”SME” variables only partially capture the effect of en-
vironmental management system, we construct a new variable namely EMS which equal
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to one if either of the above two variables is equal to one. Since all these variables are
at plant-level and it is possible that only one plant among several plants for a firm has
environmental managements systems. We assume that if a plant of a firm is accredited
environmental management systems, then this firm is also accredited with having an envi-
ronmental management system.
Market structure is an important factor that affects firm’s productivity as well as prof-
itability (Syverson, 2004; Rexhäuser and Rammer, 2014). Productive firms could be more
profitable, however, a firm’s profitability not only depends on its own productivity level
but also on the productivity level of the other rivals. Market concentration is a substantial
indicator of market structure that highly concentrated market poses different competitive
conditions on firms and high competition forced firms to improve their productivity to
stay in the market. The intensity of the competition within an industry depends on intra
market concentration, hence firms in a highly concentrated industry have low incentive to
raise their productivity (Syverson, 2011). Nevertheless, as Rexhäuser and Rammer (2014)
suggest,a firm’s market share represents the efficiency level of the firm, thus a high market
share indicates advanced productivity and profitability in the past. We measure market
concentration using a normalized HHI at the two digit level of NACE rev.1 classification.
Obtaining data on total output from FICUS and FARE data set, we firstly calculate the
market share of each firm and further divided by total industry output to construct this
index.
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The export variable takes into account the influence of trade on productivity and profitabil-
ity. This variable is included since exporters generally have higher productivity through
R&D and are characterized as having higher innovation propensity(Añón Higón et al.,
2011). To the extent that foreign markets are competitive and product variety is valued,
we expect exporters to be more competitive. In particular, if a significant number of foreign
markets demand green products, then the opportunity to improve company performance
or charge premium prices via exports could make eco-innovation more profitable. Thus, we
would expect positive effects of export on firm performance indicators. To control for the
effect of financial constraints on firm productivity and profitability, we measure leverage
by calculating the debt-to-equity ratio. In line with Lee and Min (2015), we calculate the
debt-to-equity-ratio as Debt divided by (Debt plus Equity).
We include a series of standard control variables. First, unit costs of production and further
profitability may be affected by the scale of production. Large firms could be more efficient
in production due to more specialized inputs, better coordinated resources. However small
firms could be more efficient since they have flexible, non-hierarchical structures, and do
not usually suffer from the so-called agency problem (Halkos and Tzeremes, 2007). We
capture scale effects by including firm size in our analysis. The corresponding variable
”Log size” is the log of the number of full-time equivalent employees. Firm age is included
as an indicator for accumulated organizational resources and is expected to positively re-
lated to productivity because of learning by doing. Although younger firms may also be
more productive as a mechanism to increase market share. Hence, the variable ”Log age”
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is measured as the log of age in years generated by deducting firms’ creation year from the
current year. We control for the input price by including a control variable ”Log avewage”
which is a proxy for the price of labour. We measure this by the ratio between salaries paid
to the employees and firm total number of employees.
In addition, we take into account invariant characteristics through using time dummies and
two digit NACE sector dummies to control for business cycle effects common to all busi-
ness. Furthermore, we control for the regional differences by introducing regional dummy
variables which cover 25 administrative regions.3
The sample we use in our econometric analysis comprises 1,524 French manufacturing firms
and 4,851 observations between 2004 and 2011. Of the 1,524 firms, 754 firms do some envi-
ronmental R&D investment, which represent 34.09% of the firms in our sample. Table 2.3
presents the summary statistics for our independent variables. The average size of the firm
is approximately 665 full-time equivalent employees thus our sample consists of relatively
large firms. Likewise the average export dummy is around 95% which shows that a large
majority of firms in our sample are exporters which is again a result of our sample being
restricted to large firms.
[Table 2.3 about here]
325 administrative regions comprise 22 regions in Metropolitan France and 3 overseas regions. Since
in 2014, the French parliament passed a law reducing the number of metropolitan regions from 22 to 13
effective 1 January 2016, we adopt the previous legal concept of regions.
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Figure 2.1 plots average investment in eco-innovation over time, indexed so that 2004=100.
It can be seen that over the period 2004-2011, the average eco-innovation increased by
about 150%. This figure reflects the fact that France has been increasingly investing in
eco-innovation in recent years. According to the 2015 Eco-Innovation Scoreboard, France
ranks seventh among in EU in terms of eco-innovation (Eco-innovation Observatory, 2018).
Furthermore in Figure 2.2, we present average investment in eco-innovation over time, again
indexed so that 2004=100, distinguishing between pollution intensive and non-pollution
intensive firms. The figure shows that although the overall increase in the investment in
eco-innovation of 50% for pollution intensive firms over the period, the average investment
in eco-innovation has been declining since 2009. Meanwhile, non-pollution intensive firms
are investing more resources in eco-innovation.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
[Figure 2.2 about here]
Regarding regulation stringency, Figure 2.3 perform the annual average abatement ex-
penditures for the period of 2004-2011 and we decompose total abatement expenditures
into end-of-pipe abatement and integrated abatement. Over this period, we see a steady
decreasing trend for over all abatement expenditure whereas integrated abatement expen-
ditures take a relatively small proportion in total abatement expenditures.
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[Figure 2.3 about here]
2.5 Empirical results
In Table 2.4, we present our baseline results estimating the influence of environmental reg-
ulations on firm productivity (as Equation(2)). All specifications include full set of year,
sector and regional dummies (not reported). The first model specification uses total abate-
ment intensity as the indicator for regulation stringency to take into account the direct
effect of environmental regulations on productivity, whereas the second specification di-
vides total abatement intensity into two parts: namely integrated abatement intensity and
end-of-pipe abatement intensity. Specification (3) excludes the direct effect of abatement
expenditure from the estimation. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistics indicates that instru-
mental variables are strong across all specifications.
In Specification (1), the coefficient of one lag of total abatement intensity is negative and
significant at the 5% statistical level which indicates the direct effect of pollution abate-
ment investment significantly reduce firms’ productivity. Meanwhile, controlling for the
time, sector and regional specific effects, the coefficient of induced environmental R&D
is negative but insignificant at the 10% statistical level implying that regulation induced
environmental R&D does not indeed contribute to productivity in French manufacturing
firms. This finding suggests that more stringent environmental regulations harm firms’
competitiveness in terms of productivity directly and the indirect benefit through induced
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eco-innovation is not observed. Thus, we do not find evidence that eco-innovation offsets
the costs of complying with environmental policies. This may be explained as that a large
part of the investments necessary to comply with regulations represent additional produc-
tion costs. Although some of these costs may be offset by the efficiency gains identified
through investment in environmental R&D, the net effect is negative.
In Specification (2), we decompose abatement expenditures into two different types of
abatement expenditures, namely end-of-pipe (hardware) abatement and integrated (reg-
ulatory) abatement. We find that end-of-pipe abatement investment has a negative and
insignificant effect on productivity whereas integrated abatement investment has a nega-
tive but significant effect on firm productivity. The results suggest that a firm’s level of
investment in purchasing hardware entirely dedicated to environmental protection or pro-
duction facilities more efficient in terms of environmental issues in the previous year has
no impact on the firm’s current productivity, however integrated abatement expenditure
would reduce firm productivity. Meanwhile policy induced environmental R&D remains
negative and insignificant. Furthermore, when we exclude the direct effect of regulatory
stringency on productivity in Specification (3), we still observe a negative and insignificant
effect of policy induced environmental R&D on productivity. Thus we do not find evidence
to support that eco-innovation promotes productivity after all.
Among the control variables, we find that R&D intensity does not significantly affect pro-
ductivity. This finding is expected due to the fact that all of our observations are innovators,
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this could potentially weaken the impact of R&D activities on productivity. However co-
operating with external partners in R&D activities has a positive and significant effect
on productivity which is consistent with previous study by Yang et al. (2012), support-
ing the view that external technology cooperation serves as a crucial role in building up
firm technological capability which further enhance firms’ productivity. The coefficient for
“EMS” shows a negative and insignificant effect on productivity, thus holding environmen-
tal management system certificate in the previous period has no impact on firm current
productivity. However, if a firm is in the process of applying for EMS certificate, a positive
and significant effect on productivity is observed. This result may suggest that EMS only
enhance productivity in the short run during the application period. Furthermore, market
concentration is found to have a positive and significant effect on productivity.
[Table 2.4 about here]
In Table 2.5, we report the results distinguishing between two sub-groups, namely pollution
intensive firms and non-pollution intensive firms. Regarding key variables, Specification (1)
shows fairly consistent results for polluters comparing with the baseline results in Table
2.4 . We find that abatement intensity remains significantly negative for pollution in-
tensive firms which indicates more stringent environmental regulations essentially reduce
productivity. However, in Specification (2), it seems that for polluters, neither end-of-pipe
abatement nor integrated abatement has significant effect on firm productivity. Moreover,
Specification (1) and (2) confirm that induced environmental R&D remain insignificant in
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enhancing productivity for pollution intensive firms. Nevertheless, the impact of abatement
costs on productivity is slightly bigger for polluters comparing to our baseline model that
1% increase in abatement intensity would decrease TFP by 4.01% on average for polluters.
Thus the presence of high abatement costs makes polluters more sensitive to the change in
environmental policy. Overall, our results suggest that undertaking eco-innovation can not
offset the high abatement pressure for pollution intensive firms. However, lagged R&D in-
tensity has positive and significant impact on the productivity of pollution intensive firms,
whilst the R&D cooperation with external partners has no significant effect on productivity
for polluters.
In Specification (3), we find that clean sector results show different characteristics compar-
ing with polluters. The results show that lagged abatement intensity does not affect firm
productivity significantly in clean sectors. Also comparing with polluters, the coefficient of
abatement intensity is relatively small. However the average abatement intensity for firms
in clean sectors is almost one third smaller comparing with polluters. Hence, our results
suggest that clean firms’ productivity is less sensitive to environmental regulations since
they are not heavily regulated. Likewise, Specification (3) confirms that induced environ-
mental R&D remains insignificant in enhancing productivity for clean firms.
Since the implementation of changes in the direction of R&D towards eco-innovation takes
time, and with the pressure to improve economic performance, firms in pollution intensive
sectors have less incentive for undertaking environmental R&D to offset the high abatement
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costs. Referring to the pollution haven hypothesis, Gray and Shadbegian (1998) suggest
that more stringent regulations tend to divert investment from productivity to abatement.
Firms in pollution intensive sectors would rather pay off the abatement costs than initiating
high cost new eco-innovations.
[Table 2.5 about here]
Estimation results of Equation 2.3 focusing on profitability are presented in Table 2.6.
Again, all models include full set of year, sectoral and regional dummies (not reported).
The first specification uses total abatement intensity as the indicator for regulation strin-
gency to take into account the direct effect of environmental regulations on profitability,
whereas the second specification excludes the effect of TFP from the estimation. Specifica-
tion (2) decomposes total abatement intensity into two parts: namely integrated abatement
intensity and end-of-pipe abatement intensity and furthermore, Specification (3) also ex-
cludes the direct effect of regulatory stringency from the estimation. The Kleibergen-Paap
F statistics indicates that instrumental variables are strong across all specifications.
From Specification (1), abatement intensity is found to be insignificantly affecting firms’
profitability whereas we find a negative and significant coefficient for induced environmen-
tal R&D which suggests that in general the adoption of policy induced eco-innovation
significantly reduces firms’ operating margin. The results do not find evidence to support
Porter’s hypothesis that regulation improves firm profitability by stimulating innovation
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that over compensates regulatory costs. When we decompose abatement cost into end-of-
pipe abatement intensity and integrated abatement intensity in specification (2), results
suggest neither of these types of two abatement intensity has effect on firm profitability.
Meanwhile lagged TFP shows that more productive firms are more profitable. When we
exclude abatement intensity from our estimation in Specification (3), we find similar re-
sults. In general, inventing a new technology is a costly process for the firm and our results
indicate that when the new technology is eco-innovation, the costs actually overweight the
benefits in a way that the profitability return of such innovation investment becomes neg-
ative.
Regarding control variables, we find a positive but insignificant effect of EMS on operating
margin which indicates holding environmental management system certificates in the pre-
vious period does not affect a firm’s current profitability. However, if a firm was applying
for EMS in the previous period, its profitability is significantly enhanced. A positive and
significant effect of firm age on operating margin is observed, and it suggests that more
mature firms are more profitable due to the dynamic economies of scale by learning from
experience. More mature firms may also benefit from reputation effects, which allow them
to earn a higher margin on sales (Glancey, 1998).
[Table 2.6 about here]
In Table 2.7, we report the results for pollution intensive firms and non-pollution intensive
firms. Regarding eco-innovation, Specification (1) shows a contrary result comparing with
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baseline estimation in Table 2.6 that eco-innovation does not significantly reduce polluters’
profitability. However, for non-pollution intensive firms in Specification (3), we find fairly
consistent results in comparison with baseline estimation. We observe a significant and
negative coefficient for induced environmental R&D expenditure which is different from
zero at 10% significance level. This result suggests that for firms in clean sectors, devoting
more resources to environmental R&D due to stricter regulations significantly reduces their
profitability. However, the direct effect of regulatory stringency remains insignificant.
[Table 2.7 about here]
2.6 Robustness checks
To test the sensitivity of our results, we perform a series of robustness checks. The first
set of robustness checks test whether the aggregation at the plant-level affects our main
results. To address potential aggregation bias from plants to firms, we restrict the sample
to a certain group of firms. We include firms in the sample according to the ratio between
each firm’s total number of full-time equivalent employees for plants from the ANTIPOL
and the firm’s total number of full-time equivalent employees from the FARE and FICUS
data. First, we aggregate the total number of full-time equivalent employees across all
plants surveyed in ANTIPOL at the firm level. Second, we use the employment data com-
posed by FARE and FICUS to construct the ratio. A ratio equal to 100% suggests that
there is no measurement error due to the aggregation. Firms with this ratio below a certain
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threshold are excluded from the sample.
We present baseline estimation results of equation (2) and equation (3) using different
thresholds in Table 2.8 and Table 2.10 for productivity and profitability respectively. In
Table 2.8 for productivity, model (1) reports the estimation on the whole sample which can
also be referred as 0% threshold, model (2) reports the threshold of 50%, model (3) reports
the most restricted threshold of 75%. Particularly focusing on key variables ”Log EnvR&D”
and ”Abatement intensity”, results are consistent across different thresholds. However, we
notice that magnitudes of the coefficients change when we increase the threshold.
[Table 2.8 about here]
These changes in magnitudes of the coefficients could arise from two possible reasons. First,
the measurement bias could be lower when we use a restricted sample which suggest if the
measurement bias generate endogeneity, then the estimates for the restricted samples are
less biased. Second, the composition of sample changes due to the threshold which suggest
only firms belonging to certain sectors appear in the most restricted sample. The selections
may be endogenous and generate further bias in estimations. For instance, firms in pollu-
tion intensive sectors are those mostly selected in the 75% threshold sample, since even their
smallest plants have to answer the ANTIPOL survey whereas plants in clean sectors do not.
With regard to standard deviations, the coefficients for regulatory stringency (Abate-
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ment intensity) are negative and significant across different thresholds and the coefficients
for induced eco-innovation (Log EnvR&D) remain insignificant. These results confirm our
assumption that the threshold methodology lower the potential bias raised from aggrega-
tion process. Table 2.9 reports the distribution of firms by sectors for the 0% threshold
sample and the 75% threshold sample. From Table 2.9, we observe that there is no sub-
stantial difference in the composition of the sample between these two groups, so we may
reject our second assumption that the effect of sample composition is very small in our case.
[Table 2.9 about here]
Furthermore, we apply the same threshold methodology to test the robustness of our result
on profitability in Table 2.10. Similarly, We find consistent result across thresholds. The
coefficients for regulatory stringency (Abatement intensity) are insignificant along with the
negative and significant effect of induced eco-innovation (Log EnvR&D) on a firm prof-
itability across different thresholds. Thus, we conclude that our main results are not highly
sensitive to the aggregation procedure from plant level to firm level.
[Table 2.10 about here]
Secondly, to address the endogeneity concerns regarding instruments are correlated with
omitted unobserved heterogeneity, we implement a system generalized method of moments
(GMM) approach. The System GMM estimator yields efficient and consistent parameter
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estimates, given that the regressors might not be strictly exogenous (Blundell and Bond,
2000). We include one year lag of the dependent variable as an additional regressor to
transform the static model into a dynamic one and we instrument potential endogenous
variables with their three periods lagged value. We present system GMM estimation results
in Table 2.11 and Table 2.12 for productivity and profitability respectively. Regarding pro-
ductivity in Table 2.11, the hypothesis of the absence of the second-order serial correlation
in disturbances is not rejected in each specification, hence lags of endogenous variables are
appropriate instruments in our estimations. The hypothesis of over identification of the
instruments is not rejected in each specification either, ensuring the validity of the instru-
ments. First we notice a strong degree of persistence in TFP. Regarding key variables,
results for GMM approach are highly consistent with IV results in Table 2.4 that abate-
ment intensity remains negative and significant whereas eco-innovation show no significant
impact on TFP.
[Table 2.11 about here]
In Table 2.12, we pass the tests on the presence of second order serial auto correlation and
the Sargan and Hansen tests on over-identification which justify the validity of our esti-
mation. Results are also consistent with IV results in Table 2.6 which suggest that policy
induced eco-innovation reduces a firm’s profitability significantly whereas the direct effect
of abatement costs on profitability is not significant. Overall, we confirm that our results
are robust to changes in estimation techniques.
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[Table 2.12 about here]
Finally, we compute TFP using different measurements to test whether different TFP esti-
mation techniques alter our results. As discussed in the previous section, we estimate the
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach which is a two step approach based on using mate-
rial and investment respectively to proxy for the firm’s unobserved productivity. Also, we
estimate the Wooldridge (2009) approach which is a new approach combining the moment
conditions into a single set to obtain efficient GMM estimates in one step. The correlation
coefficients between these measurements of TFP are relatively high and Table 2.13 shows
that the estimated coefficients for our key variables across three different specifications are
highly consistent. The results hold for different measurements of TFP which confirm the
robustness of our results.
[Table 2.13 about here]
2.7 Conclusions
The Porter hypothesis challenges the traditional view on the economic cost of environmen-
tal regulations by suggesting that more stringent environmental regulations may trigger
innovation which eventually enhances a firm’s productivity and offsets the cost of regula-
tions. Porter’s idea of a “win-win” option is the driving force behind policy initiatives.
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In this chapter we examine the impact of environmental regulations on firm performance
measured by productivity and profitability using a firm-level panel data of French manufac-
turing firms that invest in R&D. To overcome some data limitations of earlier studies, we
construct a panel data set containing 1,524 French firms that covers the period 2004-2011
with information obtained from varies of sources concerning innovation, environmental ac-
tivities and financial information.
More specifically, we measure environmental abatement costs to capture regulatory strin-
gency and investigate whether stringent environmental regulations weaken firms’ produc-
tivity. In addition we test whether regulatory induced eco-innovation could offset envi-
ronmental abatement pressure, known as the Porter hypothesis. Finally, we provide new
evidence on the relationship between regulatory stringency and profitability. Our unique
firm-level sample means that unlike studies that use more aggregated data, we are able
to use an identification strategy that is less sensitive to macroeconomics shocks that may
be correlated with country or sector level eco-innovation and environmental regulations.
Our results show that at the current stage, stricter environmental regulations harm firms’
productivity and also eco-innovation is not able to offset this negative effect for French
manufacturing firms. Also, we find regulations have no impact on firm profitability after
all, whereas regulation induced eco-innovation significantly reduces profitability. Overall,
we do not find sufficient evidence to support the strong Porter Hypothesis.
This study has important policy implications. Our findings indicate that stringent regu-
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lations harm firm productivity and meanwhile the impact is rather unidentified on firms’
profitability. Meanwhile, regulation induced eco-innovation does not seem to lead to a
beneficial competitiveness effect. However, evaluation of competitiveness involves multiple
dimensions and the negative effect from environmental regulations should not be over-
estimated by policymakers. Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) suggest that eco-innovation
triggered by regulations spillover the whole economy and are beneficial to societies. A
multidimensional framework is needed for policymakers to evaluate and modify the current
policy mix. Our results give further evidence against the Porter Hypothesis. As environ-
mental policies do not lead to better economic performance, and eco-innovation is not able
to mediate this effect of policies on firms economic performance.
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Source: elaboration based on the Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to R&D
Activities database on French firms over the period 2004-2011.
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Source: elaboration based on the Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to R&D
Activities database on French firms over the period 2005-2012.
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Table 2.1: Definition of variables
Variable Description
Dependent Variables
TFP total factor productivity
Operating margin operating profit divided by turnover
Explanatory variables
Abatement intensity total abatement costs divided by total output in %
End of pipe end of pipe abatement investment divided by total output in %
Integrated integrated abatement investment divided by total output in %
Log EnvR&D log of green R&D expenditure
R&D intensity number of full-time equivalent employees dedicated to R&D divided by
total number of full-time equivalent employees
ExtR&D d =1 if the firm is subcontracting and collaborating on R&D with external parties,
0 otherwise
Pubfunding d =1 if the firm received R&D resources from public sector,
0 otherwise
EMS =1 if the firm has implemented ISO14001 or other environmental management systems,
0 otherwise
EMS process =1 if the firm is in the process of applying for environment management system,
0 otherwise
Log age log of number of years since the firm began to operate
Log size log of firm size (total number of full-time equivalent employees)
Log avewage log of average wage (total salary expenditure divided by total number of full-time
equivalent employees)
HHI Herfindahl Hirschman Index
Export d =1 if the firm exports, 0 otherwise
French group =1 if more than 50% of share of the firm is held by a French group, 0 otherwise
Foreign group =1 if more than 50% of share of the firm is held by a foreign group, 0 otherwise
Leverage ratio between total liability and shareholders’ equity
2.8. Figures and tables 125
Table 2.2: First step estimation on the policy induced eco-innovation of French manufac-
turing firms (2004-2011)





































Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions include region, sectorsector and year dummies.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.8. Figures and tables 126
Table 2.3: Summary statistics for all firms
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
TFP 3.3545 0.4426 1.5728 4.7451
Operating margin 0.0723 0.1213 -2.1086 0.4225
Abatement intensity 0.1758 0.3720 0 2.5846
End of pipe 0.1459 0.3282 0 2.2651
Integrated 0.0263 0.0656 0 0.4832
EnvR&D 549.86 5332.85 0 191780.4
R&D intensity 0.0894 0.0958 0.0002 0.8421
ExtR&D d 0.6345 0.4816 0 1
Pubfunding d 0.2712 0.4446 0 1
EMS 0.7521 0.4318 0 1
EMS process 0.1207 0.3258 0 1
Age 34.4656 23.7603 3 111
Size 664.611 837.344 12.5 3908
Avewage 39.0859 11.6445 17.6686 88.5162
HHI 0.0576 0.0753 0.0018 0.4149
Export d 0.9579 0.2007 0 1
French group 0.5084 0.4999 0 1
Foreign group 0.4845 0.4998 0 1
Leverage 1.3723 2.7911 -11.6410 22.9539
Source: ANTIPOL, FARE, FICUS and The Annual Survey on the Resources
Devoted to R&D Activities data. Unit: thousand euros. Information refers
to the period 2004-2011.
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Table 2.4: Effects of abatement intensity and induced eco-innovation on productivity of
French manufacturing firms (2004-2011): baseline estimation
Dependent variable: TFP
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)










Log EnvR&Di(t−1) -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0019
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0077)
























Export di(t−1) 0.0398 0.0387 0.0421
(0.0446) (0.0449) (0.0446)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0192 0.0226 0.0206
(0.0496) (0.0494) (0.0488)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0417 0.0448 0.0427
(0.0511) (0.0508) (0.0503)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0033
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Kleibergen-Papp rk LM statistic 163.66∗∗∗ 163.58∗∗∗ 163.35∗∗∗
Kleibergen-Papp Wald rk F statistic 15.853∗ 15.86∗ 15.79∗
Observations 4,851 4,851 4,851
No.firms 1,524 1,524 1,524
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include region, sector
sector and year dummies.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Effects of abatement intensity and induced eco-innovation on productivity of
French manufacturing firms (2004-2011): by pollution intensity
Dependent variable: TFP
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
(Polluters) (Polluters) (Clean firms) (Clean firms)








Log EnvR&Di(t−1) -0.0084 -0.0086 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0089) (0.0089)
R&D intensityi(t−1) 0.5110
∗ 0.5086∗ 0.0392 -0.0403
(0.2854) (0.2828) (0.1250) (0.1250)
ExtR&D di(t−1) 0.0499 0.0510 0.0406
∗∗∗ 0.0403∗∗∗
(0.0331) (0.0333) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Pubfunding intensityi(t−1) -0.0466
∗ -0.0460∗ -0.0147 -0.0140
(0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0161) (0.0161)
EMSi(t−1) 0.0117 0.0113 -0.0085 0.0075
(0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0207) (0.0207)
EMS processi(t−1) 0.0823
∗∗ 0.0838∗∗∗ 0.0246∗∗ 0.0254
(0.0265) (0.0266) (0.0232) (0.0232)
Log agei(t−1) 0.0397 0.0389 -0.0224 -0.0229
(0.0353) (0.0351) (0.0158) (0.0157)
Log sizei(t−1) 0.0244 0.0228 0.0328
∗∗ 0.0317∗∗
(0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0152) (0.0152)
Log avewagei(t−1) 0.2851
∗∗∗ 0.2861∗∗∗ 0.3418∗∗∗ 0.3418∗∗∗
(0.0797) (0.0794) (0.0661) (0.0661)
HHIi(t−1) 1.1588
∗∗∗ 1.1426∗∗∗ 0.1249 0.1169
(0.4008) (0.4023) (0.1637) (0.1635)
Export di(t−1) 0.0646 0.0605 0.0218 0.0223
(0.0941) (0.0957) (0.0392) (0.0392)
French groupi(t−1) -0.0598 -0.0562 0.0747 0.0763
(0.0700) (0.0697) (0.0739) (0.0741)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0118 0.0150 0.0641 0.0657
(0.0746) (0.0739) (0.0749) (0.0749)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0033 -0.0043
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0022) (0.0027)
Kleibergen-Papp rk LM statistic 201.50∗∗∗ 57.29∗∗∗ 121.14∗∗∗ 122.96∗∗∗
Kleibergen-Papp Wald rk F statistic 17.19∗ 4.925 12.58∗ 12.59∗
Observations 1,532 1,532 3,319 3,319
No.firms 440 440 1,084 1,084
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include regional, sectoral and
year dummies.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Effects of abatement intensity and induced eco-innovation on profitability of
French manufacturing firms (2004-2011): baseline estimation
Dependent variable: Operating margin
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)














R&D intensityi(t−1) -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0007
(0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0371)
ExtR&D di(t−1) 0.0054 0.0053 0.0054
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0046)
Pubfunding di(t−1) 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)













HHIi(t−1) -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0019
(0.0446) (0.0447) (0.0446)
Export di(t−1) -0.0035 -0.0039 -0.0034
(0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0100)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0013 0.0008 0.0013
(0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0092)





Kleibergen-Papp rk LM statistic 245.775∗∗∗ 245.192∗∗∗ 247.984∗∗∗
Kleibergen-Papp Wald rk F statistic 25.365∗∗ 25.704∗ 25.317∗∗
Observations 4,071 4,071 4,071
No.firms 1,471 1,471 1,471
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include region, sector
sector and year dummies.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Effects of abatement intensity and induced eco-innovation on profitability of
French manufacturing firms (2004-2011): by pollution intensity
Dependent variable: Operating margin
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
(Polluters) (Polluters) (Clean firms) (Clean firms)
IV IV IV IV
TFPi(t−1) 0.1168
∗∗∗ 0.1157∗∗∗ 0.1049∗∗∗ 0.1047∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0121) (0.0121)
Abatement intensityi(t−1) 0.0005 -0.4287
(0.0058) (0.9166)




Log EnvR&Di(t−1) -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0031
∗ -0.0030∗
0.0029 (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0018)
R&D intensityi(t−1) 0.1458
∗∗ 0.1443∗∗ -0.0642 -0.0643
(0.0617) (0.0617) (0.0456) (0.0456)
ExtR&D di(t−1) 0.0038 0.0032 0.0056 0.0056
(0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Pubfunding di(t−1) 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0003
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0043) (0.0043)
EMSi(t−1) -0.0049 -0.0047 0.0127
∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0046) (0.0046)
EMS processi(t−1) 0.0170
∗∗ 0.0171∗∗ 0.0080∗ 0.0083∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Log agei(t−1) 0.0099 0.0095 0.0087
∗∗ 0.0086∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Log sizei(t−1) 0.0073 0.0071 -0.0031 -0.0035
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Log avewagei(t−1) -0.0557
∗∗ -0.0552∗∗ -0.0301 -0.0301
(0.0275) (0.0273) (0.0242) (0.0242)
HHIi(t−1) 0.1641 0.1673 -0.0226 -0.0231
(0.1143) (0.1161) (0.0494) (0.0495)
Export intensityi(t−1) -0.0179 -0.0179 0.0063 0.0071
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0133) (0.0133)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0098 0.0081 -0.0209
∗∗ -0.0196∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0088) (0.0090)
Foreign groupi(t−1) -0.0025 0.0039 -0.0228
∗∗ -0.0216∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0148) (0.0100) (0.0101)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0053
∗∗ -0.0053∗∗ -0.0021∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Kleibergen-Papp rk LM statistic 91.371∗∗∗ 91.27∗∗∗ 179.13∗∗∗ 179.41∗∗∗
Kleibergen-Papp Wald rk F statistic 11.38∗ 10.411∗ 25.67∗ 24.29∗
Observations 1,287 1,287 2,784 2,784
No.firms 432 432 1,039 1,039
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include regional, sectoral and
year dummies.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Effects of abatement intensity and induced eco-innovation on productivity of








Log EnvR&Di(t−1) -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0012
(0.0078) (0.0083) (0.0094)
























Export di(t−1) 0.0398 0.0480 0.0511
(0.0446) (0.0463) (0.0483)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0192 -0.0118 -0.0022
(0.0496) (0.0494) (0.0578)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0417 0.0052 0.0205
(0.0511) (0.0512) (0.0591)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0034 -0.0025 -0.0028
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Kleibergen-Papp rk LM statistic 202.29∗∗∗ 150.49∗∗∗ 140.68∗∗∗
Kleibergen-Papp Wald rk F statistic 16.32∗ 14.38∗ 12.83∗
Observations 4,851 4,331 3,792
No.firms 1,524 1,437 1,326
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include region, sector










Table 2.9: Firm distribution for threshold 0% level and threshold 75% level
0% threshold 75% threshold
Nace code Description Number of firms Percentage in % Number of firms Percentage in %
15 Food products and beverages 99 8.95 85 7.83
17 Textiles 48 3.25 45 3.58
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 5 0.41 2 0.18
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 5 0.54 5 0.66
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 16 1.04 16 1.31
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 25 1.94 24 1.91
22 Printing and publishing 6 0.41 4 0.42
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 10 0.59 9 0.59
24 Chemicals and chemical products 295 17.13 236 15.83
25 Rubber and plastics products 138 9.13 127 9.92
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 52 3.03 40 2.27
27 Basic metals 58 3.52 54 3.88
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 114 8.90 104 9.56
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 231 14.32 205 15.23
30 Office machinery and computers 4 0.54 4 0.36
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c 104 6.51 92 6.15
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 57 3.66 48 3.76
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 98 6.64 82 6.39
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 74 4.25 70 4.78
35 Other transport equipment 42 2.35 39 2.69
36 Manufacturing n.e.c 35 2.44 29 2.27
40 Electricity, gas and water supply 8 0.45 6 0.42
total 1,524 100 1,326 100
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Table 2.10: Effects of abatement intensity and induced eco-innovation on profitability of
French manufacturing firms (2004-2011): baseline model for different thresholds regarding
aggregation process
Dependent variable: Operating margin











R&D intensityi(t−1) -0.0009 -0.0161 -0.0311
(0.0371) (0.0368) (0.0399)
ExtR&D di(t−1) 0.0054 0.0067 0.0064
(0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0055)
















HHIi(t−1) -0.0019 0.0047 -0.0066
(0.0446) (0.0473) (0.0552)
Export di(t−1) -0.0035 -0.0013 -0.0027
(0.0099) (0.0135) (0.0149)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0013 0.0052 0.0003
(0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0121)





Kleibergen-Papp rk LM statistic 202.29∗∗∗ 231.24∗∗∗ 219.65∗∗∗
Kleibergen-Papp Wald rk F statistic 16.32∗ 30.91∗ 27.47∗
Observations 4,851 3,602 3,134
No.firms 1,524 1,369 1,251
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include region, sector
sector and year dummies.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Effects of abatement intensity and induced eco-innovation on profitability of
French manufacturing firms (2004-2011): GMM estimation
Dependent variable: TFP
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)























EMSi(t−1) 0.0027 0.0034 0.0013
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079)
EMS processi(t−1) 0.0117 0.0123 0.0114
(0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0212)





Log avewagei(t−1) -0.1714 -0.1647 -0.1688
(0.1328) (0.1348) (0.1348)
HHIi(t−1) -0.0171 -0.0127 -0.0167
(0.0889) (0.0893) (0.0897)
Export di(t−1) 0.0198 0.0196 0.0215
(0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0204)
French groupi(t−1) -0.0139 -0.0126 -0.0147
(0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0173)





AR(2) p value 0.678 0.674 0.669
Hansen p value 0.112 0.113 0.111
Observations 6,838 6,838 6,838
No.firms 2,017 2,017 2,017
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include region, sector
sector and year dummies.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.12: Effects of abatement intensity and induced eco-innovation on profitability of
French manufacturing firms (2004-2011): GMM estimation
Dependent variable: Operating margin
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
(all firms) (all firms) (all firms)
GMM GMM GMM














R&D intensityi(t−1) -0.1004 0.1135 0.1284
(0.2416) (0.2612) (0.1922)





EMSi(t−1) 0.0093 -0.0037 0.0026
(0.0096) (0.0185) (0.0106)
EMS processi(t−1) 0.0024 0.0026 0.0091
(0.0079) (0.0069) (0.0111)
Log agei(t−1) 0.0059 0.0034 0.0068
(0.0254) (0.0285) (0.0052)
Log sizei(t−1) 0.0013 0.0020 0.0011
(0.0335) (0.0375) (0.0285)
Log avewagei(t−1) -0.0426 -0.0776 0.0773
(0.0446) (0.0241) (0.0376)
HHIi(t−1) -0.1479 -0.1348 -0.1247
(0.0672) (0.0869) (0.0934)
Export di(t−1) -0.0419 0.0585 0.0287
(0.0316) (0.0412) (0.0206)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0023 0.0025 0.0033
(0.0190) (0.0153) (0.0096)





AR(2) p value 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008
Hansen p value 0.508 0.462 0.267
Observations 3,368 6,838 6,838
No.firms 1,453 2,017 2,017
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include region, sector
sector and year dummies.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.13: Effects of abatement intensity and induced eco-innovation on productivity of
French manufacturing firms (2004-2011): different measurements for TFP
Dependent variable: TFP
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
TFP (TFP lp) (TFP wooldridge)





Log EnvR&Di(t−1) -0.0042 -0.0034 -0.0014
(0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0077)













Log agei(t−1) -0.0095 -0.0017 -0.0016
(0.0139) (0.0146) (0.0151)








Export di(t−1) 0.0297 0.0376 0.0426
(0.0353) (0.0412) (0.0450)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0153 0.0227 0.0222
(0.0496) (0.0476) (0.0492)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0389 0.0453 0.0471
(0.0509) (0.0493) (0.0507)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0035
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0022)
Kleibergen-Papp rk LM statistic 164.28∗∗∗ 166.49∗∗∗ 166.26∗∗∗
Kleibergen-Papp Wald rk F statistic 15.78∗ 16.04∗ 16.06∗
Observations 4,851 4,855 4,852
No.firms 1,524 1,526 1,525
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include region, sector
sector and year dummies.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter 3
Can we invent a cleaner future: Carbon
emissions and the role of eco-innovation
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Abstract
In this chapter we examine the impact of eco-innovation on firm environmental performance
using a firm-level panel data of French manufacturing firms that invest in R&D during 2005-
2012. More specifically, we measure environmental performance using two indicators: CO2
emissions intensity and fossil fuel intensity and estimate the effect of eco-innovation on
environmental performance using the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique.
In addition, we use propensity score matching and difference in difference (PSM-DiD)
technique to test the effectiveness of eco-innovation in emission reduction. Our results
suggest that neither CO2 emissions intensity nor fossil fuel intensity is significantly reduced
by eco-innovation. Meanwhile, comparing to firms that never invest in eco-innovation, new
eco-innovators do not seem to emit less or shift energy structures. Policy implications are
discussed.
Keywords: Eco-Innovation, France, Carbon Emissions, Energy
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3.1 Introduction
Economic development and the accompanied pollution has caused an increase in global
temperature which significantly affects the climate change. One of the primary targets is
to reduce carbon emissions. Under the Kyoto Protocol, France has committed to cut its
combined emissions to 5% below its 1990 level. Firms are playing a key role in reducing
carbon emissions. A number of tools for reducing carbon emissions have been discussed.
First, improving energy efficiency has been shown to be an effective way of reducing car-
bon emissions (Buchanan and Honey, 1994). Moreover, López-Peña et al. (2012) argue
that to achieve carbon emission reduction, energy efficiency improvements would be more
cost-effective than subsidies for renewable energy. Similarly, Chang et al. (2008) find that
the adjustment in energy consumption patterns is a crucial aspect in reducing carbon emis-
sions. Other mechanisms by which emissions may be reduced are through trade (Peters
et al., 2012) or foreign direct investment (Cole et al., 2013; Lee, 2013).
Another channel by which emissions are thought to be reduced is through innovation
(Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011; Su and Moaniba, 2017). Arguably, innovation-driven effi-
ciency gains could reduce emissions and at the same time enhance economic performance.
However, it remains unclear how innovation reduce emissions and to what extent. In par-
ticular, firms’ incentives for research and development (R&D) investment are mainly on
developing technological capabilities and ensure its future advantage, moreover firms’ tech-
nological capabilities are essential to gain competitive advantage(Teece, 1986). However,
only little attention has been paid to the field of emission reduction technology due to the
3.1. Introduction 140
high initial cost, thus R&D intensity may not be effective for carbon emission reduction
(Jiao et al., 2018). Mensah et al. (2018) suggest a minor impact of innovation on CO2
abatement in OECD countries and particularly for France, their results report a rise in
carbon emissions due to the increase in the number of patent applications received from
foreign applicants. Albino et al. (2014) further argue that even for the U.S and European
countries which represent the most innovative countries, there are no significant decline in
emissions as innovation advances.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether investing in eco-innovation allows
firms to meet their environmental targets and more specifically, we investigate whether
eco-innovation is effective in enhancing firms’ environmental performance. The benefit of
eco-innovation is that it provides firms with the opportunity to ease environmental pres-
sures and at the same time promote sustainable economic growth through the more efficient
use of resources (Costa-Campi et al., 2017).1 While the previous literature has paid close
attention to the determinants of eco-innovation (Del Ŕıo et al., 2011; Cuerva et al., 2014;
Del Ŕıo et al., 2017) and the impact of regulation-induced eco-innovation on economic com-
petitiveness (Greenstone et al., 2012; Ghisetti and Rennings, 2014; Rassier and Earnhart,
2015), less attention has been devoted to examine the real impact of eco-innovation on en-
1There are a number of different definitions of eco-innovation. Kemp (2010) defines eco-innovation as
the “production, assimilation or exploitation of a product, production process, service or management or
business method that is novel to the organization (developing or adopting it) and which results, throughout
its life cycle, in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts of resources use
(including energy use) compared to relevant alternatives”. In contrast, Rennings et al. (2006) views eco-
innovation as “measures of relevant actors which develop new ideas, behavior, products and processes,
and apply or introduce them, and contribute to a reduction of environmental burdens or to ecologically
specified sustainability targets”.
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vironmental performance and the mechanisms through which such an effect may take place.
In this study, we investigate whether eco-innovation can improve the environmental perfor-
mance of firms, taking different aspects of environmental performance into consideration.
We use green R&D expenditure to measure eco-innovation and we measure environmental
performance in two ways, first CO2 emissions intensity and second, fossil fuel intensity. We
define eco-innovation as the internal R&D expenditure dedicated to the protection of the
environment. The contribution of this chapter is three-fold. First, previous studies inves-
tigating the relationship between eco-innovation and environmental performance (Lee and
Min, 2015; Zhang et al., 2017) tend to use only one indicator of environmental performance
which is usually CO2 emissions intensity at the industry or regional-level (Huaman and Jun,
2014; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2014; Costantini et al., 2017). In this chapter, we employ an addi-
tional measure that takes into account the energy mix optimization. Second, our empirical
analysis is based on a unique data set at the firm level which provides detailed informa-
tion on French manufacturing firms’ innovation activities and energy consumption between
2005 and 2012. Such data allows us to investigate the effectiveness of eco-innovation across
industries in France. Thus instead of focusing on just one industry like previous firm-level
studies (Zhao et al., 2015; Fernando and Wah, 2017), our sample comprises innovative firms
across 20 different manufacturing industries to identify whether the decision to invest in
eco-innovation subsequently affects a firm’s environmental performance. Third, we apply a
range of econometric techniques including system generalized method of moments (GMM)
and a propensity score matching difference in difference (SPM-DiD) approach to provide
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a precise examination of the effectiveness of eco-innovation. System GMM approach pro-
vides an efficient estimation that takes the dynamic effect of environmental performance
into consideration. Furthermore, to control for the potential selection bias, we employ a
PSM-DiD method.
To briefly summarize our results, our results suggest that eco-innovation does not exhibit
a significant enhancement effect on environmental performance for French manufacturing
firms over the period 2005-2012. First, our findings suggest that the decision to invest
in eco-innovation does not significantly reduce firm’s CO2 emissions intensity. Meanwhile,
investing in general R&D does not significantly reduce CO2 emissions intensity either. In
particular, larger and more mature firms are more likely to have lower CO2 emissions in-
tensity. Regarding fossil fuel intensity, we do not find any evidence that eco-innovation
significantly reduces fossil fuel intensity. However, results suggest that more productive
firms in non pollution intensive sectors are likely to reduce their fossil fuel intensity. More-
over, investing in general R&D would also reduce fossil fuel intensity significantly.
Furthermore, when we analyse the change in CO2 emissions intensity of French manufactur-
ing firms that begin to invest in eco-innovation, we find that relative to a control group, the
CO2 emissions intensity of new eco-innovators is not statistically different in the year when
they start investing in eco-innovation. Similar insignificant treatment effects are observed
in the next one, two and three years. After splitting firms into pollution intensive firms
and non pollution intensive firms, we find that CO2 emissions intensity is not significantly
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reduced after they start investing in eco-innovation for both groups. Regarding fossil fuel
intensity, we do not find significant treatment effect for new eco-innovators in the year and
afterward when they start investing in eco-innovation either.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our a brief litera-
ture review of both the theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of eco-innovation
on environmental performance. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy and section 4
provides a comprehensive description of the data set. Section 5 discusses our results. The
final section concludes.
3.2 literature Review
Among studies on eco-innovation, a large stream of existing literature investigates the
determinants of eco-innovation, identifying factors such as technological push, regulatory
pull and market-driven demand (De Marchi, 2012; Horbach et al., 2012; Ghisetti et al.,
2015a; Hojnik and Ruzzier, 2016) in stimulating eco-innovation. Research tends to ad-
dress the importance of policy interventions in stimulating eco-innovation and the intuition
behind policy intervention to stimulate eco-innovation depends on the expectation that eco-
innovation has a positive effect on emissions control. By investing in eco-innovation, a firm’s
environmental performance may improve where environmental performance is defined as
the environmental impact that the corporation’s activity has on the natural environment.
Environmental performance includes a reduction of air emissions, waste water, solid wastes,
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or a decrease of consumption of hazardous/harmful/toxic materials, or a decrease in the
frequency of environmental accidents and resource use reductions (Zhu and Sarkis, 2004;
Aragón-Correa et al., 2008). In this study, we use CO2 emissions intensity and fossil fuel
intensity as the proxy for environmental performance.
A number of previous empirical studies have evaluated environmental performance mea-
sured as the ratio between emissions and value added (Huaman and Jun, 2014; Cruz and
Dias, 2016). Due to the lack of firm-level emissions data, existing literature mainly focuses
on country, region and sector-level data and exploited data from environmental hybrid
economic-environmental accounting matrixes. Using a structural decomposition method
to analyse industries in Taiwan during 1984–2004, Chang et al. (2008) identify the major
causes of the industrial CO2 emissions reduction and highlight that optimal energy de-
manding structure is more effective in carbon emissions reduction. The authors illustrate
that certain industries including the highway, petrochemical materials, and steel and iron
industries are the primary contributors to carbon emissions. Similarly, from a cost min-
imization perspective, investigating the Spanish energy sector, López-Peña et al. (2012)
emphasize the important role of energy efficiency for reducing carbon emissions in the
short and medium term.
In terms of the impact of innovation on curbing emissions: focusing on general innovation
activities, Cole et al. (2013) find that for Japanese manufacturing firms, R&D expendi-
ture is a key factor in the CO2 emissions reduction. Innovation is often assumed to lead
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to greater efficiency of resource use which means fewer resources being used as inputs and
hence less pollution emitted per unit of output while everything else equal. Yin et al. (2015)
test the role of technological process in intermediating the impact of economic growth on
environmental performance for Chinese provinces and find that R&D expenditures limit
CO2 emission. Similarly, Costantini et al. (2013) study the impact of internal R&D and
inter-regional technological and environmental spillovers in Italian regions, and find that
the spillovers effects are more important than sector internal R&D for improving environ-
mental performance. Fernández et al. (2018) analyze the CO2 emissions in the EU and
the U.S and suggest that R&D expenditures contribute positively to the reduction of CO2
emissions in the EU and the U.S.
Eco-innovation as a distinct from general innovation, may reduce the cost of environmental
protection and could be more important for correcting pollution externalities. However,
there are very few empirical studies that investigate the effectiveness of eco-innovation in
achieving environmental goals. The target for firms investing in eco-innovation is to pro-
duce less waste, consume fewer resources and energy and meanwhile be productive or prof-
itable. To engage in eco-innovation, firms need to make a long-term commitment in term
of R&D investment for new environmental technologies (Roome, 1994). R&D activities on
eco-innovation often center on improving the use of internal resources and capabilities to
reduce environmental impacts. Adopting eco-innovation, firms tend to improve productiv-
ity and efficiency and to reduce costs and environmental impacts. However, the economic
benefits from pollution reduction are often underestimated (King and Lenox, 2002). The
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undervaluation comes from the potentially high cost of eco-innovation. Thus firms’ green
capabilities are not fully exploited.
Recent empirical studies have been able to identify the positive effect of eco-innovation on
environmental performance. At the country level, Huaman and Jun (2014) suggest that
investing in carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies is important to reduce future
carbon emissions. By investigating the distribution of CO2 emissions intensity, the authors
argue that CCS technologies allow the continued use of non-renewable resources such as
coal, which continue to provide a large percentage of energy in developing countries. Par-
ticularly focusing on 28 countries within the European Union, Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2014)
examine the determinants of intertemporal environmental performance measured by green-
house gas emissions (GHG). By taking a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach
together with directional distance functions, they illustrate that the GHG had significantly
decreased during the period 1990-2011. They suggest that this improvement in environ-
mental performance is mainly due to environmental technical progress while eco-efficiency
is relatively ineffective.2. A later study by Beltrán-Esteve and Picazo-Tadeo (2017) reach
a similar conclusion that environmental technical progress is the main driver of environ-
mental performance enhancement in EU countries. The authors further stress the essential
role of environmental policies aimed at boosting catching-up in improving environmental
performance, specifically for newer members that joined the EU after 2004.
2The concept of eco-efficiency emerged in the 1990s as a practical approach to the more encompassing
concept of sustainability (Schaltegger and Thomas, 1996). The definition for eco-efficiency is that the
ability of firms, industries or economies to produce goods and services while incurring less impact on the
environment and consuming fewer natural resources(Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2012). It is often measured by
the ratio of economic value added to environmental damage (Korhonen and Luptacik, 2004)
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At the regional level, Ghisetti and Quatraro (2017) investigate eco-innovation in vertical
integrated sectors in Italy in 2005, and the authors generate an indicator of environmental
productivity by scaling turnover by total emissions. They conclude that eco-innovation
measured by green patents, as well as spillovers from vertically related sectors, has a pos-
itive effect on environmental performance. Furthermore, the influence of eco-innovation
on environmental performance is influenced by the derived demand for green technologies.
Focusing on China’s 30 provinces during the period 2000-2013, Zhang et al. (2017) suggest
that eco-innovation significantly reduces carbon emissions. Specifically eco-innovation that
improves energy efficiency appears to have the largest impact on carbon emissions abate-
ment whereas R&D investment input and patents output also play important roles. In
addition, government environmental policies do curb carbon emissions reduction, however,
a lag effect is noted.
At the sector level, instead of only focusing on CO2 emissions, a study by Carrión-Flores
and Innes (2010) identify bi-directional causal links between eco-innovation and toxic air
pollution in 137 manufacturing industries in the U.S. The authors find that eco-innovation
is an important determinant in reducing toxic emissions, and on the other hand, tightened
pollution targets also stimulate eco-innovation. Specifically focusing on the transport in-
dustry, Beltrán-Esteve and Picazo-Tadeo (2015) suggest that across 38 countries for the
period 1995–2009, there has been a significant enhancement in environmental performance
due to eco-innovation and this enhancement is relatively stronger in low- and middle-
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income economies. The authors decompose environmental performance into environmental
technical change and eco-efficiency change, which assesses the direct impact of developing
eco-innovation and catching-up with best available green technologies, respectively. The
results suggest that comparing with catching-up approach, development of green technolo-
gies is the main driver of the enhanced environmental performance. Meanwhile, considering
both generation and diffusion of eco-innovation, Costantini et al. (2017) find a significant
effect of eco-innovation on reducing local environmental impact of production across 14
manufacturing sectors in 27 EU members. They further suggest that along with the direct
effect of eco-innovation on environmental performance, eco-innovation si also able to reduce
environmental impact of other sectors in other location through market transactions such
as sustainable supply chain.
At the firm level, focusing on manufacturing firms in Japan, Lee and Min (2015) examine
the impact of environmental R&D investments on carbon emissions and find that envi-
ronmental R&D reduces carbon emissions and increases firms’ profitability. The authors
stress the importance of corporate management strategies which provide excessive organiza-
tional capabilities, in order to implement proactive environmental practices which enhance
environmental and financial performance. However, this study fails to control for the in-
fluence of national environmental regulations in Japan using OLS estimation, this could
lead to potentially biased results. Küçükoğlu and Pınar (2015) surveyed top 500 firms in
Turkey and find that eco-innovation activities have significant positive effect on a com-
pany’s environmental performance. The authors stress the importance of green process
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innovation in enhancing firm environmental performance. Zhao et al. (2015) distinguish
between three environmental policies on efficiency improvement, namely command and con-
trol regulations, market-based regulations, and government subsidies. The authors suggest
that government subsidies for new technological R&D reduce CO2 emissions for Chinese
power plants. Focusing on Korean-owned firms in Jiangsu province in China, Long et al.
(2017a) find that eco-innovation significantly improves firm environmental performance and
furthermore, the magnitude of this positive effect is greater than economic performance.
Especially for product eco-innovation, a significant and positive effect is noted. Moreover,
using data collected from 182 Chinese firms in 2016, Long et al. (2017b) adopt the theory
of planned behavior model and find that in general, eco-innovation improves firm environ-
mental performance. The authors further decompose eco-innovation into four dimensions,
namely product design, raw material, production processes and waste treatment. Their
results show that only production processes and waste treatment significantly enhance firm
environmental performance. For Malaysian firms in green technology sector, Fernando and
Wah (2017) confirm the positive effect of eco-innovation on environmental performance.
Their results suggest that stricter regulations and market orientation on cleaner products
also improve firm environmental performance.
To sum up, the existing literature has shed some light on the impact of eco-innovation
on environment protection and economic development, however current empirical studies
suffer from some certain limitation. First, due to data availability, only a small stream
of existing literature focus on firm-level data. Among these studies, most of them exam-
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ine firms in one specific sector/region/province which indicates the lack of commonality.
Second, the measurements for eco-innovation and environmental performance in different
studies are highly country or industry specific.
3.3 Data and empirical strategy
3.3.1 Data
For this study, we employ firm-level data for French manufacturing firms due to two rea-
sons. First, French economy was severely affected by the oil shocks in the early 1970s.
Since then, the French government started restructuring the country’s energy structure in
order to reduce its reliance on imported fuel supplies and to achieve energy independence.
A serious of actions from the government motivate the development of nuclear programs
for electricity generation where CO2 emissions are much smaller for electricity produced
by nuclear and hydropower than that of coal, oil, or natural gas. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
dominant position of nuclear power where the fraction of nuclear power generated electricity
to the total electricity produced in France was 72% in 2017. Also CO2 emissions per capita
in France have declined from 9.3 tonnes to 7.7 tonnes between 2000 and 2017. Although
France contributed to about 0.91% of the world’s total CO2 emissions in 2017, its CO2
emissions are the lowest among the major Western European countries (Eurostat, 2019).
Secondly, as the third largest economy in the EU, France assigns a significant amount of
resources to R&D activities every year. France devotes approximately 4,8643 millions euros
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in R&D activities in 2015 which ranked second in terms of investment in the EU. These
R&D expenditures account for approximately 2.23% of total French GDP which is ranked
seventh in the EU (Bank, 2017).
[Figure 3.2 about here]
For our empirical analysis, we construct an unbalanced panel data set which comprises four
different data sources in order to investigate the effect of eco-innovation on environmental
performance. First, we use the EACEI (Annual survey on industrial energy consumption)
survey that is a survey of manufacturing plants and asks for information on quantities and
values of energy consumed by energy type. More specifically, different uses of each type of
energy source are included. This survey also includes other non energy related variables
such as employment, geographical location. Different energy sources include electricity
(bought, self-produced and resold), steam, natural gas, other types of gas available on the
network, coal, lignite, coke, butane, propane, heavy fuel oil, heating oil, other petroleum
products, the black liquor (a byproduct from the chemical decomposition wood for making
paper pulp), wood and its by-products, special renewable fuels, special non-renewable fuels.
And different uses of electricity include driving force, thermal use, other uses (including
electrolysis). For other types of energy, different uses include manufacturing, electricity
production, raw materials, heating and other purposes. In our sample period (2005-2012),
certain sectors such as Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products
were not surveyed, thus all plants from these sectors are excluded from our analysis. Since
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2007 onward, other non-manufacturing industrial sectors such as Material recovery were
included in the survey but are dropped from our analysis for consistency. The data has
around 12,000 plants every year and includes all manufacturing plants employing over 20
employees in the most energy consuming sectors (including Manufacture of bricks, tiles
and construction products, in baked clay, Manufacture of cement and Manufacture of lime
and plaster); all plants with more than ten employees in manufacturing of industrial gases
sector; all plants with more than 250 employees on the 31st of December of that year; a
sample of plants with employment between 20 and 249 employees in sectors that are not
energy intensive. The level of the survey is at plant level rather than firm level given that
energy consuming materials, electricity and gas meters and fuel tanks are held at that level.
In our analysis, we aggregate the plant-level data to the firm level by subtracting the first
9 digit firm-level code (SIREN) which is the unique French business identification number
from the 16 digit plant-level code (SIRET). Firms with no plant appearing in EACEI are
dropped from our sample. We assume that any missing observations from EACEI are very
small in comparison to reporting plants. 3
Second, we include the annual survey of resources devoted to R&D activities (Enquete
annuelle sur les moyens consacres a la R&D) collected by the French Ministry of Education
and Research in our panel. This survey includes over 7,000 firms that perform R&D activ-
ities. This data set provides a detailed representation of the innovation activities carried
3This assumption may have an impact on our main results if a firm has several plants below the threshold
that are not surveyed by EACEI and a large plant that is surveyed by EACEI, under our assumption, then
this firm’s total energy uses equals to a firm’s largest plant’s energy use. However, if the summation of
the small plants’ usage is not small compared to the large plant, then the firm’s total energy usage is
underestimated. This measurement error could lead to biased coefficient of interest.
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out by French firms in terms of internal and external resources, the number of employees
working for the R&D department, public funds received, the number of patents and indi-
cators of product and process innovations.
Note that all firms in this data set are innovators. Due to the sampling structure, this is a
census survey for those firms which invest more than 350,000 in innovation whereas firms
that only invest relatively small amounts in R&D are randomly selected. Thus one problem
with this data is missing values and firms with long year gaps between observations. To
obtain a consistent panel, we drop all firms with more than six years gaps between data
points from our sample. After removing those firms, we construct a panel data set using
extrapolation techniques to fill in missing observations.
Third, we include financial information on manufacturing firms using two data sets. The
first is the Unified and Comprehensive File of SUSE (FICUS) database that is based on
an annual fiscal census of firms called the Unified Corporate Statistics System (SUSE)
which is conducted by the French Ministry for the Economy and Finance and is at the firm
level. SUSE covers all firms that are under the industrial and commercial benefit (BIC)
tax system or under the non-commercial benefit (BNC) tax system, and this means SUSE
comprises all firms that send their tax return to the French Ministry for the Economy and
Finance. It gives an unbalanced panel of over 3 million manufacturing firms for a period of
14 years between 1994 and 2007. Three kinds of variables are available. First, there is firm
information such as primary industry classification at the 4 digit NACE level, employment
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and date of creation. Second, there are income statement variables such as total turnover,
total labour cost and total gross earnings. Third, there are balance sheet variables such as
debt and stock of capital. The second data set for financial data is the Approached File
of ESANE Results (FARE). ESANE is the Annual Business Statistics Production and the
FARE data replaced FICUS after 2008. Hence, to obtain fiscal data for 2008 on wards, we
use the FARE file that gives an unbalanced panel of firms for the period 2008 to 2012.
After merging the four different data sets, we remove inconsistent observations and coding
errors from our sample, including incomplete data, negative values for R&D expenditure
and other contradictory information. In addition, we drop all firms with less than 10
full-time equivalence employees. All monetary variables are represented in thousands of
Euros and have been deflated using French Producer Price Index at the sector level with
2010 as a baseline (INSEE, 2017). Our final sample is an unbalanced panel comprised of
almost 7,000 observations for about 1,800 French manufacturing firms over 8 years. We
also distinguish between pollution intensive and non-pollution intensive sectors. Following
Shimamoto (2017), we categorize the five pollution intensive sectors as (1) Manufacture
of pulp, paper and paper products, (2) Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and
man-made fibres, (3) Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, (4)
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products and (5) Manufacture of basic metals
and fabricated metal products. Although analysing the full-sample can generalize to the
population of French manufacturing firms, by investigating two sub-samples of firms, we
can focus on more homogeneous sets of firms with specific characteristics. Following OECD
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(2019) definition on fossil fuels, we define fossil fuels as resources derived from the remains
of ancient plant and animal life, including coal, oil and natural gas.
3.3.2 Data Description
After aggregating the energy uses data from EACEI, we are able to generate the total en-
ergy consumption in the unit of tonnes of oil equivalent at the firm level. Then we transform
the total energy consumption into CO2 emissions in the unit of tonnes by multiplying the
energy conversion index from the International Energy Agency (IEA) (International En-
ergy Agency, 2019). We firstly measure environmental performance using firm-level CO2
emissions intensity which is defined as the CO2 emissions in the unit of tonnes divided
by total output. Secondly, we apply the fossil fuel intensity as an additional indicator for
environmental performance. We generate the total fossil fuel consumption by summing up
different types of fossil fuels (including coal, oil and natural gas). 4 Then we define the
fossil fuels intensity as dividing fossil fuel consumption in the unit of tonnes of oil equivalent
by total turnover.
Regarding eco-innovation, we use environmental R&D expenditures as a proxy. In our
R&D data, the distribution of internal R&D is provided and one of the categories is the
percentage of R&D expenditures dedicated to the protection of the environment. There-
fore the degree of investment in eco-innovation is calculated by multiplying the share of
4Following OECD (2019) definition on fossil fuels, we include natural gas, other types of gas available
on the network, coal, lignite, coke, butane, propane, heavy fuel oil, heating oil, other petroleum products
and the black liquor as fossil fuels. Wood is recognized as a renewable source, thus it’s not included.
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environmental R&D expenditures with the amount of total internal R&D expenditures.
The degree of eco-innovation captures the extent of a firm’s internal R&D investment in
environmental innovation. Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics of the different variables
used in our econometric analysis. The average size of the firm is approximately 618 full-
time equivalent employees which indicates our sample focus on relatively large firms. 5
[Table 3.2 about here]
In Table 3.3 we distinguish firms between polluter and non-polluters. In our sample, 538
French manufacturing firms are classified as pollution intensive representing approximately
28% of the sample. From Table 3.3, we observe that polluters have a higher CO2 intensity
as well as fossil fuel intensity as expected. Meanwhile, polluters appear to be less produc-
tive and pay more wages to employees. Polluters are smaller in term of size whereas they
invest more in eco-innovation. Regarding R&D capabilities, even though polluters make
much less R&D investment, it seems that they outsource more R&D activities to external
partners comparing with non-polluters.
[Table 3.3 about here]
Figure 3.3 illustrates that the annual average energy mix of the French manufacturing
5We follow Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach to calculate total factor productivity (TFP). This
approach is based on using intermediate inputs (investment and materials) to proxy for the unobserved
productivity. We use total investment in tangible and intangible assets as a proxy for the intermediate
input. We further use logarithm of the value added of firm as proxy for output, the log of capital and the
log of labour in the estimation of the firm’s productivity.
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firms, and these values appear quite stable throughout the period of 2005 to 2012. French
manufacturing firms substantially rely on electricity (mostly from nuclear, e.g. 72 percent
in 2017), which accounts for approximately 55 percent of total energy consumption and
has modestly increased by approximately 5 percent over the period considered. The second
most important energy input is natural gas, which accounts for approximately 35 percent
of total energy consumption. Finally, other energy sources (heavy oil, oil, steam, coke,
other gas, coke-petrol, and lignite) only represent a very small share of the energy input
for the typical firms.
[Figure 3.3 about here]
In Figure 3.4 we plot the annual average CO2 intensity over time from 2005 to 2012 and
show a stable trend of reduction of emissions during this period. The average CO2 intensity
decreases for about 25%. Meanwhile, in Figure 3.5, we present the annual environmental
R&D expenditures. The significant increase of the average value of eco-innovation shows
that French firms are investing increasing resources to internal environmental R&D over
this time period.
[Figure 3.4 about here]
[Figure 3.5 about here]
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Figure 3.6 presents the distribution of CO2 intensity for firms across different sectors. We
can observe considerable sectoral variation in the CO2 intensity and confirm the existence
of sectoral heterogeneity. In particular, we observe that paper and pulp sector and non-
metallic mineral sector have the highest CO2 intensity across all manufacturing industries.
[Figure 3.6 about here]
3.3.3 Empirical strategy
In this chapter, We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of eco-innovation in improving French
manufacturing firms environmental performance. First, we use the system generalized
method of moments estimation (GMM) method to investigate the dynamic impact of eco-
innovation on CO2 intensity in France. For another, we discuss whether, or not, investing
in eco-innovation can reduce CO2 intensity, by applying the propensity score matching
combined with difference in difference (PSM-DiD) estimation method.
3.3.3.1 System GMM estimation
The use of pooled least square and fixed effect method could suffer from potential bias
including unobserved heterogeneity, omitted variable bias and measurement error. Regres-
sors may not be strictly exogenous which would cause endogeneity concerns (Biresselioglu
et al., 2016). To overcome the bias, we implement the system GMM approach to examine
the dynamic variation of environmental performance for French manufacturing firms during
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the time period from 2005 to 2012. System GMM approach provides efficient and consistent
parameter estimates. In particular, system GMM allows for more instruments comparing
with first difference GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) and moreover, system GMM is more
efficient due to the existence of heteroskedasticity (Arellano and Bond, 1991). We apply
a dynamic model by including lag of the CO2 intensity as an additional regressor and we
instrument potential endogenous variables with their three periods lagged value. However,
no significant second-order autocorrelation in the residual series assumption needs to be
tested, because such an autocorrelation will make the lags of endogenous variables inap-
propriate instruments. Besides, the instrument validity is directly tested by the Sargan
and Hansen tests (Hansen, 1982; Sargan, 1958). In this chapter, the system GMM model,
which examines the impact of eco-innovation on carbon emissions intensity, is as follow:
Co2 intensityi,t =β1(Co2 intensityi,t−1) + β2(EnvR&D intensityi,t−1)
+ β3(Fi,t−1) + β4(Ti,t−1) + µt + γj + σl + εi,t
(3.1)
where Co2 intensity is the CO2 intensity of firm i in year t and EnvR&D intensity is the
eco-innovation intensity of firm i in year t−1. In the first set of variables F, we include those
control variables including firm age, firm size, average wage, ownership of firm, TFP, and
leverage. Then in the second set of variables T, we include a series of variables to capture
firms’ technological capabilities that include R&D intensity and external cooperation R&D
dummy. In addition, year µt, sector fix effects at the NACE rev.1 two digit level γj and
regional fix effect σl are included in all specifications to control for time invariant factors
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common to firms across different regions and sectors respectively while year dummies to
account for business cycle effects. Furthermore, given that investment in eco-innovation
usually takes a long period to complete and to generate returns (Brunnermeier and Cohen,
2003), we impose a lag structure to control for the delayed effect.
Similarly, the system GMM model examining the impact of eco-innovation on fossil fuel
intensity is as follow:
Fossilfuel intensityi,t =β1(Fossilfuel intensityi,t−1) + β2(EnvR&D intensityi,t−1)
+ β3(Fi,t−1) + β4(Ti,t−1) + µt + γj + σl + εi,t
(3.2)
where Fossilfuel intensity is the fossil fuel intensity of firm i in year t. We include the same
set of control variables as for CO2 intensity.
3.3.3.2 PSM-DiD estimation
Furthermore, we investigate the effect of starting to eco-innovate by comparing a firm’s
environmental performance, several years after starting to innovate to what their hypo-
thetical performance would have been at the same time had they never begun to invest
in eco-innovation. The estimation comparing reality with hypothetical performance is not
straightforward. The reduction of CO2 emissions is also likely affected by other endogenous
factors as discussed in previous section. For instant, a potential source of bias comes from
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the endogenously determined CO2 emissions allowance prices by EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS) (Lise et al., 2010). Moreover, unlike natural experiment, the counterfac-
tual of not being treated for an observation which instead has invested in eco-innovation
is unobservable, which cause difficulties in assessing the real effect of eco-innovation while
controlling for other relevant factors.
Thus, Our empirical strategy is to employ propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-
in-difference (DiD) approach to identify this causal link between eco-innovation and envi-
ronmental performance. A concern of applying the simple PSM approach is that it does not
control for any unobserved firm characteristics that may influence the outcome (Caliendo
and Kopeinig, 2008). Thus, depend on observable differences between eco-innovators and
non eco-innovators, we construct a control group to control for selection on observable and
unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity. After matching, we apply a DiD approach to
estimate the treatment effect of eco-innovation on CO2 emissions intensity. We are able to
justify whether there is any variation in the environmental performance before and after
they start investing in eco-innovation and also to compare the results to a control group of
comparable firms that remain investing no resources to eco-innovation. Hence, a combined
PSM-DiD method enhances the reliability of the estimation results.
In this study, our treatment (newEI) is the decision of a firm to devote to eco-innovation
which equals to 1 if a firm invests positive environmental R&D for the first time at some
point within our sample period. Meanwhile, the outcome is the subsequent environmental
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performance of a firm measured by this firm’s CO2 emissions intensity and fossil fuel in-
tensity. In order to identify whether there are differences in firms’ emission intensities or
fossil fuel intensity following the decision to invest in eco-innovation, we only focus on new
eco-innovators. To identify our treatment, we drop all firms which invest in eco-innovation
consistently across our sample period. These firms do not switch at all and do continuous
eco-innovation. Then, we re-scale the time period that we denote t = 0 when a firm invests
in eco-innovation for the first time or as the median year for non eco-innovators. Based
on the re-scaled t, we drop all subsequent observations of the same firm to avoid duplicate
matches.
To start the matching process, we denote yit as firm i’s environmental performance (CO2
emissions intensity or fossil fuel intensity) in time period t and yi(t+n) as the environmental
performance n period later (n ≥ 0). Then the effect of eco-innovation on environmental
performance of firm i at t+ n is as follow:
y1i(t+n) − y0i(t+n) (3.3)
We examine the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), as the difference in firms’ en-
vironmental performances (CO2 emissions intensity) between those which newly implement
the treatment (devote to eco-innovation) and those which remain eco-innovation inactive,
by computing:
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ATT = E[y1i(t+n)−y0i(t+n) | newEIit = 1] = E[y1i(t+n) | newEIit = 1]−E[y0i(t+n) | newEIit = 1]
(3.4)
where newEI equals to one if firm i starts devoting resources to eco-innovation at time t
and zero otherwise. For 3.4, although we are able estimate E[y1i(t+s) | newEIit = 1], we are
not able to estimate the counterfactual for the same firm E[y0i(t+s) | newEIit = 1], since we
do not observe the outcome directly.
Thus, following previous literature (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1997;
Dehejia and Wahba, 2002), we construct a valid control group of observations. In our
estimation strategy, each new eco-innovator is matched with a comparable observation
which is another firm with similar characteristics but has never devoted any resources
to eco-innovation. We also make an assumption that matched firms are similar in terms
of observable characteristics as well as unobservable characteristics. The expression is as
follow:
E[y0i(t+n) | newEIit = 1, C] = E[y0i(t+n) | newEIit = 0, C] (3.5)
where C represent a set of covariates of firm characteristics. Thus we are able to apply the
method above and re-write Equation 3.4 as follow:
ATT = E[y1i(t+n) | newEIit = 1, C]− E[y0i(t+n) | newEIit = 0, C] (3.6)
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However, it is unlikely to find identical values for all covariates in C. Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) suggest that the control group can be constructed condition on the conditional
probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment characteristics:
P (C) = Pr(newEIit = 1 | C) = E(newEIit | C] (3.7)
where P is the propensity of firm i to start eco-innovation at time t. Thus due to the binary
nature of the treatment (newEI), we estimate the probability of the treatment (newEI) at
time t using Probit estimation given by:
Pr(newEIi,t = β1(Ci,t−1) + µj + γk + σl + εi,t (3.8)
where C includes covariates of firm characteristics for firm i at year t − 1. C comprises
firm age (Log age), firm size (Log size), average wage (Log avewage), ownership of firm
(French firm and Foreign firm), TFP (TFP ), leverage (Leverage), R&D expenditure
(Log R&D) and external cooperation R&D dummy (ExtR&D d). Table 3.1 provides de-
tail definitions of covariates that we included in the estimation.
[Table 3.1 about here]
In addition, we take into account invariant characteristics through using a set of year dum-
mies (µt) to control for business cycle effects common to all business. Also we include two
digit NACE rev.1 sector dummies (γj) to control for time invariant factors common to firms
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across different sectors. Furthermore, we control for the regional differences by introducing
regional dummy variables (σl) which cover 25 administrative regions.
6
We lag all time-variate explanatory variables by one year to control for reverse causality.
In addition, we include the pre-treatment growth of outcome variable in the estimation.
For instant, Firms that start to invest in eco-innovation may already have different CO2
emissions intensities comparing to firms that never devote to eco-innovation. Historical
CO2 emissions may affect current CO2 emissions, by taking pre-treatment growth, we are
able to avoid potential bias. For the estimation on the impact of eco-innovation on the
fossil fuel intensity, we also lag all time-variate explanatory variables by one year, but we
replace the pre-treatment growth of CO2 emissions intensity by the pre-treatment change of
the share of fossil fuel in total energy consumption to avoid potential influence of historical
energy mix.
Table 3.4 presents the results of the Probit estimations for estimating the propensity scores
for CO2 emissions intensity.
7 Regarding Table 3.4, results show a positive and significant
effect of TFP on eco-innovation which indicates that more productive firms have higher
probability of being new eco-innovators. We also find that subcontracting R&D activities
to external partners would increase the probability of being an eco-innovator. For pollu-
625 administrative regions comprise 22 regions in Metropolitan France and 3 overseas regions. Since
in 2014, the French parliament passed a law reducing the number of metropolitan regions from 22 to 13
effective 1 January 2016, we adopt the previous legal concept of regions.
7We include firm characteristics for firm i at year t − 1. C including firm age (Log age), firm size
(Log size), average wage (Log avewage), ownership of firm (French firm and Foreign firm), TFP
(TFP ), leverage (Leverage), R&D expenditure (Log R&D) and external cooperation R&D dummy
(ExtR&D d).
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tion intensive firms in column (2), similar results are noted comparing with column (1).
Additionally for non pollution intensive firms, paying higher wage to employees would also
increase the probability of being an eco-innovator.
[Table 3.4 about here]
After estimating the propensity scores (predicted probabilities) from the Probit estimation,
we start the matching. The matching is executed within each two digit NACE rev.1 sector
and for each year to avoid matching across the entire sample (Elliott et al., 2016). Firms
in different sectors may have different technological levels, thus the propensity to start
investing in eco-innovation would be different subsequently between different sectors. This
approach generates more homogeneous control groups within narrowly defined industries
in the same year.
A number of matching algorithms have been developed in the literature, such as ker-
nel matching, radius matching, caliper matching and nearest neighbour matching (Stuart,
2010). Austin (2014) suggests that different matching algorithms are differentiated in terms
of how the neighborhood of control firms is built around the treated observations and dif-
ferent matching algorithms make a trade-off between bias and variance. In this study, we
apply kernel matching and radius matching. Kernel matching gives each treated firm a
weight of one. A weighted composite of control observations is used to create a match
for each treated firm, where control firms are weighted by their distance in propensity
score from treated firms within a range of the propensity scores. Garrido et al. (2014)
3.3. Data and empirical strategy 167
suggest that kernel matching maximizes precision by retaining as many observations with-
out worsening bias by giving higher weight to better matches. We also impose a common
support condition. When applying kernel matching, we need to choose the range of the
propensity scores (bandwidth parameter). High bandwidth values lead to a smoother es-
timated density function, which means a better fit and a decreasing variance between the
estimated and the true underlying density function. However, a high bandwidth would
potentially smooth away underlying features which may cause a biased estimate (Caliendo
and Kopeinig, 2008). Since Austin (2011) suggests that a bandwidth of 0.02 tends to per-
formance better in estimating treatment effect, thus we choose the bandwidth of 0.02 for
Kernel matching. Furthermore, we apply radius matching which is a variant of caliper
matching Dehejia and Wahba (2002). The difference is to use all of the comparison units
within the caliper instead of using the nearest neighbor within each caliper only. A benefit
of this matching technique is that it uses as many comparison members as are available
within the caliper and therefore allows for usage of extra units when good matches are
available.
After estimating the propensity scores, we then perform the balancing test to examine the
quality of the matching across treated and control groups. We split the sample into k blocks
of the propensity scores and test within each block whether the mean propensity score is
equivalent in the treated and control groups (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Garrido et al.,
2014). If the balancing test fails, we split the interval into more blocks and test again. We
continue this process until equality holds for every interval. After the propensity scores are
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balanced within blocks across the treated and control groups, we check for the balance of
each observed covariates within blocks of the propensity scores. If the balancing test fails,
we modify covariates in the estimation until equality is achieved.
After matching, we employ DiD estimation to estimate the differences of the CO2 emissions
intensity for eco-innovative firms in the year they started investing in eco-innovation and the
subsequent three years with respect to the pre-treatment level and to compare it with the
corresponding changes for persistent non eco-innovators. Since DiD estimator removes the
effects of common shocks and time invariate unobservables, combining PSM and DiD allows
for the selection on unobservable determinants based on similar characteristics of different





















where sj is the number of observations in the treated group on the common support. t is
the year when a firm first devotes to eco-innovation, so t+n is n periods after the treatment
occurs (n ≥ 0). wjk is the weight placed on the matched control firm k when constructing
the counterfactual estimation for treated firm j. Due to the time period is between 2005
and 2012, we compare the change in the CO2 intensity for three years after the initials
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investment in eco-innovation (n ∈ 1, 2, 3).
The application of PSM-DID approach improves the quality of our empirical analysis. In
particular, matching based on a number of observable characteristics allow us to compare
closely related observations, characterized by similar firm-level factors and to tackle the en-
dogeneity issue (Blundell and Dias, 2009). Furthermore, this technique remove the effects of
common shocks and provide a robust estimation of the causal link between eco-innovation
and CO2 intensity at the firm-level for French manufacturing firms.
3.4 Empirical results
We start by estimating the dynamic effect of eco-innovation on CO2 emissions intensity for
French manufacturing firms during 2005–2012 in Table 3.5. Specification (1)–(3) imply es-
timation results on all firms, pollution intensive firms and non-pollution intensive firms. To
determine the goodness of fit of the system GMM estimation, we report the second-order
autocorrelation for the residual series assumption and the Hansen tests of over-identifying
restrictions. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of the second-order autocorrelation for
the residual series at 10% level and meanwhile, the Hansen tests show insignificant P-value
at the 10% level, suggesting that the identification of instrument variables are just identi-
fied. Tests results justify the validity of the model.
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[Table 3.5 about here]
First, for all firms in Specification (1), results show a strong degree of persistence in CO2
emissions intensity as expected. Meanwhile, focusing on our key variable, we notice a
positive but insignificant coefficient for eco-innovation. This suggests that the effect of
eco-innovation on CO2 intensity is not recognized in our sample. Regarding technological
capabilities, we find that R&D intensity is negative but insignificant. However, we observe
a negative and significant effect of firm size on CO2 intensity suggesting that larger firms are
more environmental efficient comparing with small firms. Also a negative and significant
effect of firm age is observed which is suggesting that more mature firms are less emitting
due to the greater capability of reducing their CO2 intensity. And this capability can be
either organizational or technological.
In Specification (2) and (3), we make a distinction between pollution intensive firms and
non pollution intensive firms following Shimamoto (2017). Focusing on our key variable, we
find consistent results that eco-innovation remains insignificant in reducing CO2 intensity
across both specifications. Specifically in Specification (2), we find that pollution intensive
firms show similar characteristics comparing with our baseline estimation in Specification
(1) that results show high persistence in CO2 intensity. However, looking at specification
(3), we find a negative and significant coefficient for TFP which indicates that for non-
pollution intensive firms, more productive firms are more environmental efficient. Results
also suggest that devoting more resources to R&D is likely to lower CO2 intensity. But
3.4. Empirical results 171
subcontracting R&D to external partners, by contrast, would increase firm’s CO2 intensity.
Second, we report the results on examining the effects of starting to eco-innovate by compar-
ing a firm’s CO2 intensity, several years after starting to innovate to what their hypothetical
performance would have been at the same time had they never begun to devote to eco-
innovation. In our sample, we find 395 new eco-innovators and 1270 firms that have never
invested in eco-innovation during 2005-2012. Before interpreting the treatments effect, we
implement several balancing tests which provide useful information on whether plausible
counterfactuals have been created to justify the overall performance of the matching pro-
cess. Firstly, based on the estimated propensity scores, we compare differences in the means
of the observable characteristics before and after the matching for firms from treated and
control groups. Differences between the treated and the control groups are expected before
matching, but should reduce significantly after matching has taken place. Secondly, we
check the standardized difference (SD) for variables between treated and control groups.
Low standardized difference suggests variables being used in the PSM are balanced between
treated and control groups. Different from t test, SD is not affected by sample size.
In Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 we present the balancing tests results on Kernel matching for
eco-innovation on firm’s CO2 intensity for our main specification. Table 3.6 comprises the
comparison of individual covariates considered in the Kernel matching process between
treated and control groups before and after matching. We find the presence of differences
in some covariates between treated and control groups before matching, however bias are
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decreased substantially in the matched samples. The t-test results confirm our findings.
Table 3.7 provides information on overall measures of covariate imbalance before and after
matching. Comparing the pseudo-R2s before and after matching, there are no system-
atic differences in the distribution of covariates between treated and control groups after
matching, thus the pseudo-R2 is relatively low. Also, the likelihood ratio test on the joint
significance of all variables in the matching process show rejection before matching but
not after matching. Overall, tests results suggest a well balance after matching. Thus, we
confirm that there are no systematic differences in observable characteristics between the
treated and the control groups. Hence the matching quality is satisfactory.
[Table 3.6 about here]
[Table 3.7 about here]
Now we start evaluating the effectiveness of eco-innovation on firm’s CO2 emissions in-
tensity. PSM-DID results for main specification using two different matching techniques,
namely Kernel matching with the bandwidth of 0.02 and radius matching with a caliper
of 0.02 are presented in Table 3.8 respectively. Common support and replacement are con-
sidered during the matching. The results for Kernel matching are shown in the upper part
of Table 3.8. ATTs show a positive treatment effect, but this effect remains statistically
insignificant for up to three years. The estimates indicate that there’s no significant re-
duction in the CO2 emissions intensity for new eco-innovators in the year that they start
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to invest in eco-innovation, comparing with comparable firms that did not start to invest.
Furthermore, after the one, two and three years when the initial decision of investing in
eco-innovation was made, the CO2 emissions intensity is still not significantly affected by
this decision.
[Table 3.8 about here]
For Kernel matching, we chose the bandwidth of 0.02 and radius matching with a caliper
of 0.02. According to Austin (2011), using caliper widths equal to 0.2 of the standard
deviation of the estimated propensity score and caliper widths equal to 0.02 or 0.03 tend
to have better performance for estimating treatment effects. Thus we further apply Kernel
matching with a bandwidth of 0.2 of the standard deviation of the estimated propensity
score and radius matching with a caliper of 0.2 of standard deviation of the estimated
propensity score in Table 3.9 and the results are fairly consistent with Table 3.8
[Table 3.9 about here]
In Table 3.10 we make a distinction between those firms categorized as pollution intensive
firms and non-pollution intensive firms following Shimamoto (2017). The upper part of Ta-
ble 3.10 shows that for pollution intensive firms that start investing in eco-innovation, their
CO2 emissions intensities are not significantly reduced in the year when they become eco-
innovators. Similar results are presented in the lower part of Table 3.10 for non-pollution
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intensive firms.
Thus, we find consistent results across two approaches suggesting there’s no significant effect
of eco-innovation on CO2 emissions. One possible explanation could be that eco-innovation
focuses more on product innovation which has a smaller impact on emission reduction
than process innovation. Another possible explanation could be due to the specific require-
ments from environmental regulation. If a new environmental standard is implemented,
eco-innovation may not result in cleaner production, but rather enable the firm to meet the
target at a lower cost. Furthermore, since French manufacturing firms rely substantially on
the consumption of electricity and the electricity consumed are mostly from nuclear power
(e.g. 72 percent in 2017), CO2 emissions intensity is relatively stable during of sample
period. This may potentially weaken the results of the impact of eco-innovation on CO2
emissions intensity.
[Table 3.10 about here]
Given the unique energy structure in France during our sample period and the insignificant
effect of eco-innovation on CO2 emissions intensity, the next stage is to investigate whether
eco-innovation could change a firm’s energy strategy by reducing the fossil fuel intensity.
We follow the same procedure as explained in the previous section by implementing system
GMM and PSM-DiD estimations. Table 3.11 presents the results of the system GMM es-
timation on the dynamic effect of eco-innovation on the fuel intensity. Table 3.14 presents
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the main results of the PSM-DiD estimation on the effects of starting to eco-innovate by
comparing a firm’s fossil fuel intensity, several years after starting to innovate with control
group. To evaluate the overall goodness of fit of the GMM model, wee find that all of our
specifications passed the second-order autocorrelation for the residual series assumption
and the Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions, suggesting the validity of the results.
In Table 3.11 Specification (1) for all firms, we can only observe the existence of high
persistence fossil fuel intensity. More specifically, a positive but insignificant coefficient
for eco-innovation is noted which indicates the eco-innovation does not significantly affect
firm’s fossil fuel intensity. And this insignificant effect of eco-innovation is relatively con-
sistent across all specifications when we distinguish between pollution intensive firms and
non pollution intensive firms in specification (2) and specification (3) respectively. For
specification (2), pollution intensive firms show very similar results comparing with specifi-
cation (1). If we focus on non-pollution intensive firms in specification (3), R&D intensity
seems to be a significant factor in reducing the usage of fossil fuel. However, if a firm
subcontracted R&D to external partners in the previous year, its fossil fuel intensity would
increase by 0.16%. Results show a negative and insignificant effect of TFP on the fossil
fuel intensity whereas larger and more mature firms appear to have lower fossil fuel intensity.
[Table 3.11 about here]
Secondly, we examine the effects of starting to eco-innovate on fossil fuel intensity by
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comparing a firm’s fossil fuel intensity with control group. Again, we implement several
balancing tests before interpreting our PSM-DiD results and results are presented in Table
3.12 and Table 3.13. Table 3.12 illustrates that the matching process substantially reduces
the bias for most of the covariates, and the variance ratios between treated over non-treated
indicate a good balance for most of the covariates. From Table 3.13 on the overall perfor-
mance of the matching procedure, the SD of the matched sample is significantly reduced
comparing with the unmatched sample. It reflects that the systematic difference between
new eco-innovators and matched non eco-innovators is reduced. The insignificant P-values
of the LR test indicates that no significant differences between the new eco-innovators and
the matched non eco-innovators after applying the matching. Overall, results from balanc-
ing tests suggest that there are no systematic differences in the observable characteristics
between treated and control groups. Thus we are able to justify that there are no specific
concern for the quality of the matching.
[Table 3.12 about here]
[Table 3.13 about here]
Now we start interpreting the results presented in Table 3.14. Kernel matching technique
provides positive treatment effects, but not statistically different from 0 at the 10% level for
up to three years afterward. ATTs indicate that the fossil fuel intensity is not significantly
influenced by the decision to start investing in eco-innovation for new eco-innovators in
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the year that they start to invest in eco-innovation. Nevertheless, in the first, second and
third year after the initial decision of investing in eco-innovation was made, the fossil fuel
energy consumption is still not significantly affected by this decision. In the lower part of
Table 3.14, following radius matching technique, we notice larger ATTs with same direc-
tion. However, all ATTs are still statistically insignificant.
[Table 3.14 about here]
Overall, Our results are consistent across all specifications, confirming the robustness of our
results in terms of the methodologies applied and of the validity of findings. In general, our
findings do not find evidence that there is a significant relationship between eco-innovation
and environmental performance. Recall that eco-innovation is related to the adoption of
new or modified processes, techniques, systems and products to avoid or reduce environ-
mental damage (Kemp, 2010). Hence, the implementations of eco-innovation is crucial in
reducing emissions and wastes. However, the implementations of eco-innovation requires
high initial costs, while it takes a relatively long period to recover these costs, hence, the
firms’ incentive may be relatively low in this case.
3.5 Conclusions
This study aims to contribute to the empirical literature examining the effect of eco-
innovation on environmental performance measured by CO2 emissions intensity and fos-
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sil fuel intensity using a firm-level panel data of French manufacturing firms that invest
in R&D. In particular, we further investigate whether firms that start to invest in eco-
innovation achieve a better environmental performance in the year they start to invest in
eco-innovation and in the following three years comparing with the year before they start to
invest. To test our arguments, we construct a panel data set containing 1,867 French firms
during 2005-2012. Our Distinguish from previous studies using more aggregated data, we
are able to use an identification strategy that is less sensitive to macroeconomics shocks
that may be correlated with country or sector level eco-innovation and environmental per-
formance. For our empirical results, our findings do not support the presence of a significant
relationship between eco-innovation and environmental performance. More specifically, we
find no evidence that eco-innovation significantly facilitates carbon emission reduction for
French manufacturing firms during 2005-2012. And nevertheless, we do not find evidence
that eco-innovation significantly reduce fossil fuel consumption.
The insignificant effect could be due to the special characteristics of eco-innovation. The
absence of pressures to eco-innovate by key stakeholders or the lack of institutional environ-
ment, such as public policies, limits firm’s incentive to invest in environmental technologies
which target on reducing environmental impacts. Moreover, insufficient internal capabili-
ties may also hinder eco-innovation, such as lack of technological capabilities to internalize
external green technologies, and a low priority given to environmental issues. Nevertheless,
eco-innovation may be too expensive or incompatible with the existing production process.
It may fall into a scenario that firms can not invest in eco-innovations due to the costs,
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and costs go even higher when firms are reluctant to invest. Thus regulatory intervention
is crucial in the exploitation of eco-innovation.
These results have implications for firms and policymakers regarding the effectiveness of
eco-innovation in reducing carbon emissions and enhancing energy efficiency. The successful
implementation of eco-innovation can help firms to meet their environmental goals and it is
substantially affected by environmental regulations. However, to provide sufficient supports
and incentives for firms to invest in eco-innovation, a flexible policy mix is needed. Instead
of implementing stricter environmental standards which may force some firms exiting the
market due to their incapabilities in dealing with new standards, using policy instruments
such as public funding can be efficient. Eco-innovation is often undervalued, it’s impor-
tant for policymakers to support a well designed framework which provides comprehensive
assessment to improve the recognition of the true value of eco-innovation for firms.
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Source: elaboration based on Annual Survey on Industrial Energy Consumption
database on French firms over the period 2005-2012.
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Source: elaboration based on Electricity Transmission Network database on French
electricity generation 2017.









Source: elaboration based on Annual Survey on Industrial Energy Consumption
database on French firms over the period 2005-2012.
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Source: elaboration based on Annual Survey on Industrial Energy Consumption
database on French firms over the period 2005-2012.
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Source: elaboration based on Annual Survey of Resources Devoted to R&D Activities
database on French firms over the period 2005-2012.
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Source: elaboration based on Annual Survey of Resources Devoted to R&D Activities
database on French firms over the period 2005-2012.
17 Textiles
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying 
of fur
19 Leather, leather products and 
footwear
20 Wood and products of wood and cork
21 Pulp, paper and paper products
22 Printing and publishing
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastics products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment               
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
30 Office machinery and computers
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, 
n.e.c
32 Radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus
33 Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers











Table 3.1: Definition of variables
Variable Description
CO2 intensity the CO2 emissions divided by total output
Fossilfuel intensity the fossil fuel consumption divided by total output
EnvR&D intensity the environmental R&D expenditure divided by total output
Log R&D log of firm’s total research and development (R&D) expenditures
ExtR&D d =1 if the firm is subcontracting and collaborating on R&D with external parties,
TFP total factor productivity
Log age log of number of years since the firm began to operate
Log size log of firm’s size (total number of full-time equivalent employees)
Log avewage log of firm’s average wage (total salary expenditure divided by total number of full-time
equivalent employees)
Export intensity the total export divided by total output
Log export log of firm’s export value
French group =1 if more than 50% of share of the firm is held by a French group, 0 otherwise
Foreign group =1 if more than 50% of share of the firm is held by a foreign group, 0 otherwise
Leverage ratio between total liability and shareholders’ equity
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for all firms
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
CO2 intensity 0.0456 0.0857 0.0014 0.5713
Fossilfuel intensity 0.0188 0.0571 0 0.9941
EnvR&D intensity 0.0018 0.0085 0 0.3694
R&D (EUR th.) 10963.94 48959.18 2 1471889
R&D intensity 0.0835 0.0808 0.0003 0.4082
ExtR&D d 0.6083 0.4882 0 1
TFP 1.1161 0.3571 0.3419 2.3499
Age 33.7533 23.9343 2 112
Size 618.76 1236.49 12.5 24089
Avewage (EUR th.) 37.5459 9.3166 20.4895 69.9983
Export (EUR th.) 101684.5 414845.4 0 20500000
Export intensity 0.4347 0.2856 0 0.9850
French group 0.5236 0.4995 0 1
Foreign group 0.4684 0.4990 0 1
Leverage 1.2996 2.2139 -7.8512 14.3536
Source: EACEI, FARE, FICUS and The Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted
to R&D Activities data. Standard deviations in parentheses. Information refers
to the period 2005-2012.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics of polluters and non-polluters
Variable all firms polluter nonpolluters t-test
CO2 intensity 0.0456 0.0918 0.0260 -0.0655***
(0.0857) (0.1325) (0.0416) (0.0020)
Fossilfuel intensity 0.0172 0.0396 0.0079 -0.0333***
(0.0422) (0.0679) (0.0171) (0.0010)
EnvR&D intensity 0.0018 0.0022 0.0016 -0.0006***
(0.0085) (0.0100) (0.0077) (0.0002)
R&D (EUR th.) 10963.94 7047.053 12614.71 5553.34***
(48959.18) (22466.48) (56423.18) (1227.47)
R&D intensity 0.0835 0.0845 0.0830 -0.0016
(0.0808) (0.0800) (0.0811) (0.0020)
ExtR&D d 0.6083 0.6757 0.5799 -0.0955***
(0.4882) (0.4682) (0.4936) (0.0122)
TFP 1.1161 1.1008 1.1228 0.0222**
(0.3571) (0.3623) (0.3554) (0.0089)
Age 33.7533 35.5575 33.0022 -2.5674***
(23.9343) (25.6186) (23.1396) (0.5995)
Size 618.76 540.5885 651.88 110.41***
(1236.49) (856.7569) (1363.58) (30.9827)
Avewage (EUR th.) 37.5459 39.7969 36.5989 -3.2086***
(9.3166) (9.3112) (9.1649) (0.2308)
Export (EUR th.) 101684.5 111123.4 97670.48 -13579.15
(414845.4) (466469.6) (390622.5) (10419.68)
Export intensity 0.4347 0.4368 0.4339 0.0031
(0.2856) (0.2917) (0.2831) (0.0072)
French group 0.5236 0.5163 0.5264 0.0107
(0.4995) (0.4998) (0.4994) (0.0127)
Foreign group 0.4684 0.4732 0.4667 -0.0072
(0.4990) (0.4994) (0.4989) (0.0127)
Leverage 1.2996 1.2685 1.3136 0.0441
(2.2139) (2.1908) (2.2238) (0.0556)
Source: EACEI, FARE, FICUS and The Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to
R&D Activities data. Standard deviations in parentheses. Information refers to the
period 2005-2012.
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Table 3.4: French firm’s decision to start investing in eco-innovation (Probit estimations)
Dependent variable: EnvR&D d
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
(all firms) (polluters) (non-polluters)
Probit Probit Probit
Pregrowthco2i(t−1) -0.0353 -0.0940 0.0522
(2.7313) (2.0457) (3.8702)






∗∗ 0.0104∗ 0.1812 ∗∗∗
(0.1947) (0.0052) (0.0098)
Log sizei(t−1) -0.0661 -0.0005 -0.0055
(0.0875) (0.0015) (0.0019)
Log agei(t−1) -0.0708 -0.0034 -0.0043
(0.0802) (0.0018) (0.0013)
Log avewagei(t−1) 0.1669 0.0042 0.0215
∗
(0.3387) (0.0099) (0.0129)
Log exporti(t−1) -0.0051 0.0074 -0.0021
(0.0255) (0.0047) (0.0039)
French groupi(t−1) -0.0287 0.0100
∗ 0.0118∗∗
(0.4233) (0.0059) (0.0053)
Foreign groupi(t−1) -0.0165 0.0091
∗ 0.0117∗
(0.4276) (0.0054) (0.0064)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0169 -0.0002 0.0003
(0.0259) (0.0004) (0.0004)
log likelihood -363.68 -275.05 -174.38
Wald chi2 131.43∗∗∗ 108.48∗∗∗ 98.53∗∗∗
observations 711 218 509
Average marginal effects reported with standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include sectoral, year and regional dummies.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Effects of eco-innovation on firms’ CO2 intensity (system GMM estimates)
Dependent variable: Co2 intensity
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)





EnvR&D intensityi(t−1) -0.5133 -3.0675 -0.1787
(0.7239) (2.3404) (0.3043)
R&D intensityi(t−1) -0.0205 0.1254 -0.1546
∗
(0.0594) (0.1319) (0.0911)
ExtR&D di(t−1) 0.0009 0.0001 0.0049
∗
(0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0026)









Log avewagei(t−1) 0.0094 0.0094 0.0198
(0.0092) (0.0162) (0.0180)





Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0029 0.0023 0.0131
(0.0032) (0.0075) (0.0098)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0001 0.0008 0.00001
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0006)
AR(2) p value 0.822 0.212 0.365
Hansen p value 0.673 0.487 0.719
Observations 7,605 2,260 5,345
No.firms 1,867 538 1,329
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include regional, sectoral
and year dummies. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: Balancing tests before and after matching for CO2 intensity propensity score 1
Unmatched Mean SD t-test V(T)/V(C)
Variable Matched Treated Control Bias t p¿t
Pregrowthco2 U -0.00104 -0.0009 -0.4 -0.06 0.951 1.28
M -0.00024 -0.00112 3.8 -748.7 0.38 0.706 0.40
Log R&D U 7.0186 6.8483 9.8 1.61 0.107 0.85
M 7.386 7.2818 6.1 38.4 0.61 0.542 0.89
ExtR&D d U 0.5342 0.5182 3.2 0.53 0.593
M 0.5824 0.5608 4.3 -35.3 0.42 0.678
TFP U 1.1452 1.2259 -21.2 -3.59 0.000 1.11
M 1.0918 1.162 -18.5 13.0 -1.93 0.054 1.02
Log age U 3.1842 3.2274 -5.8 -0.97 0.330 1.10
M 3.2699 3.2082 8.3 -44.1 0.80 0.424 0.80
Log size U 5.6121 5.3286 25.2 4.24 0.000 1.05
M 5.8075 5.6725 12.1 52.1 1.20 0.230 1.07
Log avewage U 3.575 3.5504 10.4 1.71 0.087 0.85
M 3.5961 3.5974 -0.5 94.8 -0.05 0.959 0.86
Log export U 9.3981 8.8601 19.1 3.15 0.002 0.88
M 9.7308 9.5604 6.0 68.3 0.60 0.547 1.38
French group U 0.5457 0.5421 0.7 0.12 0.907
M 0.4890 0.4893 -0.1 91.0 -0.01 0.995
Foreign group U 0.4413 0.4268 2.9 0.48 0.633
M 0.4945 0.5029 -1.7 41.2 -0.16 0.872
Leverage U 1.4095 1.4236 -0.6 -0.10 0.918 0.87
M 1.1651 1.1723 -0.3 49.0 -0.03 0.977 0.46
Year, sector and region dummy variables not presented but included in the balancing tests. For these dummies,
standardized differences (SD) are 0 and p-values of t-tests are 1 for the matched sample
Table 3.7: Balancing tests before and after matching for CO2 intensity propensity score 2
Pseudo Likelihood
Sample R2 Ratio Chi2 p¿Chi2 Mean Bias Median Bias B R %vAR
Unmatched 0.022 22.4 0.021 9.0 5.8 35.9 1.20 13
Matched 0.012 6.00 0.873 5.6 4.3 25.7 0.97 38
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Table 3.8: Effects of eco-innovation on firms’ CO2 intensity (PSM-DiD estimates) with a
bandwidth of 0.02
Treatment (s=0) (s=1) (s=2) (s=3)
Gaussian Kernel matching
ATT 0.0015 0.0020 0.0078 0.0048
(0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0053) (0.0062)
N(T) 189 165 153 119
N(C) 581 580 580 471
Radius matching
ATT 0.0031 0.0049 0.0079 0.0109
(0.0031) (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0085)
N(T) 189 165 153 119
N(C) 581 580 580 471
Note: standard errors in parentheses. N(T) and N(C) are the numbers of
observations for the treated and control groups respectively.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.9: Effects of eco-innovation on firms’ CO2 intensity (PSM-DiD estimates with a
bandwidth of 0.2*SD)
Treatment (s=0) (s=1) (s=2) (s=3)
Gaussian Kernel matching
ATT 0.0014 0.0013 0.0089 0.0052
(0.0025) (0.0041) (0.0057) (0.0063)
N(T) 189 165 153 119
N(C) 581 580 580 471
Radius matching
ATT 0.0048 0.0099 0.0169 0.0220
(0.0067) (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0177)
N(T) 189 165 153 119
N(C) 581 580 580 471
Note: standard errors in parentheses. N(T) and N(C) are the numbers of
observations for the treated and control groups respectively.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.6. Figures and tables 191
Table 3.10: Effects of eco-innovation on firms’ CO2 intensity by pollution intensity
Treatment (s=0) (s=1) (s=2) (s=3)
Pollution intensive
ATT 0.0053 0.0091 0.0309 0.0239
(0.0070) (0.0127) (0.0174) (0.0195)
N(T) 58 48 44 32
N(C) 160 161 161 135
Non-pollution intensive
ATT 0.00002 0.0004 -0.0016 0.0028
(0.0018) (0.0017) 0.0020 0.0047
N(T) 130 117 109 87
N(C) 413 411 411 332
Note: standard errors in parentheses. N(T) and N(C) are the numbers of
observations for the treated and control groups respectively.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.11: Effects of eco-innovation on firms’ fossil fuel intensity (system GMM estimates)
Dependent variable: Fossilfuel intensity
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)





EnvR&D intensityi(t−1) -0.3869 -1.4139 -0.0082
(0.4742) (1.3150) (0.0899)
R&D intensityi(t−1) -0.0113 0.0729 -0.0473
∗
(0.0275) (0.0869) (0.0304)
ExtR&D di(t−1) 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0016
∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0008)
TFPi(t−1) -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0088
(0.0044) (0.0086) (0.0061)
Log sizei(t−1) -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0019
∗
(0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0012)
Log agei(t−1) -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0011
∗
(0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0006)
Log avewagei(t−1) 0.0037 0.0031 0.0058
(0.0044) (0.0078) (0.0059)
Export intensityi(t−1) 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0013
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0016)
French groupi(t−1) 0.0018 -0.0003 0.0021
(0.0014) (0.0052) (0.0018)
Foreign groupi(t−1) 0.0013 0.0002 0.0009
(0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0023)
Leveragei(t−1) -0.0001 0.0004 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0003)
AR(2) p value 0.834 0.722 0.577
Hansen p value 0.739 0.273 0.632
observations 7,612 2,260 5,352
No.firms 1,868 538 1,330
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include regional, sectoral
and year dummies. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.12: Balancing tests before and after matching for fossil fuel intensity propensity
score 1
Unmatched Mean SD t-test V(T)/V(C)
Variable Matched Treated Control Bias t p¿t
Pregrowthfossilfuel U -0.00113 -0.0005 -5.1 -0.74 0.460 2.07
M -0.00024 -0.0011 5.3 -3.3 0.74 0.461 1.24
Log R&D U 7.0186 6.8495 9.8 1.61 0.107 0.85
M 7.386 7.2867 5.8 41.3 0.58 0.560 0.90
ExtR&D d U 0.5342 0.5182 3.2 0.53 0.593
M 0.5824 0.5596 4.6 -43.1 0.44 0.661
TFP U 1.1452 1.2259 -21.2 -3.59 0.000 1.11
M 1.0918 1.165 -19.2 9.5 -1.99 0.047 0.99
Log age U 3.1842 3.2274 -5.8 -0.97 0.330 1.10
M 3.2699 3.218 7.0 -21.2 0.67 0.500 0.81
Log size U 5.6121 5.3304 25.2 4.24 0.000 1.05
M 5.8075 5.6747 11.9 52.9 1.18 0.240 1.04
Log avewage U 3.575 3.5504 10.4 1.71 0.087 0.85
M 3.5961 3.5984 -1 90.8 -0.09 0.927 0.87
Log export U 9.3981 8.86 19.1 3.15 0.002 0.88
M 9.7308 9.5823 5.3 72.4 0.53 0.599 1.39
French group U 0.5457 0.5421 0.7 0.12 0.907
M 0.4890 0.4866 0.5 33.0 0.05 0.964
Foreign group U 0.4413 0.4268 2.9 0.48 0.633
M 0.4945 0.5055 -2.2 23.8 -0.21 0.834
Leverage U 1.4095 1.4236 -0.6 -0.10 0.918 0.87
M 1.1651 1.1973 -1.4 -127.7 -0.13 0.899 0.44
Year, sector and region dummy variables not presented but included in the balancing tests. For these dummies,
standardized differences (SD) are 0 and p-values of t-tests are 1 for the matched sample
Table 3.13: Balancing tests before and after matching for fossil fuel intensity propensity
score 2
Pseudo Likelihood
Sample R2 Ratio Chi2 p¿Chi2 Mean Bias Median Bias B R %vAR
Unmatched 0.023 23.08 0.017 9.5 5.8 36.4 1.21 13
Matched 0.013 6.55 0.835 5.8 5.3 26.9 0.94 25
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Table 3.14: Effects of eco-innovation on firms’ fossil fuel intensity (PSM-DiD estimates)
Treatment (s=0) (s=1) (s=2) (s=3)
Gaussian Kernel matching
ATT 0.0008 0.0058 0.0075 0.0095
(0.0019) (0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0097)
N(T) 189 165 153 119
N(C) 581 580 580 471
Radius matching
ATT 0.0018 0.0109 0.0149 0.0173
(0.0016) (0.0113) (0.0109) (0.0164)
N(T) 189 165 153 119
N(C) 581 580 580 471
Note: standard errors in parentheses. N(T) and N(C) are the numbers of
observations for the treated and control groups respectively.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.15: Effects of eco-innovation on firms’ fossil fuel intensity by pollution intensity
Treatment (s=0) (s=1) (s=2) (s=3)
Pollution intensive
ATT 0.0024 0.0225 0.0297 0.0362
(0.0069) (0.0228) (0.0220) (0.0358)
N(T) 58 48 44 32
N(C) 161 162 162 136
Non-pollution intensive
ATT 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0006) 0.0007 0.0008
N(T) 131 117 109 87
N(C) 420 418 418 335
Note: standard errors in parentheses. N(T) and N(C) are the numbers
of observations for the treated and control groups respectively.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Main Findings and Policy Implications
In this thesis, we have presented three empirical studies to provide a deeper understanding
of the various aspects of eco-innovation. Eco-innovation is a potential solution that pro-
vides a possible transition towards a cleaner, low carbon, and vibrant economy. During this
transition, firms are key actors in the creation, adoption and diffusion of eco-innovations
as well as the most important responsibilities for environmental protection. First, we ex-
amine the determinants of eco-innovation, particularly investigating the role of external
R&D cooperation in stimulating eco-innovation. Using firm-level data focusing on French
manufacturing firms over the period 2004 to 2011, we provide a comprehensive analysis of
the characteristics favorable to eco-innovation. Our results suggest that external R&D co-
operation leads to an increase in the level of investment in eco-innovation, more specifically,
emphasizing the key role played by international R&D cooperation. Beside technological
capabilities, we also highlight the importance of organizational capabilities and regulation
stringency in promoting eco-innovation.
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Second, we investigate the impact of environmental regulations on firm economic perfor-
mance using a firm-level panel data of French manufacturing firms that invest in R&D.
We test for the intermediate effect of regulation induced eco-innovation in offsetting en-
vironmental abatement pressure, known as the Porter hypothesis. Our results from an
instrument variable approach show a negative and significant effect of environmental reg-
ulations on firm’s productivity and regulation induced eco-innovation is not able to offset
this effect. Among environmental abatement costs, end-of-pipe abatement costs reduce
firms productivity significantly whereas integrated abatement cost does not. Regarding
profitability, environmental regulations do not show significant effect on operating margin,
however, regulation induced eco-innovation significantly reduces firms profitability. For
both measurements of economic performance, firms in non-pollution intensive sectors are
less sensitive to the change in regulatory stringency.
Finally, we examine the relationship between eco-innovation and firms environmental per-
formance to assess the effectiveness of eco-innovation in reducing their environmental im-
pact. Using a firm-level panel data on French manufacturing firms over the period 2005 to
2012, we measure environmental performance from two aspects, CO2 emissions and energy
structure. The results suggest that the decision to invest in eco-innovation does not signif-
icantly reduce neither carbon emissions nor fossil fuel usage. However, investing in general
R&D does reduce the use of fossil fuel significantly. On the other hand, more productive
firms in non pollution intensive sectors are more likely to reduce their fossil fuel intensity.
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In addition, we analyse the change in CO2 emissions intensity of French innovators that
begin to invest in eco-innovation, we find that relative to a control group, the CO2 emis-
sions intensity of new eco-innovators is not statistically different in the year when they
start investing in eco-innovation. The treatment effect remains insignificant in the next
three years. Furthermore, we find that CO2 emissions intensity is not significantly reduced
after they decide to invest in eco-innovation for both pollution intensive firms and non
pollution intensive firms. Similar treatment effects of eco-innovation on fossil fuel intensity
are observed.
To conclude, the empirical results in this thesis have important policy implications on the
possible ways to achieve the sustainable targets for firms and policymakers. First, the
results suggest a substantial role for external knowledge sourcing, especially international
R&D cooperation in stimulating eco-innovation. This significant effect of R&D cooperation
indicates the presence of technological inter-dependencies on knowledge and resources. At
the development stage of eco-innovation, firms are able to share costs and risks through
R&D cooperation. Thus, R&D cooperation requires more efficient public support in the
search for external knowledge sources by improving cooperation networks and firms R&D
patterns, in order to reduce the coordination costs that curb R&D cooperation. Second,
from our analysis of the effectiveness of eco-innovation, and its impact on firm performance,
well designed environmental regulations are essential. The actual policy mix needs to be
complex and dynamic, to reach a win-win situation and well designed environmental policies
should include a combination of different policy instruments. Hence, government policies
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targeting on boosting eco-innovations need to be supported by correctly aligned regulatory
frameworks which comprise various market-based instruments for pollution abatement.
Overall, with the presence of sector heterogeneity, eco-innovation requires more support
from well designed and targeted environmental regulations which would provide incentives
to firms to engage in eco-innovation by using a mixture of various market-based instruments.
Limitations
Although the empirical results presented in this thesis have been subject to a number of
robustness checks, our study sill suffers from several potential limitations. One of the po-
tential concerns arises from the data used to perform the empirical analysis. For instance,
although the R&D data used in chapters provides a good representation of the innovation
activities carried out by French firms, unfortunately it is only available for a relatively
small group of French innovators, offering complete coverage of large innovators but only a
partial representation of firms investing less than 350,000 Euros which are randomly sur-
veyed every year. Also, the R&D data provides detailed information on the environment
related R&D within internal R&D investment, whereas the decomposition of external R&D
cooperation is not available. Furthermore, another limitation of the data regards the time
period. The relatively short period of the panel data causes some concerns regarding the
generalisability of the findings.
Moreover, another concern arises from the absence of consideration of knowledge spillover
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effect. R&D is different from other inputs that the amount of R&D spent in one firm
can have spillover effects on other firms in the same industry, firms in other industries
and both within the domestic economy (domestic spillovers) and abroad (foreign spillover).
Hence, while measuring the returns to R&D one needs to consolidate the benefits that flow
through these different channels. Without considering the R&D spillover effect, our results
may suffer from the omitted variable bias.
Also, another limitation comes from the way we calculate the CO2 emissions intensity. Since
we generate the CO2 emissions intensity by multiplying each fuel consumption type by an
emissions converter, this variable only provides limited information on carbon emissions
instead of all other types of pollutants emitted during the production process. However,
eco-innovation may not be only focusing on reducing carbon emissions. This could poten-
tially under estimate the effect of eco-innovation on environmental protection.
Another concern arises from the estimation methodology applied in this thesis due to the
issue of endogeneity which could potentially affect our results. For example, we have
discussed the lobby effect on environmental regulation which may cause inherent bias.
Pressure from anti-environmental lobbies could make policymakers reluctant to implement
more stringent environmental policies that could protect the environment and result in eco-
nomic benefits. The endogenous political decisions could potentially weaken our results.
Also, since we only innovators are considered in our empirical analysis, another endogene-
ity concern comes from the selection bias in which the firms invested in eco-innovation are
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endogenously different from those which have not been investing in innovation at all.
In this thesis, we have implemented a number of econometric techniques to account for
different endogeneity concerns and we have demonstrated the robustness of our results
using a number of alternative approaches. We hope that through implementation of vari-
ous econometric techniques, our results reflect the actual effect of eco-innovation. However
our analysis might still be affected by different sources of bias which are difficult to address.
Future Research
The results of this thesis provide some empirical evidence on eco-innovation, and can be
extended in a number of ways. First, besides using input measures such as environmental
R&D expenditure for eco-innovation, it would be interesting to consider output measures
such as the number of green patents or descriptions of ongoing individual innovations. Out-
put measures for eco-innovation explicitly give an indication of intellectual output can be
used to measure research activities and to study the direction of research in a given tech-
nological field. Combining input and output measures at the same time could identify to
what extent R&D investment can be transformed to successful patents which could bring
a more comprehensive understanding of eco-innovation.
Second, to investigate the effect of eco-innovation on firm performance would not be com-
plete without a comprehensive indication of government regulations. In this thesis, we use
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environment abatement costs to measure regulation stringency and it would be interesting
to bring in more elements reflecting the enforcement of environmental regulations, for ex-
ample, the number of inspections from environmental agency. An extensive study might
be needed to evaluate the relationship between joint effect of regulation enforcement and
regulation compliance on eco-innovation.
Third, this thesis has partially addressed the influence of international trade by consider-
ing export activities, it might be interesting to further investigate the relationship between
eco-innovation and other aspects of firms internationalization strategy. The link between
eco-innovation and trade patterns instead has been mostly neglected in the literature espe-
cially at the firms level, probably due to the lack of data availability. Such a study might
be particularly useful in enhancing our understanding on how do firms shift their trade
patterns to cope with eco-innovation strategies.
Last by not least, it would be interesting to decompose public R&D funding into different
aspects. In this thesis, we do not find evidence supporting the impact of pubic funding on
eco-innovation. The French public sector invests significant public resources to R&D ac-
tivities every year, and benefit from advanced high-tech industries, pro-active government
policies and high quality research institutions. It would be particularly useful to evaluate
the effectiveness of dis-aggregated public support in enhancing eco-innovation development,
in terms of the output of R&D activities supported by public authorities targeting on en-
vironmental protection.
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